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Introduction 
For many of those who supported the United Nations at its inception, social justice and 
economic advancement were as important to international harmony as the prevention or war. 
Today, these needs are no less a concern, even if the realities of population growth, under-
development, under-investment, and a world still riven by inequality might lead us to question 
just how far we have come. 
The picture is by no means entirely negative, however, and the international refugee regime 
demonstrates good evidence of co-operation, of solutions found and protection ensured; of 
progress, of a substantial degree of resilience, a solid historical base in the practice of States, 
and the capacity to evolve. We do move on, and even if that does not necessarily lead to 
progress in all things, it may mean that certain issues are now more clearly delineated, and that 
we can look to the future with a measure more confidence. 
Of course, like so much of the law which regulates relations between States and their conduct 
towards individuals, certain elements remain contested. Whether the regime can respond 
effectively to today’s challenges may be doubted, for much depends on political will among 
States; and on a quality of leadership and vision seen before, but which today seems only too 
lacking. 
Still, it helps to look to the past. International lawyers do that a lot, seeking patterns of 
behaviour which, in their turn, may herald the emergence or consolidation of a customary rule 
of law and the sense of an obligation. But we also look to the past empathetically, to gain 
understanding of how earlier, not so dissimilar situations were encountered, how they were 
perceived and analysed, and how they were met. It is not that history repeats itself, or can be 
made to repeat itself; or that what worked then, must necessarily work now. It is simply that 
there are lessons to be learned and mistakes to be avoided. 
1. International refugee law yesterday 
So let’s go back to the beginning, and see how the history of international refugee law closely 
parallels the modern history of international law and organisation. 
It all began at a meeting in Paris in February 1921. Gustave Ador, then President of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), met with the President of the Council of the 
League of Nations, and brought up the urgent problem of several hundred thousand Russian 
refugees then adrift in Europe and elsewhere – adrift and without protection, written off by 
their country of origin, with no prospect of settling locally, of finding employment, let alone 
of moving on to other countries. The ICRC and the League of Red Cross Societies took up the 
challenge of relief, with considerable assistance from the American Red Cross and the 
International ‘Save the Children’ Union.  But relief was not enough, the resources of voluntary 
organisations were rapidly diminishing, and something had to be done with regard to legal 
status, employment and emigration. There was no better organisation than the League, argued 
the ICRC, to look into the issues, and only the League was in a position to surmount the political 
and social difficulties and come up with solutions.  
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In a letter on 15 June 1921 to the President of the Council of the League, Gustave Ador urged 
it to take the necessary action. The Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, sounded out 
governments on what to do, and many responded positively, favouring both ‘a general 
organisation under the auspices of the League’, and a High Commissioner – someone with 
personal authority, able to secure the necessary support from governments, to influence non-
governmental organisations and gain their respect. Such a High Commissioner would define 
the legal status of the refugees, organise their repatriation or allocation to other States, find 
them productive employment (a recurring theme) and, together with philanthropic 
organisations, undertake relief work. This would cost money, of course, and although it was 
briefly considered that ‘funds belonging to former Russian Governments, ... at present 
deposited in various countries’ might be used, nothing came of the idea. 
A conference duly took place in Geneva from 22-25 August 1921. The Norwegian, Fridtjof 
Nansen was proposed as High Commissioner – he had already worked on famine relief in 
Russia and on the repatriation of former prisoners of war – and a telegram was sent off. On 1 
September, he replied by letter, accepting the post, and at once began the search for solutions. 
One of the first problems was that of Russian refugees in Constantinople, many of them now 
‘absolutely without resources’. For them, as for others, Nansen saw answer as settling them ‘in 
productive employment in countries where they will not become a charge on the public funds’. 
He set about finding opportunities, the governments of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia stepped 
up, and Nansen then turned to organising transport, visas and transit. 
A year later, he was able to report that funds had also been provided by Member States and by 
the American Relief Association for the ‘evacuation’ (we would now say ‘resettlement’) of 
Russian refugees from Constantinople, with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State also assisting. In the 
meantime, of course, Nansen had secured the agreement of governments under the 
Arrangement of 5 July 1922 to issue identify certificates to Russian refugees – a simple 
administrative step which was highly instrumental in their ultimately finding solutions. Almost 
all League members adopted the system, together with Germany, a non-member. 
He also called attention to issues which even then were of critical concern, just as they are 
today. He noted the ‘exceedingly unhappy situation of Russian refugee children’, and that some 
140,000 refugee children were estimated to be in Europe. An orphanage was transferred in toto 
from Constantinople to Belgium, while other groups of children were evacuated to France and 
Bulgaria, special provision being made for their education. 
No less in need of special attention were refugee invalids, and refugees in the Far East, 
including problematic numbers in China who had been engaged in military activities in their 
home country. He intervened with Romania to prevent the threatened expulsion, for ‘military 
reasons’, of some 10,000 Russians who had lost their nationality and who could only return to 
their country, ‘at a grave personal risk’. Mass expulsion was averted, although on condition 
that interested organisations make arrangements, ‘for their satisfactory evacuation elsewhere’. 
Similar issues arose in Poland, which proposed the expulsion of all ‘non-political refugees’. 
The High Commissioner again intervened, noting that many had lost their Russian nationality 
and would not have been allowed to return in any event. ‘Resettlement’ opportunities were 
negotiated with the United States, even as discussions were initiated with the Soviets on the 
repatriation of those wishing to return. 
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When we think of the cardinal principle of non-refoulement today – the rule which prohibits 
the return of the refugee to wherever he or she may run the risk of persecution – we tend to 
look back no farther than the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, or perhaps 
to the 1933 Convention on the International Status of Refugees. But the idea, the principle, was 
already implicit in the doctrine of refugee protection and assistance in the 1920s. The League 
and the ICRC both accepted that, if refugees were to return to Russia, then this would need to 
be accompanied by assurances of the ‘most elementary security and the prospects of conditions 
at least as favourable as those under which they are now living’. Even in the absence of any 
explicit treaty provision, Nansen felt able to intervene with States to stop the threatened return 
of refugees. 
In the League’s attention to the situation of Russian refugees (soon joined by other groups and 
categories), we can see protection against forcible return and other emerging principles at work 
– recognition of responsibility to assist countries of first refuge; acceptance of the importance 
of a set of solutions to be promoted with and by States, including emigration (but with that 
emphasis always on ‘productive employment’), and special measures for vulnerable groups; 
and recognition of the value of identity certificates, followed rapidly by the refugee passport. 
The numbers of refugees in Europe always exceeded the 800,000 or so Russian refugees to 
which reference is often made, and other categories likely brought the figure to 3 million, if 
not more. In 1923, Armenians were added to the High Commissioner’s mandate, followed by 
Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldeans and Turkish refugees in 1928. Although each of these later 
groups was seen to share certain common characteristics – the refugee was outside his or her 
country of origin, no longer enjoyed its protection, and had not acquired the protection of 
another – States preferred an ad hoc, group by group approach, seeking to limit their 
commitments to known categories and staying away from any general description of unknown 
quantity. However, this was not Nansen’s view. On the contrary, as Louise Holborn noted, he 
believed that long-range plans, ‘carefully conceived and carried through would prove not only 
far more successful but much less costly than the relief and piecemeal efforts being made’. 
In 1930, Fridtjof Nansen died. No new High Commissioner was appointed at the time, but the 
functions and responsibilities were transferred to a new office, named in his honour. In October 
1933, as the Nansen Office itself was on the point of winding up and on the eve of a decade or 
so of devastating displacements, a diplomatic conference was convened in Geneva to draft a 
convention on the legal status of the refugee, and to promote the principle of equal treatment 
with nationals. It was to be the first occasion in which the principle of non-refoulement was 
mentioned in an international agreement, in which limitations on expulsion were mooted, and 
in which access to education was seen as essential to equality.  
More significant, perhaps, was the emphasis which delegates gave to national interests, 
particularly in the case of the so-called front-line States. For Poland, the refugee question 
looked quite different than for those countries more distant, where refugees arrived only after 
having passed through a sort of filter. Similarly, when the question of putting return clauses on 
Nansen certificates came to be discussed, together with whether refugees should be allowed to 
go back unhindered to the country of issue, the interventions of those days sound all too 
familiar, especially when placed alongside current proposals for revision of the Dublin scheme 
and the ‘common European asylum system’. Austria, for example, wanted to consider each 
potential readmission on a case by case basis. Finland thought that frontline receiving States 
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deserved special attention, and that no one could think of obliging such States to readmit every 
refugee who had ever stayed there. Greece, too, said that a refugee’s departure was considered 
definitive, and Poland was of much the same view. The 1933 Conference wound down to its 
conclusion with little apparent enthusiasm. Only three States signed on the day, and ultimately 
only eight States ratified the convention, three of them with substantial reservations and 
declarations.  
All the while, the flight from Nazism took hold. To their credit, in one small respect at least, 
States agreed that there should be a new High Commissioner responsible for Refugees (Jewish 
and other) coming from Germany, but formally outside the League owing to Germany’s 
continuing membership. James McDonald was appointed to the post, also in October 1933, and 
was tasked to ‘negotiate and direct’ the ‘international collaboration’ necessary to solve the, 
‘economic, financial and social problem of the refugees...’ It got worse. Doors were closed, the 
pressure grew, and while private organisations might do their best for the refugees, it was not 
enough just to help those who fled. Major efforts were needed to remove or mitigate the causes, 
and this, said McDonald in his December 1935 letter of resignation, was a political function 
and therefore the responsibility of the League itself, given the danger to international peace and 
security. 
By this time, however, the League was too weak to influence events. A new High 
Commissioner was appointed to succeed McDonald, with his mandate extended to refugees 
from Austria after the Anschluss in 1938; and a new organisation was created, the 
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, following the Evian conference that year. Events, 
however, rapidly took over. Notwithstanding the times, notwithstanding knowledge of events 
and of persecution and of flight, humanitarian responses were not the order of the day. On the 
contrary, refugees were seen as potential threats – to the economy, to social cohesion, to the 
process of ‘appeasement’. As Louise Holborn concluded in May 1939, the League had, 
‘... handicapped itself... first by always dealing with [refugee 
work] as a humanitarian question instead of treating it as a 
political one and striking at the root of the problem... by 
negotiations with the refugee-producing countries; and second 
by its unwillingness to commit itself to long-range plans.’ 
It is ironic that the architecture of international law and organisation set up for refugees in the 
new era of the United Nations did little at the time to engage with these concerns. To this day, 
causes remain a fundamental challenge to a community of States and to an organisation 
premised on non-intervention, while the seductive but illusory pull of ‘temporariness’ 
continues to influence policies and practices at both national and international level. 
2. International refugee law today 
When States finally came together in the new United Nations, refugees were high on the 
agenda. In its first London session in February 1946, the General Assembly identified three 
principles which had already figured in League of Nations doctrine, but which now acquired 
new salience: first, that the refugee problem was international in character; second, that there 
should be no forced return of those with valid objections to going back to their country; and 
third that, subject to this consideration, repatriation should be promoted and facilitated. While 
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the UN necessarily built on what had gone before, there was one major, significant difference. 
With the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the individual was 
now clearly in the frame; and while sovereignty and non-interference might continue their role, 
the movement of refugees between States and the entitlement of refugees to protection was 
clearly a matter of international law. 
The Constitution of the UN’s first agency, the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), was 
adopted in December 1946, and focussed on finding solutions for those displaced by the Second 
World War and by contemporaneous political developments. Co-operation was as limited as it 
had been in the time of the League, even though a reading of the Article 1 of the United Nations 
Charter might have hinted at something stronger. Recent developments, even within such a 
supposedly well-integrated regional organisation as the European Union, have shown only too 
well how difficult it is to distil the principle of co-operation into practical results. Self-interest 
remains at the heart of the matter, and action in pursuit of solutions for refugees depends, as it 
always has done, on the formal consent of States, staggering from one crisis to another. 
The IRO’s successes and failures cannot be separated from its political context. On the one 
hand, it undertook comprehensive resettlement activities, but on the other, it was expensive, 
consistently criticised by the eastern bloc and, for some of its western supporters, unsuited to 
broader political purposes. Even though there were then some fifty-four members of the United 
Nations, only eighteen joined the organisation and contributed to its programmes, either 
financially or with commitments to the resettlement of Europe’s refugees and displaced. 
Alternatives were debated in the Third Committee and the Economic and Social Council in the 
late 1940s, and States agreed that the IRO should be replaced by a non-operational subsidiary 
organ of the General Assembly, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), whose work would by ‘complemented’ by a new convention on the status 
of refugees. UNHCR, which came into being on 1 January 1951, was formally entrusted with 
responsibility to provide international protection and, together with governments, to seek 
permanent solutions for the problem of refugees. But its work was also to be ‘humanitarian’ 
and ‘non-political’ and, as with the League, prevention and causes were none of its business. 
In addition, when States came to draft the 1951 Convention, they expressly declined to write 
in specific obligations on co-operation, which the then UN Secretary-General saw as crucial to 
an effective regime. His suggestion for an article on burden-sharing was rejected, as was his 
proposal that States give ‘favourable consideration’ to admitting refugees. It is precisely in 
these areas – causes and co-operation – that the international refugee regime reveals its 
incompleteness, and this helps to explain many, if not all, of the actions taken by States, 
particularly unilaterally, and of the concerns which many also share. 
Although the occasional official or politician may complain that the 1951 Convention is 
unsuited for today’s conditions and call for an overhaul of the legal framework, they are 
generally hard pushed to say what exactly is wrong. There is a debate here, which is worth 
having. Perhaps the refugee definition is not wide enough and it should be re-drawn to embrace 
more clearly the ‘new’ categories of displaced? Or perhaps the principle of family unity should 
be moved from the Final Act into the body of the Convention? That does not seem to be what 
they want, but neither do the proponents of ‘reform’ seem inclined to challenge the core 
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meaning of protection, and to demand the power to send people back to where they will be at 
risk of death, persecution, torture, or other serious violations of their human rights. 
There are still undoubted strengths in international refugee law, as it has evolved in practice 
and in the institutions set up by States. The 1951 Convention and its ‘updating’ 1967 Protocol 
are now complemented by regional arrangements in Africa, Central America and Europe. The 
protection of refugees has itself evolved and been strengthened by developments in the general 
field of human rights, while the principle of non-refoulement is manifestly one of customary 
international law. 
International refugee law is a dynamic regime, a matter of what is written, what is done, what 
is expected. It is an international regime, in that it links a treaty concluded under the auspices 
of the United Nations, to an agency – a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly accepted by 
States both as partner and supervisory mechanism; and then to a forum of States, the UNHCR 
Executive Committee. 
In practice, the links are more extensive still. UNHCR’s staff of 9,000 plus operate, and inter-
operate with States at the official level, in 125 countries world-wide. UNHCR will often be 
involved when refugee status decision-making authorities seek to apply international criteria 
to the disparate facts of individual lives. Whenever and wherever people arrive in search of 
protection, whether or not in large numbers, it is UNHCR’s responsibility to provide protection, 
that is, to intercede with governments, if necessary, to ensure that those in need are identified 
and treated accordingly. UNHCR may not have the authority to bind States or to interpret legal 
matters with final effect, but the role with which it has been entrusted by States means that its 
views must be considered in good faith, and justifiable reasons given for disagreement. In such 
contexts, national and international officials are engaged in common cause, as indeed they have 
been, if not since time immemorial, then at least since 1921. 
The essence of refugee protection today can be stated quite simply. The refugee is someone 
whose status is defined and recognised by international law, both under treaty and as a matter 
of customary international law. He or she does have a right to seek asylum, and the search for 
refuge is not a criminal act from an international law perspective, whatever States may pretend. 
It follows that refugees in search of protection are not to be penalised because of their illegal 
entry or presence, and that each claim must be examined on its merits; in this context, the 
precise standard of international due process may be a work in progress, but the essentials are 
emerging in the practice of States and in light of overarching principles of human rights. 
Above all, as over ninety years of sufficiently conforming practice have confirmed, the refugee 
must not be refouled. There are gaps and grey areas which States can exploit in their own 
interest – the gap between non-refoulement and asylum, for example, which human rights is 
seeking to bridge; or the gap between primary obligations and responsibility when it comes to 
identifying which State or group of States should protect and assist. But the core is clear, and 
at the risk of simplifying a complex scenario, the outlines of the scheme of protection are self-
evident in those primary rules which lay down the parameters for State action, indicating the 
limits beyond which the State cannot go without incurring responsibility for its actions. 
The fundamental rules of the international refugee regime are primary in the sense that, unless 
there are very exceptional circumstances, they can override or trump other important interests, 
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commonly expressed in terms of sovereign powers. They change the picture, they lay down the 
conditions for subsequent State conduct (not to return a refugee to where he or she may be 
persecuted; not to penalize a refugee by reason of illegal entry; to deal with a person as a 
refugee, and within the framework of protection, co-operation and solutions provided by 
international law and its institutions). Such primary rules do not necessarily provide solutions 
for every resulting problem, but they are the essential juridical basis – the framework – from 
which ‘subsidiary’ rules will take their normative and constructive force. 
Refugees, for example, commonly use the same means of travel and entry as irregular and 
undocumented migrants. What States do to combat smuggling and trafficking has a major 
impact on refugee protection, and here the primary rules emphasise the clear distinctions to be 
made between refugees and those not in need of international protection, who fall under other 
legal regimes. It is in the very process of making such distinctions that the key to appropriate 
solutions is found, whether within the field of international refugee law or of international law 
at large. 
The challenges today lie precisely at the intersection between the implementation of 
international protection obligations, on the one hand; and the orderly and humane management 
generally of the movement of people between States, on the other. 
3. International refugee law tomorrow? 
Does international refugee law, with all its constraints on States’ freedom of action, have a 
future? Certainly, the present international community of independent ‘sovereign’ States will 
continue, and people will continue to move between States in search of refuge and livelihood 
opportunities. As States look for solutions, history and practice suggest that perceptions of self-
interest will continue to influence policy and their readiness to co-operate with others. At the 
same time, with an eye on the goal of mitigating the necessity for flight, some States will 
increasingly call for a review of those aspects of ‘sovereignty’ which are obstacles to 
humanitarian action: the unrealised potential of the ‘responsibility to protect’ may yet come 
into its own. 
Clearly, international refugee law will have to find its place in a world of increasing 
international migration, in a highly globalised and securitised political and economic context. 
Although the differences are readily explicable in the abstract, there is no clear bright line 
between the refugee and the economic migrant, no matter what the UNHCR Handbook may 
wish. But that is not so much a problem, as an urgent invitation finally to introduce a workable 
international legal framework for the governance of migration and for the protection of the 
rights of migrants, irrespective of their status. 
In 1946, the General Assembly recognised that the refugee problem was international in scope 
and nature, by which it meant that no one State should be expected or required to shoulder 
responsibility on its own. Even as States have attempted, and continue to attempt, to assert 
unbound unilateral sovereign competence in such matters, it is now evident that the multiple 
and multi-dimensional interests of States require international co-operation for their realisation, 
and that this, in turn, will require States to deal with one another – States of origin, States of 
transit, States of intended or eventual destination – on a basis of equality and equity. 
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3.1 A European perspective 
The recent and ongoing crisis in Europe has exposed the illusion that there was much ‘common’ 
in the so-called ‘Common European Asylum System’. Bearing in mind the principles of 
solidarity, co-operation and fair sharing of responsibility, one can see that ‘expectations’ of 
Greece’s ability to manage the EU’s external borders were never well-founded; it was just 
wishful thinking, as it is also with regard to other Member States who have faced large numbers 
of refugees and asylum seekers. 
As many have emphasised, the only way to get into the EU as a refugee is, in fact, irregularly. 
While the EU has institutionalised a broader protection base for those who get there 
(Convention refugee status, subsidiary protection, humanitarian grounds), it has remained more 
or less closed to applications ‘from outside’. Hence the advocacy, over many years, for opening 
up avenues for legal admission by refugees presently in non-EU countries, including 
humanitarian visas, more generous family reunion, study opportunities, and the like; the 
response has been mainly rhetorical, not substantive. 
Recent events have showed also the critical need for immediate shelter and assistance for those 
on the move, no less than for support so that transit and receiving States can provide reception 
facilities and a measure of control and organisation, both for better management and to bring 
assurance to those on the move and the communities through which they pass or where they 
remain. Such first steps are crucial, not only to avoid inhumane and degrading conditions 
contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter, but also to open 
the way to considered and defensible evaluations of overall protection needs, and to engage in 
the essential processes of identification and security assessment. 
A co-ordinated, collaborative European response could help to avert a future race to engage in 
border closures, summary denial of entry and removals inconsistent with EU and international 
law, or which pass on an insupportable burden to ‘front-line’ EU and non-EU States. In 
addition, well-structured, co-ordinated and organised reception can and should be the pathway 
to protection decision-making, whether on a group or individual basis. 
A truly communitarian response would put fairness front and centre. What is needed, is for 
responsibility for determining protection claims to be transferred from the national to the EU 
level. For there will be no end to chaos and fragmentation unless refugee reception and status 
determination are truly Europeanised, with decision-making by a European body competent to 
fulfil collectively the individual obligations of Member States and the policy and protection 
goals of the EU. 
3.2 An international perspective 
International law is not itself a ‘solution’ to the problem of refugees and the challenges 
produced by migratory flows, but it can be a facilitator and a guide to the principled 
effectiveness of measures which States may take or contemplate. In this sense, it offers a 
framework and the goals by which to judge the viability of process and the quality of success, 
if any. International law thus conditions the sovereignty dimension, particularly when 
considered within the institutional context of the United Nations. 
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Despite the General Assembly’s 2003 decision to put UNHCR’s mandate on a permanent 
footing (‘until the refugee problem is solved’), nothing much else has changed – States continue 
to see the refugee problem as essentially ‘temporary’ in nature. This might be thought 
encouragingly optimistic, and evidence of their intent and willingness to ensure that solutions 
to forced migration will be quickly forthcoming, and that no refugee situation should become 
protracted through time. The consequence, however, is that States remain unwilling to commit 
themselves to humanitarian and protection realities without limit of time. 
The idea that refugee situations are ‘temporary’ has a certain seductive appeal, despite the 
multiple lessons of history. What we do know, is that refugees will move, from persecution 
and conflict to places of refuge, and from places of uncertain or strained refuge, to places of 
actual or perceived greater security. The fact that we will not know exactly how many is itself 
reason enough to put institutionalised mechanisms of mutual support into place, recognising 
also that there is no working or workable conception of the ‘temporary’ (as a predictive tool), 
which allows or justifies the muddle-headed, short-sighted, often quite mean-spirited policy 
and legislative proposals which have emerged from the dark side in recent months. Looking at 
the broader issues raised by an increasingly mobile world in which, too often, those on the 
move are left adrift, abused, and without protection, novel, long-range thinking is clearly called 
for, much as Nansen and McDonald thought in earlier times, even if on somewhat different 
issues. 
The UN Secretary-General has urged States to commit to upholding safety and dignity in large 
movements of both refugees and migrants, to commit to a Global Compact on responsibility 
sharing for refugees and migrants, and to commit to a Global Compact for safe, regular and 
orderly migration. The ‘New York Declaration’, adopted on 19 September 2016 by Heads of 
State and Government meeting in the General Assembly is full of fine words, very fine words, 
recognizing that the world is a better place for the contribution made by migrants, and re-
affirming that the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status, are to be 
protected. It acknowledges finally that large-scale movements are such that no one State can 
manage them on its own, and that greater co-operation is called for if lives are to be saved, root 
causes addressed, and prevention and mediation of conflict promoted. It proposes a number of 
‘commitments’, which include working to address root causes, to prevent or resolve conflict, 
and to promote human rights. The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol remain the 
‘foundation’ of the international refugee protection regime, in which human rights and 
humanitarian law also play their part, and in which there needs to be ‘a more equitable sharing 
of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees’. 
The proposed ‘Comprehensive refugee response framework’ offers an outline for the future, 
regarding reception and admission, meeting immediate and ongoing needs, supporting host 
countries and communities, and working towards durable solutions. The primary goal remains 
return to countries of origin, with legal stay in host States in the interim and an emphasis on 
measures to foster self-reliance. Third States are then encouraged to make available or expand 
resettlement opportunities and what are now called ‘complementary pathways for admission’. 
But this, and the rest, remains just an outline. It is not the ‘Global Compact’ that the Secretary-
General hoped for – that is postponed to 2018; rather, it is a pilot project, a scheme for action 
to be pursued by UNHCR and States, to see how it all works out. Does it add anything to what 
is already in place and what is already being done? That seems doubtful; its value for the 
moment may lie in its calling attention, once again, to the need for a ‘comprehensive’ approach. 
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Next, the Declaration proposes a number of steps, ‘Towards a global compact for safe, orderly 
and regular migration’; this, too, is a work in progress, with 2018 also as the intended dateline. 
Once again, this is to be a process of intergovernmental negotiations, and considerably more 
time and effort will be required to bring States to any sort of consensus on such contested 
questions. At this stage, the proposals do little more than highlight issues and identify ‘actors’, 
including the Special Representative of the Secretary General for International Migration, the 
International Labour Organisation, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the 
International Organization for Migration. The effective protection of migrant rights, however, 
remains to be included, developed and placed on a more effective and credible institutional 
base. 
4. Alternative ways and other things to do 
There is still much to be done at the international level, over, above and beyond the New York 
Declaration. Among others, the competencies of the Security Council and the UN Secretary-
General should be revisited seriously and urgently, with a view to anticipating crisis, acting to 
mediate and prevent conflict, and moving to counteract the necessity for flight, for example, 
through effectively operationalised ‘safe zones’. 
What we know, and what we keep re-learning, is that if security against displacement by 
conflict is not provided, and if security conditions in countries of first refugee, fall short of 
providing assistance, livelihood, education and at least some opportunity, then refugees will 
continue both to flee and to keep moving. That is the lesson of experience, after experience, 
after experience. 
Another lesson from history has been the disinclination on the part of States to place refugee 
and humanitarian funding on a more secure basis. Alternatives have certainly been debated – 
the International Finance Facility, for example, back in 2005 – but effective planning and costs 
management demand at least a proportion of guaranteed funds. Perhaps some use might also 
be made of the frozen assets of States responsible for refugee and forced migration and 
population displacement, with the Security Council and/or States, acting through regional and 
related organisations, using sanctions and related competencies to free up funds for 
humanitarian assistance. 
If there is one weakness in the regime established by the 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refuges, it is in the failure of these instruments to establish clearly 
which State should be responsible for determining claims to protection; and which State or 
States should contribute to relieving countries of first asylum, and how. The resulting ‘legal 
hole’, has not been resolved through the political mechanisms of the regime at large, for 
example, in the now 98 Member State Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme. Here, 
international experience in environmental protection may offer a model, and an opportunity to 
investigate the possibility of States committing to an outline instrument, a framework 
convention for durable solutions, setting out certain objectives to which they would agree in 
principle, while leaving a measure of discretion in the implementation of those agreed 
objectives. In this way, specific targets and detailed rules (if needed) could be addressed in a 
separate protocol, oriented to context and particular circumstances. A framework convention 
could thus strengthen the basics, while allowing specific challenges to be dealt with by groups 
of States contoured more precisely by shared national or regional interests, proximity, alliance, 
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and the like. The key to such an approach would be to institutionalise a permanent ‘steering 
group’ within the treaty regime, competent to call a meeting of States party and to set the 
agenda; the UNHCR Executive Committee might be the place. 
Keeping asylum ‘alive’ means matching it also with viable migration management. States have 
long resisted the ‘internationalisation’ of migration at large, and the results have been 
ineffective and inefficient, on the one hand, and insecurity and human rights violations, on the 
other. No international agency is yet responsible for the protection of forced migrants, and for 
working with governments to find solutions or improve arrangements for those outside their 
country, who may not fit within traditional categories. Change is urgently needed, on both 
fronts. 
Over the years, the UN General Assembly has expressly affirmed that UNHCR’s 1950 mandate 
extends beyond its original terms, and that it also includes stateless persons, the internally 
displaced, and others ‘of concern’. This does not lead to new obligations on States additional 
to those to which they have consented by becoming party to treaties, or which are applicable 
under customary international law, but it does help to contextualise issues like protection in an 
operational sense. There has always been a disjuncture in practice, and a certain tension, 
between the institutional responsibilities of UNHCR, the obligations of States, and their 
‘sovereign’ interests – this is part of what makes international refugee law such a dynamic 
system. 
A number of radical, institutional changes could enable the international system to develop and 
maintain capacity to respond effectively to today’s population displacements and to those 
which, inevitably, will follow. A first necessary step in ‘nudging’ the regime towards greater 
equity and more effectiveness is to ‘internationalise’ certain key migration issues, in particular, 
by providing for the protection or better protection of those moving between States who have 
no claim to enter or remain, but who are effectively adrift, exploited, detained, abused, and 
worse. This would not only improve the situation of countless individuals and families, but 
would also better serve the interests, including the security interests, of States, and constitute 
an important step towards better management. 
This can be achieved not by a new treaty, which is unlikely today, but by an imaginative use 
of existing institutions engaging with practical matters – in this case, by having the UN General 
Assembly revise the UNHCR Statute for the twenty-first century. Revision is needed in any 
case, both to do away with historical anomalies and redundancies, but more particularly, to 
reflect changes already made and to bring in new tasks that call for the application of UNHCR’s 
extensive and unique protection and assistance experience. In short, the organisation’s mandate 
should expressly encompass refugees, stateless persons, the internally displaced, and migrants 
or those otherwise displaced, who are without or in need of protection. 
This is just a beginning, but it could offer States an established and accepted partner, capable 
of operating across the whole spectrum of the movement of people between States; open up 
possibilities for future developments, for example, in standard-setting and strengthening 
regional opportunities; and keep human rights and protection front and centre in debate, policy 
and practice. 
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The basic rules of international refugee law are well-understood, and they do condition action 
and reaction. Related areas, however, are not so well regulated and regime gaps, both universal 
and regional, are readily exploited. There is a great need for leadership, joined up thinking, 
structural change, and UNHCR could take the lead – institutional responsibility can be 
extended and enhanced, while States can be left to watch and learn until such time as they are 
ready and able to take on more in the way of obligation. 
 
  
 17 
 
Bibliography 
 
League of Nations 
 
‘The question of the Russian refugees’, Report presented by M. Hanotaux, French 
representative, and adopted by the Council on June 27th, 1921: LoN doc. C.133(b). 
M.131.1921.VII. 
 
‘Russian Refugees’, Development of the question since the last meeting of the Council. 
Memorandum by the Secretary-General and resolution adopted by the Council on September 
2nd, 1921: LoN doc. C.292.(a) 1921. VII. 
 
‘Russian Refugees’, Acceptance by Dr Nansen of the Post of High Commissioner, 12 
September 1921: LoN doc. C.337. 239. 1921. 
 
‘Russian Refugees’, Further Communications completing Council Document No. C. 126. 
M.72. 1921. VII. 
 
‘Russian Refugees’, Report by Dr Nansen submitted to the Council on September 1st, 1922: 
LoN doc. C.602. M.360. 1922. 
 
‘Russian Refugees in Constantinople’, Note by the Secretary-General, 25th November, 1922: 
LoN doc. C.743. M.453. 1922. 
 
‘Russian Refugees’, Report by Dr Nansen, Official Journal, Extract No. 19: LoN doc. C.373. 
1923. 
 
‘Refugee Questions’, Memorandum by Dr Nansen: LoN doc. C.553. 1924. XIII. 
 
‘Resignation of Mr. James McDonald, High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) 
from Germany. Note by the Secretary-General’, 7 January 1936: LoN doc. 
C.13.M.12.1936.XII. 
 
United Nations 
 
United Nations, ‘In safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugees and migrants’, 
Report of the Secretary-General: UN doc. A/70/59, 21 April 2016 
 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/1, ‘New York Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants’, 19 September 2016 
 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 428 (V), 14 December 1950 
 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 62(I) I-II, ‘Constitution of the International 
Refugee Organization, and Agreement on interim measures to be taken in respect of refugees 
and displaced persons’, 15 December 1946 
 18 
 
 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 8(I), ‘Question of refugees’, 12 February 1946 
 
United Nations Security Council resolution 688 (1991), 5 April 1991 
 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
 
‘Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015’, Geneva: UNHCR, 20 June, 2016, 20: 
http://www.unhcr.org/statistics 
 
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva: UNHCR, 1979; 
reissued 2011 (paragraphs 62-4): http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html  
 
International Law Commission 
 
Report of the International Law Commission, 64th Sess., A/71/10, 2016, chap. IV, ‘Protection 
of persons in the event of disasters’ (draft articles and commentaries)  
 
Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission, ‘Eighth report 
on the protection of persons in the event of disasters’: UN doc. A/CN.4/697, 17 March 2016 
 
European Union 
 
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), Brussels, 4.5.2016 
COM(2016) 270 final 2016/0133 (COD) 
 
European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council, Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing 
Legal Avenues to Europe’: Brussels, 6.4.2016, COM(2016) 197 final 
 
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal 
Avenues to Europe, Brussels, 6.4.2016, COM(2016) 197 final 
 
European Commission, Recommendation of 11.1.2016 for a voluntary humanitarian admission 
scheme with Turkey: doc. 15428/15, 14 January 2016 
 
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a  
third-country national or a stateless person (recast), Official Journal of the European Union, L 
180/31, 29.6.2013 
 19 
 
 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, 
2012/C 326/02 
Literature and comment 
 
Daniel Bodansky, ‘A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future UN Climate Change 
Regime’, (2011) 43 Arizona State Law Journal 697 
 
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants: Downhill All 
the Way?’, Lecture at the Graduate Institute, Geneva, 21 November 2016 
 
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Movements of People between States in the 21st Century: An 
Agenda for Urgent Institutional Change’, (2016) 28 International Journal of Refugee Law 679-
94 
 
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Mediterranean Papers: Athens, Naples and Istanbul’, (2016) 28 
International Journal of Refugee Law 276-309: 
http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/content/28/2/276.full.pdf+html  
 
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Politics of Refugee Protection’, (2008) 27 Refugee Survey 
Quarterly 8-23 
 
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Selim Can Sazak, ‘Footing the Bill: Refugee-Creating States’ 
Responsibility to Pay’, Foreign Affairs, 29 July 2015: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2015-07-29/footing-bill 
 
Louise W. Holborn, ‘The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem’, (1939) The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 203, 124-35 
 
Nele Matz-Lück, ‘Framework Conventions as a Regulatory Tool’, (2009) Goettingen Journal 
of International Law 1, 439-58 
 
Patrick Wall, ‘A New Link in the Chain: Could a Framework Convention for 
Refugee Responsibility Sharing extend the reach of the Protocol?’ (forthcoming in (2017) 29 
International Journal of Refugee Law) 
 
  
 20 
 
RLI Working Paper No. 17  
 
 
 
 
 
The Universal Asylum System and the 2016 New York Declaration: 
Towards an Improved ‘Global Compact’ on Refugees? 
 
Terje Einarsen and Marthe Engedahl (University of Bergen) 
(terje.einarsen@uib.no) 
(marthe.engedahl@student.uib.no) 
 
 
Abstract 
Refugee law and the international system for refugee protection have lately come under 
unprecedented strong pressure. The reason is a combination of historic high numbers of 
refugees and a declining will of politicians, governments and populations in many receiving 
states to publicly support the ideal and practice of refugee protection. Critical analysis of the 
current regime may however also present an opportunity for constructive reform. This paper 
discusses prerequisites for conditional reform of the present system for international refugee 
protection. The existing global system – termed the ‘universal asylum system’ – is fragmented, 
but at the same time its core legal structures are sound and the system as a whole is more 
coherent than often asserted. Extended global cooperation, in particular with a view to burden 
sharing and sharing of responsibility for refuge protection, seems to be necessary.  
The first phase of the debate has now come to end at the global level, by the adoption of the 
2016 New York Declaration. This potentially very important document reinforces worldwide 
political support for the existing legal and institutional structures. It also expresses a clear intent 
to move forward.  
After reviewing earlier successful cases of cooperation on a temporary or ad hoc basis, as well 
as suggestions for reform made by scholars, the picture emerges that the next step for the world 
community will be crucial. We believe that there is a need for new body – a ‘Global Compact’ 
institution – that should be empowered to calling new high-level conferences, if necessary, and 
making non-binding recommendations for concerted global initiatives on burden-sharing 
mechanisms and fair responsibility sharing among states and other stake-holders within a 
renewed universal refugee protection regime. We think that the earlier success of the Helsinki 
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Final Act, on peace and security and human rights protection, might serve as useful inspiration 
in this regard. 
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1 Introduction 
Refugee law and the international system for refugee protection have lately come under 
unprecedented strong pressure. The reason is a combination of historic high numbers of 
refugees and a declining will of politicians, governments and populations in many receiving 
states to publicly support the ideal and practice of refugee protection. Millions of refugees from 
Syria and the Middle East have tried to flee to Europe, while most refugees remain in the region 
or are internally displaced. Adding high numbers of refugees and asylum seekers from 
Afghanistan and several African countries, this has caused the perception of an acute global 
crisis, not only for effective refugee protection, but also for the international refugee regime. 
This development begs critical analysis of the current regime, but may also present an 
opportunity for constructive reform. 
A core question is whether the present refugee and asylum system is now ripe for termination 
or reinforcement, or rather whether the status quo should be maintained. For example, it has 
been suggested by some circles especially in social media debate and by some governmental 
representatives in public that the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
(henceforth ‘the 1951 Convention’) and its 1967 Protocol are out-dated and thus should be 
replaced with a ‘Quota System’ globally or regionally for European states. Well-intended as 
they might be, such radical proposals are neither desirable nor very realistic. Essentially, there 
are three main sustainable policy options for the world community, which are cumulative rather 
than alternative: 
a. Uphold the present system and make it more efficient and fair; 
b. Discuss new additional mechanisms for mass flight situations; 
c. Renew the focus on causes and responsibility for refugee movements.1 
Considering the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (adopted by consensus at 
the UN General Assembly, 19 September 20162) (henceforth the ‘New York Declaration’ or 
‘the Declaration’) it may seem as though the major choice between future termination or 
reinforcement of the system has already been made by the world community – fully in line 
with the first bullet point above.  
The more than 190 Heads of State and Government and other High Representatives present 
reaffirmed all the fundamental principles of the UN and global international law relating to 
refugees and migrants and expressed their intention to fully comply with them. Despite being 
a political declaration of collective intent and not a legally binding instrument, the importance 
                                                 
1 This article builds on views and ideas in Terje Einarsen, The Universal Asylum System: Towards Termination 
or Reinforcement? presented at 'The Future of Refugee Law', 1st Annual Conference, Refugee Law Initiative, 
University of London, 29 June – 1 July 2016. See Presentation Slides, available at http://www.sas.ac.uk/rli/annual-
conference/1st-annual-conference/annual-conference-poster-presentations. Marthe Engedahl has provided drafts 
for sections 3, 4. The authors would like to thank the reviewers for useful comments. 
2 United Nations, New York Declaration, Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants, 19/09/2016 
(including an annex on a comprehensive refugee response framework and another on a global compact for safe, 
orderly and regular migration), see https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/a_71_l1.pdf 
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of the Declaration for the future direction of global refugee protection should not be 
underestimated.  
In concise language, it was solemnly declared: 
We reaffirm the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. We 
reaffirm also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and recall the core 
international human rights treaties. We reaffirm, and will fully protect, the 
human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of their status; all are 
rights holders. Our response will demonstrate full respect for international 
law and international human rights law, and where applicable, international 
refugee law and international humanitarian law.3 
Furthermore, the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol is still being endorsed as “the 
foundation of the international refugee protection regime”.4 The current importance of their 
full and effective application by the respective states parties and the fundamental values they 
represent are recognised.5 Consequently, the somewhat hyped alternative of terminating the 
present system and replace it with something else must now be considered moot as 
incompatible with the New York Declaration.  
The New York Declaration emphasises the need to address the root causes of crisis situations 
caused by armed conflict, violence and terrorism, and the need to prevent or resolve conflict 
by peaceful means.6 In this context it is assumed that displacement could be reduced if all 
parties to armed conflict respected international humanitarian law.7 Apart from this factual 
assessment, it is significant to note that serious violations of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law ultimately forms part of international criminal law on individual 
responsibility for core universal crimes; including but not limited to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The Declaration is therefore closely aligned to the third bullet point above 
as well, although this part of the Declaration needs further elaboration in the processes ahead.  
What is developed more in the New York Declaration, though, is how the present refugee 
protection system could be made more efficient and fair through concerted and more 
streamlined efforts. Hence, the attached Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework 
(CRRF) outlines a fairly-structured and innovative way forward for the world community in 
its quest for enhanced refugee protection and fair sharing among states of burdens and 
responsibilities. It should lead to the adoption in 2018 of a new “Global Compact on refugees”.8 
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is entrusted an instrumental role in this 
process.9  
                                                 
3 Ibid., para. 5. 
4 Ibid., para. 65. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., para. 64. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., Annex I, Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, para. 17-19. 
9 The New York Declaration stipulates that UNHCR shall engage with states and consult with all relevant 
stakeholders over the coming two years, with a view to implementation of CRRF. In 2018, UNHCR shall submit 
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We agree fully with the spirit and objectives of the New York Declaration. The question is of 
course whether the CRRF and the forecasted ‘Global Compact’ will in fact lead to substantial 
progress in accordance with the aims.  
We would suggest that it is also an urgent matter to discuss what tools should be added to the 
existing toolkit of refugee protection mechanisms to facilitate fair and efficient responses to 
large movements of refugees and ensure the operation of a well-functioning global regime in 
the future. Hence academic (and media) attention should in our opinion now focus more on 
constructive contributions to the process ahead and critical assessments of what should be done 
– and how – to improve the system within the parameters set. With respect to those parameters, 
however, the research community should not necessarily interpret the New York Declaration 
and its annexes narrowly. In other words, the UNHCR-led process might be an opportunity 
also for discussing reinforcement of the current regime by means of complimentary 
mechanisms, pilot projects, or concrete application of the CRRF not necessarily envisaged by 
states or the UNHCR thus far. Such discussions require as a baseline a comprehensive 
understanding of the existent legal and institutional framework.  
In the following the core structures of the current system, which we may refer to as ‘the 
universal asylum system’, is first explained and linked to the New York Declaration (section 
2). In section 3, we recall certain models of international burden- and responsibility sharing in 
theory and practice, and in section 4 we discuss this platform of earlier knowledge with a view 
to a renewed ‘Global Compact’ on refugees. Some preliminary conclusions are finally drawn 
in section 5.  
2 The Universal Asylum System – Fragmented yet Coherent 
2.1  Legal Framework and Terminology 
This section takes stock of the core normative legal framework and the key international 
institutions like the UNHCR that comprise the essence of the current universal asylum system. 
The normative system is represented essentially by the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.  
However, the entire contemporary international and institutional system for the protection of 
refugees and assistance to refugee populations should be considered (see also sections 2.2-2.4).  
The current refugee regime has frequently been portrayed as fragmented, and limited in scope, 
often referring to the 1951 Convention’s refugee concept, which is partly also the reason why 
it has been challenged lately. In this section, we shall establish that, while the universal asylum 
system is quite fragmented with some notable shortcomings, it is also (reasonably) coherent as 
a universal protection system: one that is based on binding international law and proclaimed 
fundamental values and interests of the world community. Furthermore, the present system is 
not as limited as sometimes perceived, although it falls outside the capacity of this paper to 
provide full evidence in that regard.  
                                                 
a proposed Global Compact to the General Assembly, based on the CRRF and the outcomes on the consultation 
and evaluation process with states and other stakeholders. 
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In this paper, we have chosen to use the phrase the ‘universal asylum system’ to better capture 
the global nature of the system and the underlying the refugee problem, but otherwise it is used 
in a descriptive manner, synonymous with expressions such as the ‘international refugee 
regime’ or the ‘refugee protection system’. This is arguably thought provoking, since the 
concept of ‘asylum’ is not clearly defined in international law and is being used with different 
connotations.10 Notably, the concept of asylum may have a different content within different 
national jurisdictions. Asylum at the national level is often perceived as a legal institution 
encompassing the possibility of a formalised residence permit to be domestically granted to 
asylum-seekers recognised as refugees, and the notion may as well include the international 
and domestic legal effects of such permission.  
Under general international law, ‘asylum’ does not, however, entail a right for refugees to be 
granted a formalised national permission neither to enter a specific country nor to reside there. 
However, the notion of ‘asylum’ should not be abandoned internationally just because it may 
have a different legal content as compared to domestic law. On the contrary, independent 
lawyers may usefully underline the universality and lex lata character of certain aspects of 
asylum under current international law exactly when refugee law is under pressure, since a 
change of international obligations of states requires more than expressions of political 
viewpoints lex ferenda.11  
For this reason, it is important that the New York Declaration reaffirmed “respect for the 
institution of asylum and the right to seek asylum” […] [and] the fundamental principle of non-
refoulement in accordance with international refugee law”,12 as well as recognised more 
generally that “international refugee law, international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law provide the legal framework to strengthen the protection of refugees”.13 The 
statements form a concise and more concerted expression by high representatives of the world 
community than ever before; while the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol certainly 
remain the foundation of the international refugee protection regime, the legally binding 
international law framework clearly reaches beyond the treaty law obligations of the 148 states 
now parties to one or both of these instruments. Hence this paper posits a notion of an extended 
refugee protection regime, one which applies to both the (cumulative) substance of 
international law and to states not parties to the main refugee law instruments; the latter may 
nonetheless may have obligations owed to refugees and similarly situated persons under related 
international treaty law and/or customary international law.   
2.2 Key Norms and Institutions of the Universal Asylum System  
2.2.1 Solidarity with Refugees and Disproportionally Affected States 
The universal asylum system established since World War II has certain key normative and 
institutional foundations. Its historical background is still relevant for understanding its scope 
                                                 
10 For example, the notion of ’diplomatic asylum’ raises distinct issues beyond the scope of this paper. 
11 Revision of multilateral treaties, for example, usually requires specific procedures to be followed. See e.g. 
Article 45 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.  
12 United Nations, New York Declaration, op.cit., para. 67. 
13 Ibid., para 66. 
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and functions, namely unresolved and serious refugee situations endured between the two 
world wars, and the continued and increased presence of refugees during and after World War 
II.14  
That emerging system was being based on a human rights conception of the legitimate and 
paramount aim of protecting refugees from persecution under all circumstances, by providing 
an international framework for asylum in other countries – albeit with the exceptions for 
fugitives from genuine justice and for persons being suspected of having committed war crimes 
or other universal crimes. The rules were expressed in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR).15 This idea of enhanced international refugee protection is linked 
to a notion of global solidarity based on enlightened self-interest; that we may all, as human 
beings of larger societies, become refugees, or our children, or grandchildren. The Preamble 
and Article 1 of the UN Charter suggest that this rationale is closely tied also to the aims and 
purposes of the UN. In fact, only a few modern states have not experienced that a significant 
number of their inhabitants at some point in time became refugees or internally displaced 
because of armed conflict or targeted persecution.  
The prevailing understanding has thus for a long time been that the refugee problem is global 
in nature. New refugee situations may in principle occur almost anywhere, any time, while 
experience has shown that receiving neighbouring countries, transit countries, as well as many 
other receiving states, are not always able or willing to handle the ensuing difficulties in ways 
that respect and secure the dignity of forced migrants. This understanding, that the refugee 
problem thus requires serious global commitment, has however been put into question as more 
states and refugee populations have been left struggling while common legal obligations are 
being violated or circumvented by several governments pursuing more restrictive policies. 
It is thus potentially important that the need for deepened solidarity with refugees and the most 
affected states is now being expressed in common language by the world community. Hence 
the New York Declaration declares a “profound solidarity with, and support for, the millions 
of people in different parts of the world who, for reasons beyond their control, are forced to 
uproot themselves and their families from their homes”.16 Furthermore, the global nature of the 
refugee problem is once again underlined.17 Especially when the movements are large, 
neighbouring developing countries are often disproportionally affected, sometimes with 
serious repercussions for the refugees arriving there. 
Furthermore, the non-binding character of the UDHR has not prevented several human rights 
norms from developing into customary international law, and it seems today arguable that the 
                                                 
14 For an account of the historical origin of the current system, as well as the drafting history of 1951 Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol, see e.g. various articles and commentaries in Andreas Zimmermann (ed.), The 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol – A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 
2011. 
15 Article 14 states as follows: ”(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution. (2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political 
crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” 
16 See United Nations, New York Declaration, op.cit., para. 8.  
17 Ibid., para. 7: “These are global phenomena which call for global approaches and global solutions. No one State 
can manage such movements on its own.” 
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initial moral imperative of solidarity with refugees is now prone to be complemented by an 
emerging general legal principle of international law of global solidarity with refugees and 
disproportionally affected states. Despite its legally non-binding character, the New York 
Declaration and the processes ahead may provide support for such a claim. 
2.2.2 The Right to Seek Asylum 
The first legal pillar of the universal refugee system is a liberating and straightforward response 
to this latter difficulty for the refugees: the establishment of a universal right to seek asylum in 
other countries from persecution – which is not limited to a neighbouring country.18 The human 
right to leave any country, including the country of origin, the fundamental principle of non-
refoulement, and the exemption from punishment for seeking asylum in good faith, are bearing 
elements that operationalize the right.19  
Obstructions by states, however, might be lawful, or may operate within the grey-zones of 
international law, and are frequently used to limit the application of this right in practice. This 
could be done, for instance, by introducing visa requirements, carrier sanctions, and physically 
closing boarders by using fences or walls. Clearly, refugees do not have a right to a visa under 
international law, i.e. a predetermined permission to enter a country to seek asylum there. This 
was made clear in the preparatory discussions of UDHR Article 14, and the 1951 Convention 
and later international instruments have not really changed much in this respect.  
Nevertheless, the principle of non-refoulement refuses a neighbouring state to the refugee 
situation to reject asylum-seekers at their borders. This principle, of course, applies to 
developing states as well as to developed states. Furthermore, the principle is recognised as a 
fundamental legal principle, with a legal basis in customary international law and/or the general 
principles of international law that consequently extends beyond the 1951 Convention and its 
1967 Protocol. 
With respect to access to transit states and destination states farther away, the legal issues are 
somewhat more complicated, and they are not further pursued in this article.20 As underlined 
also in the New York Declaration, states have rights and responsibilities to manage and control 
their borders.21 A balance must be struck, however, so that border control measures and 
procedures are implemented in compliance with obligations under international law, in 
particular international human rights law and refugee law.22 Hence a person under actual 
jurisdiction of state authorities cannot be denied refugee protection and certain procedural 
safeguards against return without proper status determination. This is also true with regard to 
restrictive extraterritorial measures, such as interception of asylum seekers at the high seas; as 
                                                 
18 See UDHR, Article 14. 
19 These rights have been expressed in various international declarations and treaties on human rights including 
the 1951 Convention, see e.g. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 12 (on the right to 
leave any country) and the 1951 Convention Article 31 (on exemption from penalties) and Article 33 (non-
refoulement). 
20 For an instructive introduction and account, see e.g. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum – 
International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of Migration Control, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
21 See United Nations, New York Declaration, op.cit., para. 24. 
22 Ibid. 
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have been underlined by international courts.23 It should also be noted that member states to 
the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol may not necessarily transfer their obligations 
towards refugees within their jurisdiction to other states by moving the asylum seekers onwards 
or back to an earlier transit state, at least not without clear agreements guaranteeing their 
inherent and express rights as (potential) refugees under applicable international law.24  
Finally, it is always a matter of state discretion whether to provide access to individual asylum 
procedures or to offer refugee protection on a collective basis without detailed individual 
procedures, so long as individual persons within an exposed group are not suspected of serious 
crimes that should lead to exclusion from refugee status under the 1951 Convention, see its 
Article 1F.  
2.2.3 The Right to Enjoy Asylum 
The human right to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution is the second legal pillar 
of the universal refugee system. To ‘enjoy’ asylum from persecution is equivalent with 
effective international protection of a certain standard, including respect for other human rights 
applicable to refugees. The concept is different from a formal grant of asylum in a written 
decision and it does not require a formal permission of residency. However, it implies, as a 
minimum, a governmental consent to sojourn. Consequently, a receiving state must provide 
either de jure permanent permission to residency, de jure temporary permission to remain on 
the territory, or an explicit or implicit consent to stay, so long as the danger persists. 
The principle of non-refoulement, the prohibition to forcibly return refugees or asylum seekers 
to a country in which they risk being subjected to persecution, is thus an inherent part of the 
right to ‘enjoy asylum’. It also includes the prohibition of indirect return to persecution to any 
country that would itself be inclined to breach the principle of non-refoulement.  
Enjoying asylum may furthermore include a number of specific refugee rights and standards 
with corresponding obligations of the member states,25 as well as general human rights 
protection according to international human rights law, while refugees stay in the country of 
asylum.26 Convention refugees are furthermore protected from being returned or transferred to 
other countries where the rights protection is substantially sub-level of the refugee rights and 
state obligations under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, also as applied in practice.27 
                                                 
23 See e.g. Case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Judgment of 23 February 2012. 
24 The Dublin system that applies to asylum seekers arriving in any European State participating in the Dublin 
system, might be an example of such an international and multilateral agreement, although in practice the 
guarantees have not always been fulfilled. See e.g. the illustrative case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 21 January 2011. 
25 See especially 1951 Convention Articles 1 and 3-32. 
26 On the different rights of refugees and their application, see e.g. James C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees 
under International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
27 For an informative overview of legal issues and discussion in this regard, see e.g. Rainer Hofmann and Tillmann 
Löhr, Requirements for Refugee Determination Procedures, in Andreas Zimmermann (ed.), The 1951 Convention 
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International human rights law expands to a certain extent on the personal scope and material 
protection standards offered by the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. For example, the 
non-refoulement rules as clarified in the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, by the Committee against 
Torture under the UN Convention against Torture, and by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, are more absolute in nature as compared to 
the non-refoulement rule of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. While the latter provision 
makes an exception for refugees constituting a security risk or a community danger in the 
receiving state, this exception has not been considered applicable under international human 
rights law.28 Furthermore, although there is substantial overlap of the personal scope of non-
refoulement under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol on the one hand and on the other 
hand various other non-refoulement rules in other human rights instruments at the global and 
regional levels, they may also each have some specific fields of application which in sum thus 
provide international protection to a somewhat broader range of refugees and persons similarly 
situated than ‘convention refugees’ under the 1951 Convention, see Article 33 taken in 
conjunction with Article 1 (definition of refugees).  
The grey zones of interpretation and application of the refugee concept in the 1951 Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol have been intensely discussed in refugee law theory and practice.29 The 
supervisory role of the UNHCR under Article 35 of the 1951 Convention has in this regard no 
doubt contributed to more clarity, while authoritative interpretation by an international refugee 
court, with a view to more equal and coherent implementation of refugee rights in national 
asylum practice would have been welcome from the perspective of legal certainty and the rule 
of law. As noted also below (section 2.4), state parties to the 1951 Convention have never made 
use of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under Article 38, 
and state representatives have never seriously discussed the option of an international ‘refugee 
court’.  
However, many international legal issues relating to the enjoyment of asylum have been 
(largely) clearly settled with the assistance of UNHCR, international law theory, and supreme 
national courts of law. In addition, the drafting history of the 1951 Convention and its 
preparatory documents has become better known, more available for research, and analysed in 
the literature in recent years.30 This has also contributed to understanding that the refugee 
                                                 
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol – A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2011, 1081-
1128.  
28 This position, which has since also been followed in other cases before different international judicial review 
bodies, was first authoritatively expressed in the case of Chahal v. United Kingdom, Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 15 November 1996.   
29 See e.g. James C. Hathaway and Michelle Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, Cambridge University press, 
Second Edition, 2014; Andreas Zimmermann and Claudia Mahler, in Andreas Zimmermann (ed.), The 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol – A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 
2011, pp. 281-464; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford 
University Press, Third Edition, 2007. 
30 See generally Andreas Zimmermann (ed.), The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol – A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2011. On the drafting history of those instruments (with 
particular emphasis on the refugee definition) see Terje Einarsen, Drafting History of the 1951 Convention and 
its 1967 Protocol, in Andreas Zimmermann (ed.), The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol – A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2011, 37-73. 
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definition was intended to be substantially broad and inclusive by its drafters, hence considered 
to cover individuals and groups exposed to persecution in a wide range of circumstances in a 
society, including situations of war, occupation, and targeted violence against minority groups 
in society as well as individuals and associations persecuted for their views and manifestations. 
As such, the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol is still highly relevant with respect to large 
movements of refugees in the contemporary world. 
Regional instruments also back up the enjoyment of asylum, such as the OAU Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the Cartagena Declaration 
on Refugees (in the Americas).31 In Europe, the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as interpreted by the European Court of Human 
Rights upholds and reinforces important aspects of the right to seek and to enjoy asylum.  
2.2.4 International Institutions 
The universal asylum system requires international cooperation and international institutions 
established for that purpose to facilitate refugee protection and assistance to refugees, 
especially when singular states are struggling to meet their international obligations and the 
needs of refugees alone. UNHCR, the principal refugee agency of the United Nations, is of 
course the most important global institution for this purpose, accompanied by UNRWA (for 
Palestine refugees). The main functions of the UNHCR are: to provide assistance to refugees 
in countries of asylum (in particular in developing countries), to facilitate solutions and 
temporary protection, and to supervise the application of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 
Protocol. With respect to solutions, UNHCR will facilitate voluntary repatriation to the country 
of origin when the country is safe again, integration in the country of asylum and respect for 
refugee rights there, and, if possible, resettlement in third states that is usually pursued through 
permissions granted by the relevant state with a view to permanent settlement.  
Several other UN bodies and institutions are also more or less involved, directly or indirectly, 
in the universal asylum system. They include but are not limited to the General Assembly, the 
General Secretary, and treaty supervisory bodies under various human rights treaties. 
Involvement might also still be mostly potential. For example, the UN Security Council should 
probably be more active with a view to large-scale refugee problems with implications for 
peace and security, since movements of refugees are often caused by situations also 
constituting threats to peace and security in the first place, and may next increase such threats 
when receiving states struggle due to movements across borders. Another example is the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 38 of the 1951 Convention, a competence that 
has never been activated.  
Before moving on to a more concrete discussion of the traditional and future challenges of 
international refugee protection, particularly with respect to burden and responsibility sharing, 
it is necessary to stress that many large-scale refugee situations since the establishment of 
UNHCR in 1950 have been dealt with and often to the satisfaction of state parties, as well as 
                                                 
31 This is noted also in the New York Declaration, op.cit., para. 66. 
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majority of refugees. In other words, the key structures are in place, and have protected many 
millions of refugees since World War II.  
3 Burden and Responsibility Sharing under the Universal Asylum System 
3.1 The Refugee Convention and the New York Declaration 
As we have seen, the 1951 Convention and its related documents clearly map out the rights of 
a refugee and the responsibilities of the refugee receiving country. The preamble of the 1951 
Convention recognises that “the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain 
countries”, such that real global protection “cannot therefore be achieved without international 
co-operation”.32 The 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol constitute in fact the principal 
example of such legally binding cooperation for refugee protection.  
Nevertheless, the 1951 Convention does not establish any legally binding obligation that places 
responsibility on other countries than the country of asylum, and it does not specify what 
international co-operation may entail in extension of the 1951 Convention. The same holds for 
the 1967 Protocol. On many occasions this has been identified as the Achilles heel of the 
universal refugee system.33 It is thus important that bridging the perennial gap between the 
rights of the refugee and the responsibility of the world community at large was set as the 
primary objective of the UN Summit.34 
In the field of international refugee protection collective efforts have most often been ad hoc, 
without states giving any long-term commitments on specific, collectively binding 
mechanisms. Non-binding declarations made by the international community that focus on 
solidarity and burden sharing is nothing new. What is potentially different this time is the 
explicitly formulated determination on finding “long-term and sustainable solutions”.35  
The challenge then it seems, lies in identifying realistic, effective and sustainable models that 
can be operationalized and that will lead to a coherent implementation of the already existing 
legal framework, possibly also to extensions. In the section that follows we review selected 
models of cooperation that have been assessed as successful implementations in practice and 
of reform suggestions that could be relevant to the process towards reaching the objectives of 
the New York Declaration. Recognising that a range of academics and practitioners have 
provided valuable contributions that could also be highly relevant, the context here only 
permits us to look at a small selection of proposals that might have deserved mentioning.  
                                                 
32 See the 1951 Convention, Preamble, fourth paragraph. 
33 See e.g. United Nation General Secretary, In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and 
Migrants, 21/04/2016, http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/in_safety_and_dignity_-
_addressing_large_movements_of_refugees_and_migrants.pdf  
34 Fillippo Grandi address to Summit on Addressing Large Movement of Refugees and Migrants, at United Nation 
General Assembly in New York 19/09/2016, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/9/57dfa1734/un-
summit-commits-protect-refugee-migrant-rights.html 
35 United Nations, New York Declaration, op.cit. Annex I, Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, 
para..10. 
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3.2 Implemented Models: Identifying Factors of Success 
3.2.1 Refugees under the Mandate of IRO 
Between 1947 and 1950 some 1.3 million World War II-refugees and displaced people were 
transferred from refugee camps in the western zones in Europe to Western European countries 
and this enterprise has by some been defined as a success.36 Despite a significant number of 
refugees – 410 000 – were considered ‘hard core’ and almost impossible to resettle, the burden-
sharing model in the post-war period did offer durable solutions to the great majority of the 
people uprooted as a result of the war. The burden-sharing mechanisms triggered were ad hoc 
and not intended to put binding obligations on states with respect to future refugee situations.  
In short, three factors could be identified as the keys to realization of the scheme;37 cultural and 
ethnic ties between the refugees and the receiving countries; need for labour in the third 
country; and finally, the principal receiving countries had been central parties in the war, thus 
the feeling of moral obligation was strong. Even though a formal distribution key was not 
established there were enough countries offering to resettle most of the displaced persons 
defined as refugees by the International Refugee Organization (IRO). Thus, the IRO functioned 
as a facilitator of resettlement, while leaving each receiving country free to decide on specific 
intake criteria based on its preferences. 
3.2.2 The Comprehensive Plan of Action 
The resettlement of approximately 1.1 million Vietnamese refugees to the US and other anti-
communist regimes in the Western world after 1975 is as another example of an ad hoc 
implemented responsibility and burden-sharing scheme that was built on collective agreement 
between first countries of asylum and secondary receiving countries. Initially, the response to 
the so-called plight of the ‘boat people’ was handled through what has been framed as a “market 
system of resettlement”, 38 where access to a first country of asylum was dependent on the 
willingness of third countries to accept resettled refugees. The process was steered by selection 
criteria linked to immigration concerns, so-called humanitarian obligations and political 
factors, resembling the mechanism established in the post-world war distribution of refugees.  
After a decade, dwindling support to the resettlement scheme led to a second phase of the 
international burden-sharing response to the Vietnamese refugee situation, 39 eventually 
resulting in the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) to be established in 1989 after a series 
of UNHCR-led negotiations between country of origin, country of first asylum and potential 
countries of resettlement.40 The countries of asylum agreed to stop the deterrence policies that 
had been on the rise and to undertake individual asylum assessment procedures, while the 
                                                 
36 Astri Suhrke (1998) Burden-sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus National 
Action, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4, 396-415, 404. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 406 
39 Ibid. 
40 For an instructive introduction and account, see e.g. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Uncertain Haven: 
Refugee Protection on the Fortieth Anniversary of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, October 1991 
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country of resettlement agreed to resettle all genuine refugees and the country of origin agreed 
to accept voluntary returnees that were not considered genuine.41 However, the refugee 
receiving countries were given the discretion they wanted to establish unilateral selection 
procedures and intake-criteria.42  
Many have stressed the role of the US and its influence on other countries of CPA resettlement, 
as key to its successful implementation. It is plausible to conclude that fundamental to the 
scheme was not an altruistic concern for refugee protection, but the geopolitical security 
interests in the region of the US and the central role that was played by the UNHCR as driver 
towards a collective effort,43 and that “humanitarian imperatives alone would not have sufficed 
to sustain” the CPA.44 
3.2.3 The Kosovo Crisis 
A third example of successful and voluntary ad hoc burden sharing took place in Europe in the 
aftermath of the international intervention in the former Yugoslavia. The initial phase of the 
Kosovo refugee crisis was caused by clashes between the Kosovo Liberation Army and Serbian 
security forces in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and by the severe human rights 
abuses against the Kosovar Albanian population during 1998 and the beginning of 1999.45 Even 
before the NATO bombing started in March 1999, the number of displaced people was huge 
and resulted in a mass influx of refugees to neighbouring countries such as Albania and 
Macedonia.46 In a matter of days after the first NATO air strikes, tens of thousands of refugees 
started arriving in Macedonia and Albania, resulting in a practically closed Macedonian border 
through the employment of go-slow processes. In what is named the Blace Field, refugees were 
stuck between Yugoslavia and Macedonia in very poor conditions. 47 On the contrary, Albania 
welcomed the refugee "with open arms".48 In Macedonia, however, the ethnic balance was 
considered fragile. An increased share of Albanian's of the total population was for instance 
believed to increase the risk of Macedonia becoming directly involved in the Kosovo conflict.49  
The international community was criticized for having responded late to the Kosovo crisis, 
because of few geopolitical or economic interests in the region.50 However, when first deciding 
to intervene, all the refugees in Blace were moved to camps built by NATO, evacuated through 
the Humanitarian Evacuation Program (HEP) or Humanitarian Transfer Program (HTP) – and 
                                                 
41 Alexander Betts, in Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (ed.) Refugees in International Relations, Oxford 
Univerity Press, 2011, 71. 
42 Suhrke (1998), op. cit., 406. 
43 Betts (2011), op. cit. 73. 
44 Suhrke (1998) op. cit., 406. 
45 Human Rights Watch, Under Orders. War Crimes in Kosovo, 2001, 110. 
46 Numbers differs. While Human Rights Watch estimated a total 370 000 displaced people, other have operated 
with lower figures, see Meltem Ineli-Ciger,Why do States Share Burden During Refugee Emergencies?, Suleyman 
Demirel University Faculty of Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2015, 65-97, at 79. 
47 Micheal Barutciski and Astri Suhrke, Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovations in Protection and 
Burden-sharing, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2001, 95-134, at 98. 
48 Human Rights Watch ,op. cit., 114. 
49 Barutciski and Suhrke, op. cit., 96. 
50 Sophia Benz and Andreas Hasenclever, in Betts and Loescher, op. cit., 199. 
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the space was empty after just a few days.51 This has been seen as an extremely efficient 
burden-sharing scheme, established on ad hoc basis in order to respond to strong international 
public pressure. Because the evacuation programmes linked admission into Macedonia with 
distribution schemes with the US and 27 more countries, refugees regained access to 
Macedonia on the condition that they would only stay in the first country for a very limited 
period. The World Bank and a wide range of countries contributed financially.52  
The willingness of the international community to engage in a mechanism for sharing of 
burdens in the Kosovo situation has by some been linked to the involvement by NATO and the 
perceived moral obligation to protect victims of this war.53 The US took on the role of 
leadership, while the UNHCR on the other hand was partly critical to the HEP and HTP models 
that were being implemented. Both geopolitical interests in Macedonia, as it was used as a 
military base for the operation against Yugoslavia, and humanitarian concerns, have been 
identified as the motivating factors behind the initiative.54 In retrospect, the collective effort to 
provide refugee protection has been generally celebrated for its unprecedented effectiveness.55 
3.2.4  Lessons for future international cooperation 
The principal conclusion drawn from some of the successful stories in the complicated history 
of international cooperation regarding protracted refugee situations is that countries prefer ad 
hoc schemes of burden-sharing. Secondly, realizations of these burden-sharing schemes are 
likely to be conditioned upon the specific historical context, geopolitical and economic 
interests, and international power-relations. This is supported by the conclusion made by Ineli-
Ciger in her account of state behaviour in protracted refugee situations.56 She observes that 
every state has different interests represented in a specific refugee situation, and while some 
states are heavily invested in one way or the other, others might be generally unaffected. The 
interests affected by a refugee crisis influence the willingness of a specific government faced 
with a choice of contributing to a burden-sharing scheme or not.  
The wording of the New York Declaration, however, seems to imply that all states now have 
committed themselves to look for long-term, improved responsibility and burden-sharing 
mechanisms that will cater to a more stable and efficient response to refugee situations. The 
greatest challenge lies perhaps in establishing a new and effective institutional framework that 
is acceptable to states.57 
The next section will first take stock of selected earlier reform suggestions set forth by scholars 
of refugee law and protection. The different models and initiatives proposed are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive and thus some might be implemented simultaneously within a structured 
global framework, depending on the concrete circumstances of a specific refugee situation. We 
                                                 
51 Barutciski and Suhrke, op. cit., 99. 
52 Ineli-Ciger, op.cit., 81. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Barutciski and Suhrke, op. cit., 99. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Ineli-Ciger, op.cit., 90. 
57 See section 4 for a further discussion on this. 
 36 
 
have grouped the proposals into three categories, which are labelled ‘redistribution of 
refugees’, ‘internationally administrated temporary protection’ and ‘development schemes’. 
3.3 Models of International Cooperation Proposed in the Literature 
3.3.1 Redistribution of Refugees  
In his Plan for distribution of Asylum-Seekers, Grahl-Madsen proposed a Western European 
responsibility-sharing mechanism, building on national quotas for redistribution of refugees 
from the country of first asylum that would be determined by means of a distribution key on 
the basis of gross national product of a given country.58 Asylum seekers in countries of first 
asylum could be redistributed to other countries in the same region, but no country would be 
forced to admit any person whom might pose a threat to national security or public order, and 
no refugee would be forced to be sent to a country against his or her will. While emphasising 
that the obligation undertaken by the state would have an absolute ceiling, making sure that 
each state would only agree to host refugees “within a reasonable limit”59, the plan also foresees 
that, if the number of refugees drastically exceeds the estimated number, then “ad hoc measures 
will have to be taken”.60  
It has also been proposed global burden-sharing mechanisms where the number of refugees 
redistributed to a given country would be based on landmass and population density.61  
Based on some of the same principles, Schuck (1997) presented a comprehensive account of a 
market-based burden-sharing model of refugee regulation. 62 It had the following points of 
departure: the burdens laid on refugee receiving states must be reduced by establishing a set of 
obligations that other states are willing to accept and implement; and, these obligations must 
be allocated in a way that the states consider fair.63 The system proposed is based on a voluntary 
and binding quota system that a group of states agree to participate in, where an institution is 
mandated to decide the refugee protection quota for each member state. To be implemented, 
the quotas assigned to each state must be perceived as fair, as this will also make it easier for 
member states to induce more countries to take part in the system. A state is permitted to pay 
another member state to fulfil the protection needs of refugees assigned to them, thus Schuck 
introduces a system for trading in refugees.64 He argues that a regional or sub-regional level of 
implementation would be the most efficient solution, due to both economic and political 
reasons. A quota system based on binding but voluntary membership would provide the states 
                                                 
58 Atle Grahl-Madsen, Further Development of International Refugee Law, Nordic Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 35, No. 3/4, 159-180, at 165. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid, 169. 
61 James Hathaway and Alex Neve, Making International Refugee Law relevant again, Harvard Human Rights 
Journal, Vol. 10, 1997 115-211, at 204. 
62 Peter H. Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 
22, No. 2, 1997, 243-297.  
63 Ibid., 246. 
64 Ibid., 248. 
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with “refugee crisis insurance”, as it increases control over future refugee inflows and gives 
the member states the flexibility they need.65 
If agreed upon by the world community, a burden-sharing system based on a binding quota 
system would in theory be extremely easy to operationalize and it would also satisfy some 
numeric standard of what seems fair. However, these mechanisms raise a range of practical 
questions. As we have seen, states are more inclined to contribute if rather specific conditions 
are in place. Considering the current political climate, where more and more creative deterrence 
policies are on the rise,66 and key refugee-hosting countries, such as Kenya, have decided to 
shut major refugee camps, referencing restrictive migration policies in Europe67, it seems 
utopic that states would accept binding burden-sharing quotas on a general basis. On the other 
hand, if every state committed to shoulder their part of the burden by agreeing to a fairly-
defined and limited quota system, solidarity between states would perhaps grow stronger as 
every country would be obligated to take part and share some of the burden.  
If states in fact would prove willing to negotiate a formalized quota, Suhrke has pointed out 
the risk of states trying to fix the number of refugees to be resettled in the lowest possible 
amount, thus restricting the potential efficiency of the system.68 In the view of Hathaway and 
Neve, formalized quotas, as a starting point for resettlement, should “at most serve only an 
auxiliary function in defining the basis for responsibility sharing”.69 They argue that such a 
system has the potential of damaging the commitment necessary to secure refugee protection, 
which is probably a valid point. Even though a quota system might seem fair in numeric terms, 
by excluding other factors in deciding on resettlement schemes, such as the state’s willingness 
to receive a specific group of refugees, it could in the long-run contribute to dwindling support 
to secure the human rights of all refugees while in refuge. Thus, pre-defined and binding quota 
systems could endanger the fundamental access to refugee protection that the system is built to 
provide. 
3.3.2 Internationally Administrated Temporary Protection 
In their article “Making International Refugee Law relevant again”, Hathaway and Neve (1997) 
make an elaborate argument for a shift towards what they call “solution-oriented temporary 
protection of refugees”.70 The reform presented is universal in its scope and sub-global in its 
implementation, and in line with the current legal framework of refugee law. It would be 
organized around separate entities called interest-convergence groups,71 consisting of inner 
                                                 
65 Ibid., 250. 
66 James Hathaway and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2014, 235-284. 
67 Government of Kenya Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, Government Statement 
and Update On the Repatriation for Refugee and Scheduled Closure of Dadaab Refugee Camp, see 
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68 Suhrke (1998), op. cit., 414. 
69Hathaway and Neve, op. cit., 204. 
70 Ibid., 181. 
71 The term is used by Hathaway and Neve to describe, “sub-level associations of states that ought reasonably to 
feel drawn together to create a mechanism of shared responsibility for refugee protection” and as a result commit 
themselves to a system of response mechanisms triggered by mass refugee situations, see ibid., 188 and 190-192. 
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and outer core member states. Arguing that a universal burden and responsibility sharing 
system would be the better one, they conclude that a sub-global system is probably more 
realistic.72 Implementation would be based on assessment of the physical security of the 
refugees concerned, the functional compatibility between the refugee population and the 
refugee receiving states, cultural harmony, and lastly, the geographical proximity that would 
contribute in making repatriation a foreseeable solution.73  
They claim that four main features of the proposed system could make states willing to agree 
on binding obligations. First, it would equip states with a more sustainable approach to control 
migration, as focusing on deterrence policies will not prove viable in the long run. Second, it 
would meet the interests as identified in the analysis, such as geopolitical and economic 
considerations. More vaguely defined interests, such as cultural and religious ties with 
countries of first asylum are presented as a third factor that would create incentives for states 
to commit to sub-regional burden-sharing mechanism. Fourth, they argue that a profound 
interest in refugee protection and development issues could also motivate states to agree to 
legally binding obligations.74 Other countries that are neither inner nor outer core members 
would also be welcome to contribute to the burden-sharing mechanism. 
The shift to a sub-global, temporary protection regime as stipulated by Hathaway and Neve, 
offers a quite flexible, but at the same time principled model of cooperation. Writing in line 
with a regional approach to refugee burden-sharing, Suhrke and Hans base their own reform 
proposal on the assumption that an “elaborate and universalized system of humane 
responsibility sharing [is] unworkable” due to realpolitik concerns that shapes the behaviour 
of states.75 Thus, the responsibility sharing system they draft are based on a two-tier model of 
both regional protection and extra-regional obligations, where the physical responsibility for a 
specific group of refugees is placed within the geographical area in which the refugee’s country 
of origin is located, while the international community as a whole is committed to economic 
support.76 The structural premise of this scheme is that providing improved temporary 
protection ‘within the region’ would be preferable, since proximity to the refugee’s country of 
origin makes repatriation easier. This kind of sharing of regional protection and universal 
responsibility would also make it easier to obtain the political support needed. A mechanism 
for financial support from countries outside the region would in this case be essential to actual 
implementation.77 Instead of establishing a systematic and long-term burden-sharing scheme, 
that potentially motivates states to demand greater control over membership and caseloads, 
Suhrke and Hans argued that a regional system of shifting refugees from one country to another 
within the specific region would allow the countries involved to develop sustainable intake 
                                                 
72 Hathaway and Neve refers to a forthcoming conclusion of Asha Hans and Astri Suhrke on the relationship 
between realpolitik on the one hand and on the other hand legal obligations and humanitarian considerations, see 
ibid., 187. 
73 Ibid., 204. 
74 Ibid., 192-194. 
75 Astri Suhrke and Asha Hans, Responsibility Sharing, Refuge. Canada's Journal on Refugees, Vol. 15. No. 1, 
1996, 12-13. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid.,13. 
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criteria in times of large-scale movement.78 Thus their model of internationally administrated 
temporary protection in the region also includes elements of a regional redistribution model. 
Applying a quite different approach to reforming the universal system of refugee protection, 
Burton already quite early looked at the possibility of developing a complimentary system of 
refugee protection through international leasing of territory.79 The idea is that leasing 
agreements between the international community and an individual state would entitle the 
international community with the right to use a specific piece of land refugees already occupy. 
Furthermore, the leasing agreements she proposed would commit the host country to allow an 
“international human rights monitoring team” unhindered contact with the refugee population 
on the leased land. Burton argued that this solution would result in higher degree of 
accountability for all parties involved, including UNHCR, host countries and refugees, 
especially to people seeking refuge in countries that have not ratified the 1951 Convention or 
its 1967 Protocol. It would provide the international community with the means necessary to 
offer effective security to the refugee population in the area. Burton argues that the refugee 
receiving states then would “obtain sorely needed payment” to cover the economic burden of 
housing refugees, and in addition expenses such as cost of food, housing, clothing, health care 
and so on would be covered by the international community. 80 
A contract could be given on a perpetual term, with access to terminate it on a 30 days’ notice 
for both parties, or it could be stipulated to “run with the refugees” so that the rights of the 
international community to access and dispose over land would be dependent on where the 
refugees are. While discussing how to determine the cost of leasing, Burton does not offer any 
specific solution, concluding that the amount may vary with the willingness of the international 
community to compensate the host country.81 
The idea was taken a step further by Einarsen, proposing a possible future complimentary 
model of regional temporary protection, on UN-leased territory in a safe country in the region 
based on a clear and voluntary agreement.82 This proposal, entitled ‘International Territories 
of Asylum’, is not limited to leasing agreements of land already occupied by refugees. It makes 
clear that the world community, as represented by the United Nations and the specific 
institutions that would be established, and with the support of the Security Council, would 
assume full responsibility for the protection of the refugees and security issues on the leased 
territory. Unarmed prima facie refugees would have voluntary access to the leased territory.   
The ITA-model would be dependent upon global sharing of responsibility; provision of 
temporary ‘international territory’ by host countries in the region, physical and legal protection 
and humanitarian assistance (the UN as such and the UNHCR, in cooperation with other 
organisations) and financial and political support from other states. A limited settlement and 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 Eve Burton (1988) Leasing Rights: A New International Instrument for Protecting Refugees and 
Compensating Host Countries, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2, 307-332, at 309. 
80 Ibid., 319. 
81 Ibid., 321. 
82 Terje Einarsen, Mass Flight: The Case for International Asylum, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 7 
No. 4, 1995, 552-578. 
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resettlement programme would be an integrated part of this model, with a view to assisting 
refugees with particular needs but also in order to prevent the leased territories from becoming 
permanent places within which refugees are contained.83 This model could easily be combined 
with development schemes and employment of refugees, including contracts with enterprises 
and entrepreneurs with a view to building infrastructure on the leased territory (see next section 
3.3.3). 84 
3.3.3 Developments Schemes  
Along with Collier, a development-economist and former director of the Development 
Research Group of the World Bank, Betts introduces a development-based approach to 
refugees.85 They argue that by focusing on opportunities of employment in economic zones,86 
this would generate both better conditions for the refugees and for economic growth in the 
refugee receiving country. Their call for reform is premised on the assertion that the current 
refugee regime is based on a “boats-and-camps approach” that neither improves the lives of 
the refugees and the prospects of the specific region, nor satisfies the economic and security 
interests of the refugee receiving country.87 By looking beyond refugees as a humanitarian 
challenge and instead framing refugees as a development opportunity, it is argued that such a 
model has the potential to curb the often exhausting and dangerous travels that refugees are 
forced to make. In practice Betts and Collier suggest offering jobs to a set number of refugees 
based on the preferences of each specific country in special economic zones that are either 
already excising or that would be set up. Both national and foreign firms, amongst them firms 
operating in the refugee country of origin, can set up operations. As in the models suggested 
by Burton and Einarsen, land and locating refugees within a geographical area is central, 
however in the model presented by Betts and Collier, one of the major contributions expected 
of the international community involves encouraging businesses to invest in the zones through 
giving financial incentives such as subsidies and trade concessions. If implemented, they argue, 
the refugee population would be jobs-generating and thus potentially spur development 
processes in the refugee population which would also benefit the rebuilding of the country of 
origin, and for the host countries as it gets the opportunity of taking advantage of economies 
of scale.88  
                                                 
83 Ibid., 570. 
84 A more radical proposal would be to create a new nation for refugees, see the critical remarks in this regard by 
Alexander Betts, Is creating a new nation for the world's refugees a good idea? The Guardian, 4 August 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/aug/04/refugee-nation-
migration-jason-buzi  
85 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Help Refugees Help Themselves: Let Displaced Syrians Join the Labour 
Market, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 6, 2015, 84-92. 
86 An economic zone or what is normally called a 'special economic zone' could be defined as “demarcated 
geographic areas contained within a country’s national boundaries where the rules of business are different from 
those that prevail in the national territory. These differential rules principally deal with investment conditions, 
international trade and customs, taxation, and the regulatory environment; whereby the zone is given a business 
environment that is intended to be more liberal from a policy perspective and more effective from an 
administrative perspective than that of the national territory”, Wold Bank Report, Special Economic Zones. 
Progress, Emerging Challenges and Future Direction, 2011, 12. 
87 Betts and Collier 2015, op. cit.,, 85. 
88 Ibid., 88. 
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The model, which is already being tried out in Jordan, a process which Betts and Collier is 
deeply involved in,89 raises however some fundamental questions related to labour standards 
and human rights. Betts admits that the model of employment “is not optimal” but the second-
best option. He might have a point. Perhaps this is a model to be tried out and evaluated, and 
if successful, it could be one of a set of schemes that could be implemented in times of 
protracted refugee situations. We tend to agree with Betts (2015) when he assumes that "we 
need innovative and creative solutions. At the heart of this must be a rethinking of the political 
geography of asylum".90 
3.3.4 Holistic Reform of International Refugee Protection 
As of lately, a range of refugee law scholars has made strong cases for also strengthening the 
empowerment of refugees, through investing in education and providing access to 
employment. Several different new elements with a view to extended cooperation might be 
envisaged within a reinforced international framework. 
Gammeltoft-Hansen has made the argument for a reform compatible with the framework of 
the 1951 Convention, based on five premises.91 First, a reform needs to be holistic in the sense 
that legal, economic and political considerations must be addressed. Second, it needs to be 
inclusive and global in its scope, not Eurocentric. Third, it needs to retain the notion that 
protection is granted on a temporary basis. Fourth, it should apply differentiated responsibilities 
dependent on the state’s ability and appropriateness; and lastly, in must build on innovative 
and broader perspectives on the ways in which refugee protection is organized and 
implemented. Gammeltoft-Hansen argues that to solve the inherent challenges in the shaping 
of refugee policy states must facilitate actual access to education, to the labour market, provide 
microloans, thus creating an environment for the refugee to live an active and meaningful life. 
This could be financed though investment plans in developing countries which host most of 
the world’s refugees. This seems to be in line also with recent contributions made by Hathaway 
and Neve, amongst others.92 Milner, agreeing with the conclusions made by Betts, argues that 
                                                 
89 Alexander Betts and Paul Collier (2016) Jordan’s Refugee Experiment. A New Model for Helping the 
Displaced, Foreign Affairs, postscript 28/04/2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-
east/2016-04-28/jordans-refugee-experiment 
90 Alexander Betts (2015), Is creating a new nation for the world's refugees a good idea?, The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/aug/04/refugee-nation-
migration-jason-buzi 
91 Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Escaping Realities? Why European refugee policies have failed and what 
could be done instead, Oslo, 6th April 2016, see: 
http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/JUS5530/v16/undervisningsmateriale/slides-from-the-pa-flukt-
presentation.pdf 
92 James Hathaway (2016) A global solution to a global refugee crisis, openDemocracy.net, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/james-c-hathaway/global-solution-to-global-
refugee-crisis and Alex Neve (2016) Refugee reform must become a global project, openDemocracy.net, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/alex-neve/refugee-reform-must-become-global-
project 
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reform today requires “taking the issue of refugees out of a humanitarian silo and integrating 
refugee issues into the UN’s work in areas such as development and peace building”. 93  
4 Towards an Improved ‘Global Compact’ on Refugees?  
4.1 The Comprehensive Refugee Protection Framework as Baseline 
Despite numerous earlier attempts by scholars, experts and practitioners to propose ways 
forward towards enhanced international refugee protection, especially with a view to 
improving the structures for the management of large-scale refugee movements, states have for 
a long time been reluctant to confront the challenges in a concerted manner and discuss new 
innovative ideas. Apparently, the global refugee crisis through its proportions and the 
potentially negative regional and global impact on conditions for peace and security and social 
developments has finally led to some kind of mental change among state leaders.  
For the first time the collective world community through their high representatives has 
explicitly recognised the urgent need for extended international cooperation on refugee 
protection. For example, in order to address the needs of refugees and receiving states, it is 
now declared a common aim to seek “more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility 
for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, while taking account of existing contributions 
and the differing capacities and resources among States”.94 What make this and similar 
statements more than just nice words is that CRRF was made part of the document and the 
proposed next step towards a new ‘Global Compact’ on refugees already in 2018.  
The stated objective of the CRRF, and thus by implication also an objective of the future  
‘Global Compact’, is fourfold: to ease pressures on host countries of refugees, to enhance 
refugee self-reliance, to expand access to third-country solutions, and to support conditions in 
countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.95 Generally speaking the CRRF is a mix of 
some new and some traditional elements of extended international cooperation beyond the core 
legal obligations of the 1951 Convention and other human rights instruments. Such measures 
are typically facilitated and organised by the UNHCR and its partners, in cooperating with host 
states. This is clear already from the main titles of the CRRF; ‘Reception and Admission’, 
Support for immediate and ongoing needs’, ‘Support for host countries and communities’, and 
‘Durable Solutions’. However, the language makes clear that the CRRF is about intensified 
commitments with concrete expectations on several points.  
Consequently, by endorsing the New York Declaration, the world community should now be 
seriously committed to start working towards the adoption of a renewed global compact on 
refugees. The word ‘compact’ in this context points in the direction of a possibly legally 
binding, worldwide agreement. However, the agreement must not necessarily be legally 
binding. In fact, there are good arguments in favour of a non-legally binding agreement. First, 
                                                 
93 James Milner (2016) Rediscovering a winning formula for refugee protection, openDemocracy.net, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/james-milner/rediscovering-winning-formula-response-to-
hathaway 
94 See the United Nations, New York Declaration, op.cit., para. 68. 
95 Ibid., Annex I, Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, para. 18. 
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a legally binding agreement can only be achieved through a multilateral convention in this case, 
which would entail not only a slow process but also a substantial risk of failure. If only some 
states would ratify the new treaty framework and take on legally binding obligations, the whole 
purpose of extended global cooperation would be undermined. Secondly, there are precedents 
showing that a non-binding declaration might be more effective in some cases, and we believe 
this is the case here. As pointed out by UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was also, like the New York Declaration, was 
adopted as a political declaration, but still it did revolutionize human rights.96  
We agree that what is most important now is to create a solid enough platform for enhanced 
refugee protection and possibly more creative sharing of burdens and responsibilities within a 
structured framework. That framework should build on the CRRF but it must become 
significantly reinforced by the ‘Global Compact’. Otherwise, the momentum gained by the 
New York Declaration would be wasted.  
The processes ahead should involve a “multi-stakeholder approach”97. This entails including a 
wide range of actors, also besides states, the UNHCR, and other UN related organs, such as 
international financial institutions, regional coordination and partnership mechanisms and civil 
society partners, including the private sector. In accordance with the CRRF, countries of the 
world have now committed themselves to aim for higher numbers of resettled refugees and to 
provide other legal pathways for refugees to seek protection.98 Furthermore, non-receiving 
states will participate in mobilizing resources in an effective manner and extend finance lending 
schemes for developing and middle-income countries that have received a high number of 
refugees.99 In addition to providing reception and admission practices in line with the 
framework and humanitarian assistance, host states are expected to encourage empowerment 
of the refugees living there.100 This approach seems to reflect thoughts and ideas earlier 
provided by researchers and experts in section 3 above and could also imply that the outlined 
plans for a future Global Compact on refugees comprise institutional reinforcement. 
Although the CRRF has already received criticism for its lack of more substantial proposals 
for much needed reinforcement and reform of the present international protection system, and 
for not offering concrete solutions to the shortcomings of the current system,101 we are still 
inclined to interpret the CRRF as an ambitious first step towards a universal agreement on 
constructive responses to situations of large-scale refugee movements. Given that states should 
not realistically be expected to adopt the most radical mechanisms proposed in theory 
                                                 
96 Volker T̈urk, Q&A: The New York Declaration is a ”once in a lifetime chance” for refugees, UNHCR home 
page, 30 September 2016, see http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/9/57ee3af54/qa-new-york-declaration-
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immediately, the question is whether and how the ‘Global Compact’ in practice might become 
something more than the CRRF.    
4.2 Institutional Reinforcement through a Procedural Mandate? 
How does the world community move from the set of tendencies stapled out in the CRRF to 
agreeing on practical institutional, organizational and legal reform? At an institutional level 
expansion of the procedural powers that lies within the UN system could be one feasible way 
of strengthening the structures to facilitate cooperation. More specifically, this could entail 
mandating an organ with the authority to summon states for conferences to discuss measures 
to be taken in specific situations. The organ could either be UNHCR with an expanded mandate 
or a new organ consisting of representatives from the UNHCR, the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), which now has been made a “related organisation” of the UN, state 
representatives, and other relevant stakeholders.  
Recalling the multi-stakeholder approach called for in the CRRP, the last alternative might be 
best suited to meet the objectives of the Declaration. Within this institutional reform, 
attendance at conferences would be mandatory. If no agreement is reached, there must still be 
a follow-up mechanism, if the 'Global Compact' is going to serve its purpose.  
The conclusions made in section 3 do indicate that states prefer non-binding, short-term 
solutions to specific refugee situations rather than engaging in long-term binding commitments 
of international cooperation. Without being naïve, it is worth acknowledging that this is the 
first time in the UN's history that all its members have agreed to engage in negotiations related 
to strengthening cooperation on refugee protection. Taking this into account, previous 
experiences with reluctant states are not necessarily decisive for the future outcome of the 
present process.  
The creation of a permanent common platform for dialogue on international cooperation should 
be a part of a 'Global Compact', and this would most likely require an additional institutional 
framework to what already exists. In other words, there is a clear and present need for a follow-
up institutional mechanism to be established with the framework of the ‘Global Compact’. 
Inspiration for this could be sought in the earlier Helsinki process and the Helsinki Final Act, 
which contained a follow-up mechanism that secured the success of that important, non-legally 
binding framework for international cooperation on peace and security and human rights 
protection.102 It secured a continuous multilateral process, which included “meetings of experts 
of the participating States, and also within the framework of existing organizations such as the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and UNESCO (…)”. We would suggest, in 
line with the multi-stakeholder approach of the New York Declaration, that a representative 
body of stakeholders should be established within the parameters of the Global Compact. The 
UNHCR should be its chairperson. 
By strengthening early warning, in line with the CRRF, the new body or institution should be 
able to summon members at an early stage so that planning for preventive measures could be 
                                                 
102 See The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 
(Helsinki Declaration), available at: http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/osce/basics/finact75.htm 
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a feasible alternative to the ad hoc measures that we often see today. Such a mechanism could 
facilitate the implementation of a thought through burden and responsibility sharing scheme, 
developed to meet the specific needs of a specific situation. Such a mechanism could serve as 
a systematic and efficient response in accordance with the spirit of the New York Declaration 
and the proposed Global Compact. As we have seen in section 3, the international community 
has proved willing to engage in ad hoc models of resolving mass refugee situations that have 
sought to share financial and material costs between countries and to resettle refugees from the 
country of asylum to a third country. Notwithstanding arguably successful cases of 
international collaboration, the outspoken premise of the New York Declaration is a need to 
establish permanent mechanisms to be triggered at an earlier stage than what we have seen in 
the past.  
To be an effective institutional mechanism leading to constructive outcome, the organ should 
also be mandated to make advisory suggestions regarding schemes that should be enforced to 
meet the specific demands identified. A predetermined list of schemes should be developed 
and agreed upon by the member states during the process towards the 'Global Compact' to 
minimize the chances of disagreement when the situation calls for an efficient and collective 
operation. Perhaps this institutional structure is one way of meeting both the conceived 
preference towards ad hoc models of cooperation, as the states would have to deal with every 
incident of mass refugee movement in an individual process, while at the same time, if 
implemented in accordance with its purpose, the chances of reaching an agreement in a faster 
pace could increase. Additionally, the assessment of the implemented models showed us that 
a key factor of success in international cooperation has been the leadership of a strong actor. If 
the body proposed ceases the opportunity and fills its mandate as granted by the Declaration 
and the Compact, perhaps could it be the kind of ‘strong leader’ through such a soft-law 
mechanism that is needed to initiate and implement useful schemes of international refugee 
cooperation. 
Implicit in its mandate to summon member states would be competence to identify groups or 
situations of refugees that the world community needs to prioritize. As noted in section 3 above, 
a wide range of factors such as geopolitical, cultural, political and economic incentives affect 
which situations of mass movement get much attention and which do not. A body with a 
procedural mandate as suggested above would arguably be able and willing to make 
independent and fair proposals in a global perspective for states to consider and eventually 
adopt. Importantly, the institution envisaged could also be mandated to suggest pilot projects 
based on new and innovative reform ideas that are currently being developed, and bring 
together representatives of member states and other stake holders in working groups to 
implement these projects. It could also engage in dialogue with host states, countries of origin, 
and countries of resettlement, as well as with the refugee communities affected, and NGOs, to 
analyse which pilot projects would be suited in a concrete situation. By including financial 
institutions such as the World Bank, and other private sector actors, opportunities for 
entrepreneurship and employment in the formal labour market could be tested more 
systematically. 
A likely by-product of such a step-by-step reform would be a renewed focus also on causes 
and responsibility for refugee movements. Another theme not elaborated further in this paper, 
 46 
 
concerns the financing of Global Compact mechanisms for extended international refugee 
protection. The global community of states should however be willing to consider innovative 
ideas, such as a UN 'refugee tax' on international arms transfers.103   
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have discussed the prerequisites for conditional reform of the present system 
for international refugee protection. The existing global system – termed the ‘universal asylum 
system’ – is fragmented, but at the same time its core legal structures are sound and the system 
is more coherent than often asserted. However, the dimension and complexity of the current 
world refugee crisis has sparked a necessary debate on intensified global cooperation, 
especially with a view to extended international cooperation on burden-sharing and sharing of 
responsibility for refuge protection that extends clearly beyond the existing legal frameworks 
as represented by the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.  
The first phase of this debate has now come to end at the global level with the New York 
Declaration. This potentially very important document reinforces worldwide political support 
for the existing legal and institutional structures. It also expresses a clear intent to move forward 
towards extension of international refuge protection in a structured manner. Going forward, we 
believe it is recommendable to remain open for new inventive ideas in addition to stay 
confident in well-known tools that have earlier been employed with success.  
After reviewing some earlier successful cases of cooperation on a temporary or ad hoc basis, 
as well as suggestions for reform made by scholars of international refugee protection, the 
picture emerges that the next step for the world community will be crucial. In our opinion, it is 
now urgent that international stakeholders, particularly UNHCR, keep an open mind and a 
desire to really improve the system. We believe this to be possible: a golden opportunity exists 
if an additional institutional framework will be enacted as a continuous follow-up mechanism. 
There is a need for new body – a ‘Global Compact’ institution – that should be empowered to 
calling for new high-level conferences, if necessary, and making non-binding 
recommendations for concerted global initiatives on burden-sharing mechanisms and fair 
responsibility sharing among states and other stake-holders within a renewed universal refugee 
protection regime. We think that the earlier success of the Helsinki processes and the Helsinki 
Final Act, on peace and security and human rights protection, might serve as useful inspiration 
in this regard. 
  
                                                 
103 This was proposed by Einarsen at 'The Future of Refugee Law' conference, see supra note 1.  
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The crisis in Syria, which has given rise to the largest refugee outflow in many decades, has 
once again thrown into relief a recurring tension in the global refugee regime. On the one hand, 
the regime is premised on the understanding that individual host States will provide protection 
to refugees on behalf of the international community. On the other, State contributions as host 
countries are necessarily unequal, even arbitrary, with States in the “global south” hosting 86 
per cent of the world’s refugees as at the end of 2015. 
At the heart of these tensions is a key set of principles: international cooperation, solidarity, 
burden sharing and responsibility sharing (“burden sharing”) between States in the refugee 
regime. Recital 4 of the preamble of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1951 Convention) expresses this as follows: 
Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a 
satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope 
and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international cooperation. 
Through an analysis of the travaux prépartoires of the 1951 Convention, this paper serves as 
a first step in reconsidering some longstanding assumptions with respect the principle of burden 
sharing in international refugee law. There are two key findings. First, the travaux 
préparatoires reveal (say some of the drafters) that the burden sharing provision in recital 4 of 
the preamble was intended to have a surprisingly specific purpose. Second, I demonstrate that 
ultimately the inclusion of burden sharing in the preamble was the result of a “double 
compromise” that continues to impact our understanding of the principle today. 
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1. Introduction104 
1.1 Background 
The crisis in Syria, which has given rise to the largest refugee outflow in many decades,105 
has once again thrown into relief a recurring tension in the global refugee regime. On the 
one hand, the regime is premised on the understanding that individual host States will 
provide protection to refugees on behalf of the international community. On the other 
hand, refugee protection obligations under international law generally attach to the State 
that has jurisdiction over an individual asylum-seeker or refugee.106 State contributions 
as host countries are necessarily unequal, even arbitrary, as most refugees at least initially 
arrive and stay near to their countries of origin, where they are first able to reach safety.107 
At the end of 2015, primarily by virtue of geographic proximity to refugee origin 
countries, States in the “global south” hosted 86 per cent of the world’s refugees.108 This 
is not just a “north-south” issue however: within the European Union there have also been 
serious concerns about the uneven distribution of State responsibilities for refugees - a 
concern that significantly magnified with the large increase in arrivals in 2015 and 
2016.109  
At the heart of these tensions is a key set of principles: international cooperation, 
solidarity, burden sharing and responsibility sharing (hereafter “burden sharing”110) 
between States in the refugee regime. Recital 4 of the preamble of the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) expresses this as follows: 
Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain 
countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United 
Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be 
achieved without international cooperation.111  
                                                 
104 The opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not reflect the views of the United Nations. 
105 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, 20 June 2016, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/unhcrsharedmedia/2016/2016-06-20-global-trends/2016-06-14-Global-Trends-
2015.pdf. 
106 UNHCR, “Burden-Sharing - Discussion paper submitted by UNHCR Fifth Annual Plenary Meeting of 
the APC”, (2001) 17 ISIL Yearbook of International Humanitarian and Refugee Law, 
www.worldlii.org/int/journals/ISILYBIHRL/.../17.rtf, p. 2. See also: UNHCR, Protection Policy Paper: 
Maritime Interception Operations and the Processing of International Protection Claims: Legal Standards 
and Policy Considerations with Respect to Extraterritorial Processing, November 2010, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4cd12d3a2.html, pp. 3-4. 
107 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: In Search of Solidarity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), at 197. Cf. Stephen H. Legomsky, 'Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum 
Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection', Legal Research and Protection Policy 
Research Series (Geneva: Department of International Protection, UNHCR, 2003), 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3f4de85d4.pdf. 
108 UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, 20 June 2016, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/unhcrsharedmedia/2016/2016-06-20-global-trends/2016-06-14-Global-Trends-
2015.pdf, p. 2. 
109 For latest data on arrivals across the Mediterranean, see UNHCR, Refugees/Migrants Emergency 
Response – Mediterranean, updated regularly, http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php.  
110 See further Part I.B below for an explanation with respect to terminology. 
111 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137; 
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Presented in this way, burden sharing appears to represent a call for collective action to 
resolve refugee challenges, as well as the notion that granting asylum may create 
difficulties for some States. But the nature, meaning and scope of burden sharing, its legal 
relevance within the refugee regime, and what exactly it requires, or not, of States is still 
frequently described as unclear. 
This is not to say that literature, policy and practice on burden sharing is lacking. To the 
contrary. Since at least the 1970s there has been a cyclical rise and fall in academic and 
policy interest in burden sharing, coinciding with high-profile, large-scale refugee crises 
and (more/less) successful efforts by the international community to respond. Previous 
peaks of interest include the late 1990s and early 2000s, following the conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia and in Kosovo,112 and the late 1970s and early 1980s, following the 
outflow of refugees from Vietnam and in Central America.113 The crisis in Syria, and 
particularly its impact in Europe have, once again, heightened policy and academic 
interest in burden sharing – including within the United Nations, with the issue being 
discussed at a series of meetings in 2016 culminating in the adoption of the New York 
Declaration for Refugees and Migrants by the UN General Assembly in September.114  
For all this renewed interest in burden sharing, the current discussion in many ways echo 
previous periods in that it involves an entrenchment, rather than a reconsideration, of 
certain preconceptions. First, the assumption that burden sharing, while a desirable part 
of the international refugee regime, is a vague principle in terms of its scope and 
normative content, and is more relevant politically than legally.115 Second, the assumption 
                                                 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267.  
112 See generally: Astri Suhrke, “Burden-sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective 
versus National Action”, 11 Journal of Refugee Studies 396–415 (1998), p. 315; Michael Barutciski and 
Astri Suhrke, “Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovations in Protection and Burden-Sharing”, 
14 Journal of Refugee Studies 95–115 (2001). 
113 See generally: Richard Towle, “Processes and Critiques of the Indo-Chinese Comprehensive Plan of 
Action: An Instrument of International Burden-Sharing?”, 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 537-
370 (2006); Alexander Betts, “Comprehensive Plans of Action: Insights from CIREFCA and the 
Indochinese CPA”, New Issues in Refugee Research (Geneva: UNHCR, 2006), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ff163c82.html. 
114 The New York Declaration contains language acknowledging “a shared responsibility to manage large 
movements of refugees and migrants in a humane, sensitive, compassionate and people-centred manner” 
(para. 11), as well as “the centrality of international cooperation to the refugee protection regime” (para. 
68). States “commit to a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting 
the world’s refugees, while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and 
resources among States” (para 68): United Nations General Assembly, New York Declaration for Refugees 
and Migrants, A/RES/71/1, 19 September 2016, 
http://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/57e39d987/new-york-declaration-refugees-migrants.html. See 
also Executive Committee Conclusion No. 112 (LXVII) (2016) on “International cooperation from a 
protection and solutions perspective”, 
http://www.refworld.org/type,EXCONC,UNHCR,,57f7b5f74,0.html. 
115 For example, UNHCR’s former Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Erika Feller, has stated 
that: “…the current displacement situation, even as desperate as it is, may nevertheless offer a rare 
opportunity to build upon the foundations of the 1951 Refugee Convention, through a process to finally 
clarify the meaning of international solidarity and the general content of burden sharing. … The absence of 
agreement around what burden and responsibility-sharing should actually lead to has been a serious 
loophole in the protection architecture and the opportunity to remedy this now has at least a fighting 
chance”:  Erika Feller, Protection Elsewhere – But Where? National, Regional and Global Perspectives on 
Refugee Law, Keynote Address, November 2015, 
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that States are failing to sufficiently share burdens in practice – as evidenced by the 
inequitable distribution of refugee hosting responsibilities between countries.  
The purpose of this paper is to serve as a first step in reconsidering these preconceptions 
about the scope and nature of burden sharing in the refugee regime as it is currently 
structured, by going back to the origins of the insertion of the reference to burden sharing 
in the preamble of the 1951 Convention. Following brief notes on terminology (Part I.B) 
and the architecture of the 1951 Convention (Part I.C), Parts II and III analyse the travaux 
préparatoires of the 1951 Convention with respect to the “burden sharing provision”, 
which was initially envisaged for the operative part of the 1951 Convention and was 
ultimately included in recital 4 of the preamble. My focus is on understanding the 
apparent purpose of the provision as written, according to its drafters.116 In Part IV, I draw 
attention to a number of issues emerging from the travaux préparatoires that continue to 
have implications for the principle of burden sharing and the operation of refugee regime 
as a whole – and indeed go some way to explaining the significant confusion in which we 
find ourselves today.  
1.2 Note on terminology 
In international refugee instruments and also in the literature there are four separate terms 
that are used, both interchangeably as well as consecutively, to refer to similar ideas: (1) 
international cooperation; (2) international solidarity; (3) burden sharing; and (4) 
responsibility sharing.117 While used interchangeably in policy contexts, it is arguable 
                                                 
http://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/Conference2015_Keynote.pdf. Prior to his 
departure, the former High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, noted: “As we face the highest 
levels of forced displacement in recorded history, the institution of asylum must remain sacrosanct, 
honoured as one of the deepest expressions of humanity – especially now as it is being so severely tested 
in many parts of the world. It is my conviction that the best way to do this is through genuine international 
cooperation and equitable burden and responsibility sharing. In fact, if there is one Protocol that is yet to 
be drafted to complement the 1951 Convention, it is one on international solidarity and burden sharing:” 
Antonio Guterres, Opening remarks at the 66th session of the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme, October 2015, 
http://unhcr.org/56122bd76.html. See also: Alexander Betts, “The Political Economy of Extra-Territorial 
Processing: Separating ‘Purchaser’ from ‘Provider’ in Asylum Policy”, New Issues in Refugee Research 
(Geneva: UNHCR, 2003), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ff2b2b82.pdf, p. 2. (“Without any binding 
enforcement mechanism, the 1951 Convention and UNHCR’s ExCom can only rely on gentle persuasion 
or innovation to coax states towards greater cooperation to create a more sustainable asylum regime”). 
Stephen H. Legomsky, “Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third 
Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection”, Legal Research and Protection Policy Research Series 
(Geneva: Department of International Protection, UNHCR, 2003), 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3f4de85d4.pdf, p. 608. (“While international law imposes no obligation on 
states to accept refugees for permanent resettlement, agreements to share responsibility for doing so are 
highly beneficial and therefore strongly encouraged by UNHCR and others.”) 
116 As distinct from seeking to use travaux for interpretative purposes. I note the warning provided by 
Hurwitz: “The travaux préparatoires should be used with particular caution in the case of the Refugee 
Convention, given that only 26 States participated in the draft of the Convention to which 144 States are 
now party”: Agnès Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 132. It is therefore not my intention to imply that the approach of the drafters 
with respect to recital 4 of the preamble is conclusive of its meaning and scope today. 
117 Hurwitz identifies two additional terms that are also relevant in the general international law context: 
“good neighbourliness” (part of the law of co-existence, entails respect by States of their obligations under 
public international law, above all its basic principles) and “comity” (a species of accommodation not 
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that these terms are not completely synonymous from an international legal 
perspective.118 For the purposes of this paper, I continue to use the term “burden sharing” 
because, based on my research to date, this is the term that most clearly encapsulates what 
I understand to be the scope of the principle as applied in contemporary practice. (See 
further Part IV below).  
1.3 Note on the architecture of the 1951 Convention 
The 1951 Convention is, together with the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), an important pillar of the modern refugee 
regime.119 It was adopted following the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons (held in Geneva from 2 to 25 July 1951120) 
and entered into force in April 1954. The 1951 Convention broke new ground in several 
respects.121 For the purposes of this paper, the most significant were that: 
a. By adopting a general definition of a “refugee” based on a well-founded fear 
of persecution, the 1951 Convention went further than earlier refugee treaties, 
which had referred to specific national and ethnic groups rather than 
establishing generalized criteria that could fit future situations;122 
b. Under the International Refugee Organization (IRO) (1946-1952), 
repatriation and large-scale resettlement were the primary solutions envisaged 
for refugees.123 Conversely, the 1951 Convention was premised on the grant 
                                                 
unrelated to morality, implying neighbourliness, mutual respect and the friendly waiver of technicalities, 
rules of politeness, convenience and goodwill observed by States in their mutual intercourse without being 
legally bound by them): Agnès Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 167. As discussed in Part IV below, the drafters of the 1951 
Convention also referred to the term “international collaboration”, as a further alternative.  
118 See below, Part IV.B. See also, e.g., Jost Delbrük (ed.), International Law of Cooperation and State 
Sovereignty: Proceedings of an International Symposium of the Kiel Walther-Schücking-Institute of 
International law, May 23-26 2001 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002). 
119
 For the purposes of this paper, the 1951 Convention signals the start of the modern refugee protection 
architecture that is still in place today. For further details with respect to the refugee regime in place prior 
to 1950 see generally: Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)).  I note that that many States, including significant host States, are not 
1951 Convention signatories. Further, the modern refugee protection regime now extends beyond the 1951 
Convention to include regional instruments, conclusions on international protection adopted by UNHCR’s 
Executive Committee, General Assembly resolutions and customary international law, amongst others. 
Accordingly, any analysis of burden sharing as contained in the 1951 Convention does not conclude 
consideration of the operation of burden sharing principles in the refugee regime as a whole.  
120 The procedural history of the 1951 Convention is summarized in Guy Goodwin-Gill, “Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees”, United Nations 
Audiovisual Library of International Law, 2008, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html.  
121 See further: National Population Council, National Population Council’s Refugee Review (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1991); Louise Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time (vol 
I) (New York: The Scarecrow Press, 1975). 
122
 See, e.g., Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, 28 October 1933, League of 
Nations, Treaty Series Vol. CLIX No. 3663, Article 1 (“The present Convention is applicable to Russian, 
Armenian and assimilated refugees, as defined by the Arrangements of May 12th, 1926, and June 30th, 
1928, subject to such modifications or amplifications as each Contracting Party may introduce in this 
definition at the moment of signature or accession.”) 
123
 See generally: Louise Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time (vol I) (New York: The Scarecrow 
Press, 1975), pp. 29 - 33. The International Refugee Organization (IRO) was non-permanent specialized 
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of permanent asylum to refugees by what today would be termed “first 
countries of asylum.” Its purpose was to set out internationally consistent and 
generally higher standards of treatment for refugees in such countries, 
including access to courts (Article 16) and the labour market (Article 17) on a 
“national treatment” or “most-favoured nation” basis. In other words, the 1951 
Convention was essentially an agreement between States as to how they would 
treat refugees on their territories.124 
Contrary to contemporary criticisms that the 1951 Convention is too narrow to accurately 
capture the full scope of displacement, the Convention was seen at the time of its adoption 
as imposing significant obligations on host States/countries of first asylum - both because 
of the generalized refugee definition and the presumption that host States would provide 
permanent asylum to refugees who found themselves on their territory. Again, large-scale 
resettlement, which had been the primary solution provided under the IRO but was costly 
and from which the United States wanted to distance itself125 was no longer to be the 
default solution. Instead, the principal operating assumption was that the governments in 
whose territories refugees resided should care for them as far as possible.126 As an 
                                                 
agency of the United Nations. Its “wide range of functions made it possible for the first time to approach 
the refugee problem in all its phases: identification, registration, and classification; care and assistance; and 
repatriation or resettlement and reestablishment in countries able to receive those refugees who were under 
the mandate of the IRO” (p. 31). This “complex operation could be accomplished only through joint effort 
by the member governments of the IRO, the governments of asylum and of resettlement, the international 
and national voluntary agencies, and several UN organizations” who “worked together in a three-phase 
effort towards a final settlement of refugees” involving: (1) temporary relief activities of care and 
maintenance; (2) the movement of refugees out of the countries of temporary hospitality through either 
repatriation or resettlement; (3) the establishment of the refugee as a person possessing full citizenship and 
thus adequate legal protection and the means of earning his livelihood” (p. 32). Accordingly, “in contrast 
to the overseas migrations of former centuries, post-war migrations were thus planned and coordinated to 
a large extent by an international organization with enormous individual and collective resources” (p. 32). 
Holborn provides further information about the various resettlement programmes adopted by the IRO, 
including mass settlement, individual migration and the Resettlement Placement Service (p. 32), noting that 
the immediate post war years provided a favorable environment for resettlement of refugees (p. 33). 
124 Guy Goodwin-Gill, ‘Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees’, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, 2008, 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html; Louise Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time (vol I) (New 
York: The Scarecrow Press, 1975), p. 84 (noting that “(t)he effect of the Convention was to establish a code 
of the basic rights of refugees, rights which signatories of the Convention pledged themselves to respect”). 
125
 See generally Louise Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time (vol I) (New York: The Scarecrow 
Press, 1975), noting that the United States believed “it had done its share” (p. 61). “The Western European 
countries realized that, given the new US policy, there was no realistic hope of the IRO continuing to handle 
the problem of refugees by relieving the countries of first asylum of their presence” (p. 62). Further 
“(e)veryone, both in Europe and overseas, realized that the major burden of the remaining refugees would 
now have the be carried by the countries of first asylum, and the issue to be decided was what if any 
assistance the international community was going to provide to those countries….” (pp. 61-62). See also, 
Refugees. Study of Statelessness. Communication from the International Refugee Organization, Document 
E/1392, 11 July 1949, para. 3, noting that the Member States of the IRO would, on dissolution of the IRO, 
“consider themselves as being relived … of the responsibility which will rest upon them until then as 
members of the Organization”, although “The delegations of certain European States…wished to make 
clear that they considered the necessity for international action to be as great in the field of international 
assistance as in the field of protection…”, para. 8(f). 
126 “International assistance should be authorised only as a supplement [to ordinary government services], 
and for a limited time”: Louise Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time (vol I) (New York: The 
Scarecrow Press, 1975), p. 138. See also Refugees. Study of Statelessness. Communication from the 
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agreement between host States as to how they would treat refugees, the 1951 Convention 
notably does not address the question of admission to any country or establish a right to 
seek asylum. Further, it does not apportion responsibility between States, for example, by 
prescribing which State should deal with a claim to refugee status or establishing quotas 
for admission.127 The exception to this is the burden sharing provision, ultimately 
included in recital 4 of the preamble, to which I now turn. 
2. Analysis of the travaux préparatoires: efforts to include burden sharing in the 
operative part of the 1951 Convention 
The original draft text of the 1951 Convention proposed by the Secretariat in January 
1950 included a “Chapter II” entitled “Admission”, which contained an article as follows: 
Article 3 
(1) In pursuance of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
High Contracting Parties shall give favourable consideration to the position of 
refugees seeking asylum from persecution or the threat of persecution on account 
of their race, religion, nationality or political opinion. 
(2) The High Contracting Parties shall to the fullest possible extent relieve the 
burden assumed by initial reception countries which have afforded asylum to 
persons to whom paragraph 1 refers. They shall do so, inter alia, by agreeing to 
receive a certain number of refugees in their territories.128 
In the comments on the text by the Secretary-General, it was clarified that the article 
“does not touch on the actual status of refugees and lays down no binding legal 
obligations. It does, however, indicate a number of guiding principles which it might be 
thought desirable to incorporated in the Convention.”129 The rationale for paragraph 2 
above,130 as set out by the secretariat, was that “owing to their geographical position and 
                                                 
International Refugee Organization, Document E/1392, 11 July 1949, para. 76(a) (“It is assumed that after 
the termination of the IRO programme, any care and maintenance required by refugees will, in general, be 
provided by the Governments of the countries in which they reside. Coordination of the work for refugees 
of humanitarian relief organizations might, however, usefully be undertaken at an international level”; and 
para. 76 (b) “It is also assumed that after the termination of the IRO programme resettlement operations on 
an international scale will cease. A future international agency….might however be able to interest 
reception countries in the admission of refugees needing resettlement, or facilitate the resettlement of 
refugees under migration schemes”. 
127 Guy Goodwin-Gill, ‘Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees’, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, 2008, 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html.  
128 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Memorandum by the Secretary-General, 
Annex: Preliminary Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and Stateless Persons), United 
Nations Economic and Security Council, E/AC/32/2, 3 January 1950, pp. 22-23. 
129 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Memorandum by the Secretary-General, 
Annex: Preliminary Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and Stateless Persons), United 
Nations Economic and Security Council, E/AC/32/2, 3 January 1950, pp. 22-23. 
130 I have not summarized the discussions on the issues with respect to admission in paragraph 1. However, 
it was the strong position of the United States that the convention “must deal with the rights of refugees 
who had already been admitted into a country, without seeking to establish who should admit them and in 
what circumstances”. Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, First Session, Summary 
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liberal traditions, some States are destined to become the initial reception countries for 
refugees”, and that “[i]t is but just that other countries should not allow these [States] to 
bear the whole burden and by agreeing to admit a certain number of refugees to their 
territory should assume their equitable share”. 131 Again, however, the secretariat stressed 
that “[c]learly no binding and precise obligations can be imposed on Governments - for 
example by specifying the extent to which they must agree to receive refugees on their 
territory. It is for this reason that the Article includes the deliberate vague form of words: 
‘a certain number of refugees’.” 132 
Accordingly, the question of relieving the “burden” on States receiving large numbers of 
refugees was initially envisaged as forming part of the operative part of the 1951 
Convention, and explicitly linked to the question of admission as well as efforts to 
recognize a “right” to seek asylum along the lines of Article 14 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). At this same time, it is striking that even for the 
Secretary-General there was no intention to make this provision either “legally binding” 
or more precise in terms of State obligations.  
It was ultimately these characteristics that served as a basis for several States to object to 
inclusion of the article in the substantive part of the 1951 Convention in early discussions. 
Venezuela, for example, “observed that it was generally accepted in international law that 
only those provisions which imposed obligations on the signatories were included in the 
articles of international instruments; clauses containing statements of principle, hopes, 
wishes, etc. were generally inserted in the preamble and not in the operative part”.133 As 
Chapter III “did not…impose any specific obligation” but “simply stated a general 
principle”, the text “was unnecessary, since it was obvious that the effectiveness of the 
convention would depend on the goodwill and the spirit of solidarity of the signatory 
States.”134  
France was the primary proponent of retaining Chapter II in the text of the 1951 
Convention, for reasons explored further in Part III. The delegation noted that “if 
countries far from whence the refugees were coming were not prepared to make some 
effort to relieve the burden assumed by initial reception countries, the latter would be 
unable to support indefinitely the considerable commitments resulting from their liberal 
policy and the Committee’s work would be absolutely purposeless”.135 France stressed 
that “a wish expressed in the preamble of the convention or in a separate text would 
certainly not have the same force as a moral obligation set forth in the body of the 
                                                 
Record of the Seventh Meeting, United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/AC.32/SR.7, 2 February 
1950, para. 29. See also the comments of the United Kingdom, para. 35. France strongly opposed this noting 
“[i]t was indisputable that the most essential, most urgent and primary right for the refugee was that of 
finding a reception country; otherwise he would never obtain the status of a refugee and would never be 
able to benefit by the legal protection provided by the convention”: para. 42. 
131 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, Memorandum by the Secretary-General, 
Annex: Preliminary Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and Stateless Persons), United 
Nations Economic and Security Council, E/AC/32/2, 3 January 1950, pp. 22-23. 
132 Id. 
133 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, First Session, Summary Record of the 
Seventh Meeting, United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/AC.32/SR.7, 2 February 1950, para. 8. 
134 Id, para. 9. 
135 Id, para. 13. 
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convention”.136 With respect to allegations that the language of the article was “vague”, 
the French delegate stated that “he feared that the article would give rise to insuperable 
objections if the obligation stated therein was couched in more specific form”.137 
Likewise, the Chairman (Canada) argued that the Committee “should not allow itself to 
be excessively influenced by legal considerations in seeking to formulate provisions to 
ensure that a certain category of human beings, the refugees, should receive the minimum 
considerations to which they were entitled”. 138 Denmark also noted that first asylum 
countries (“which received refugees and for which it was in practice impossible to 
question their admission”) required “assurance that other countries would favourably 
consider admitting refugees”; otherwise “if such assurances were not given to countries 
of initial reception, some of them might be somewhat apprehensive about opening their 
doors to refugees”.139 
The factual premise of the need for burden sharing itself was not called into question. The 
United Kingdom noted that “[i]t was only natural” that “countries geographically adjacent 
to the refugees’ countries of origin” should wish the burden on them to be shared, and 
that “it was to be hoped that the latter group would provide them with all requisite 
assistance, as in fact it had already done in the past”.140 Likewise the United States “was 
in no way seeking to avoid the obligations of international solidarity”, rather “the 
question…was whether the obligation to relive the burden of the initial reception 
countries should appear in the operative part of the convention".141 Several States 
advocated for the burden sharing provision to be included either in the preamble or in a 
General Assembly resolution.142 Indeed, Brazil suggested that a General Assembly 
resolution could “stipulate the method by which that principle of international solidarity 
could be put into practice”,143 while the United States said that “in the interests of 
[receiving countries] it would be better for the problem to be raised in the United Nations 
rather than within the framework of the Convention”.144 
The Committee ultimately voted by six votes to three with two abstentions that no clause 
on admission – and thus on burden sharing - should be included in the operative part of 
the 1951 Convention. The question was left open of finding “another place” for the 
reference, either in the preamble or a resolution of the General Assembly. Following the 
vote, the Chairman specifically stated that “he hoped that the fundamental idea of that 
clause would be expressed in the generous spirit which the initial reception countries had 
the right to expect. 145 And in prescient remarks, the Director-General of the IRO 
                                                 
136 Id, para. 22. See also para. 44 (noting “a mere expression of hope in the preamble or in a separate 
resolution would not have the same binding character as a moral commitment explicitly accepted by 
plenipotentiaries on behalf of the States principles”). 
137 Id, para. 43. “Certainly, all delegations were fully aware that their countries were under a moral 
obligation to assist the initial reception countries to solve the refugee problem and that it was impossible to 
specify exactly the extent of that obligation because it was not possible to foresee in advance how it would 
be put into practice in each particular case”. 
138 Id, para. 19. 
139 Id, para. 30. 
140 Id, para. 32. 
141 Id, paras. 38-39. 
142 E.g., by Venezuela. Id, para. 12. 
143 Id, para. 17. 
144 Id, para. 39. 
145 Id, para. 50. 
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cautioned that: 
…one of the fundamental characteristics of the refugee problem produced 
by the Second World War and its aftermath has been the continuing influx of 
refugees into certain countries which have been called upon to bear the brunt of 
providing first asylum. It would… be opportune for an attempt to be made on the 
international level to deal with the problem of admission, and also to provide some 
means whereby the burden imposed upon countries of first asylum might in some 
degree be shared by the other members of the international community of nations 
through the inclusion in the international convention relating to the status of 
refugees of provisions concerning the admission of refugees … the Director 
General of the IRO therefore considers that it is his duty to point out the special 
need for the inclusion in the draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
of provisions concerning admission, and that a failure to include any such 
provision will leave a most serious gap in the Convention.146 
3. Analysis of the travaux préparatoires: including burden sharing in the preamble 
After early attempts to include burden sharing in the operative parts of the 1951 
Convention failed, focus was then turned to the preamble.147 The text of what became 
recital 4 was initially proposed by France as follows: 
But considering that the exercise of the right of asylum places an undue burden 
on certain countries because of their geographical situation, and that a satisfactory 
solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international 
scope and nature cannot be achieved without international cooperation to help to 
distribute refugees throughout the world.148 (emphasis added) 
The French delegate justified the insertion of the proposed clause by noting that 
“the grim reality which the Ad Hoc Committee (on Statelessness and Related Matters) 
would have to take into account was that a number of countries were overburdened with 
refugees and were threatened with continuous new intakes”.149 The French delegate 
clarified that this included Austria, which hosted 450,000 refugees in a total population 
of 7 million inhabitants; as well as France itself which had recorded a monthly flow of 
4,500 refugees fleeing the Franco dictatorship in Spain at the time the 1951 Convention 
                                                 
146 Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, Refugees and Stateless Persons. Compilation of 
the Comments of Governments and Specialized Agencies on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Statelessness and Related Problems (Document E/1618), Memorandum by the Secretary-General, United 
Nations Economic and Social Council, E/AC.32/L.40, 10 August 1950, paras. 4, 13. 
147 The preamble was discussed by the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems (16 
January- 16 February 1950) and the Social Committee of the Economic and Social Council (meeting in 
July and August 1950). The draft refugee definition and the preamble as amended were adopted by the 
Economic and Social Council on 11 August 1950. See further, Guy S Goodwin-Gill, “Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees”, UN Audiovisual Library of 
International Law, 2008, http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html.  
148 France: amendment to the draft convention relating to the status of refugees, UN Doc. E/L.81, 29 July 
1950, para. 4.  
149 Economic and Social Council, United Nations Economic and Social Council Official Records, Eleventh 
Session, 406th meeting, E_SR.406_ENG, 11 August 1950, p. 275. 
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was drafted, and had hosted up to 500,000 refugees by this point.150 The French delegate 
stated that “[i]f that situation were not take into account, the instrument created might 
prove incapable of serving its purpose”.151 In other words, speaking as a host country 
experiencing what has come to be known as a “mass influx”, France was concerned that 
if the burdens experienced by such States were not accounted for, the 1951 Convention 
may be unable to be meaningfully applied in practice. This assumption – the factual 
necessity of international cooperation to ensure that the 1951 Convention could be applied 
by certain States experiencing mass influx – is the starting point for understanding the 
intention of the French delegate with respect to the clause. Echoing both the Secretary-
General in his initial proposal for the clause, as well as many receiving countries today, 
the French delegate emphasized that geography would mean that some States would 
always receive larger flows of refugees than others;152 the need for the 1951 Convention 
to ensure “equity” for those States in this respect;153 and the fairly onerous obligations 
that the 1951 Convention imposed through the generalized refugee definition and the high 
standards of treatment to be provided by contracting States.154  
                                                 
150 See further Claudena Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 59, noting that “(a)lthough the number of Spanish refugees approximated the 
number from the Third Reich, this exodus differed in that it took place within a much shorter period of 
time, and the responsibility for assisting the refugees fell to one country, France. …. They did not have 
major difficulties in finding temporary asylum in France but, once there, they still needed some form of 
international legal protection and a means of earning a living while they waited and hoped for revolution 
in their home country”. 
151 Economic and Social Council, United Nations Economic and Social Council Official Records, Eleventh 
Session, 406th meeting, E_SR.406_ENG, 11 August 1950, p. 275. 
152 Noting that “[t]he truth was that certain European countries were the victims of their geographical 
situation which had made them, for more than 30 years, a haven of refuge in a particularly disturbed part 
of the world…”: Social Committee, Summary Record of the Hundred and Fifty-Eighth Meeting, Economic 
and Social Council E/AC.7/SR.158, 15 August 1950, p. 8. 
153 “The wording proposed by the French delegation presented the problem of refugees in terms that were 
equitable both for the refugees themselves and for the countries receiving them”: Social Committee, 
Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixtieth Meeting, Economic and Social Council, E/AC.7/SR.160, 
p. 26; “[t]he Committee should not lose sight of the exceptional burdens assumed by certain countries or 
the need to submit for signature by the Governments especially concerned a text which they would find 
equitable”: Id p. 27; the “French amendment endeavoured to provide a definition of the refugee problem 
which would be equitable both to the refugees themselves and to the countries which granted them 
hospitality…”: Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, 
Economic and Social Council, E/AC.7/SR.166, 22 August 1950, p. 12; “The rights of countries of refuge 
should be safeguarded, as well as the rights of refugees”: Economic and Social Council, United Nations 
Economic and Social Council Official Records, Eleventh Session, 406th meeting, E_SR.406_ENG, 11 
August 1950, para. 62. 
154
 Noting “the Convention itself would entail considerable obligations for the Contracting Parties”: Social 
Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Seventh Meeting, Economic and Social 
Council, E/AC.7/SR.167, 22 August 1950, pp. 6-7. The French delegate particularly emphasized his 
concern about the breadth of the definition of a refugee under discussion: “Never before had a definition so 
wide and generous, but also so dangerous for the receiving countries, been put forward for signature by 
governments:” Economic and Social Council, United Nations Economic and Social Council Official 
Records, Eleventh Session, 406th meeting, E_SR.406_ENG, 11 August 1950, p. 276. Further “Mr. 
ROCHEFORT (France) thought it impossible to begin the general discussion on the definition of the word 
"refugee” without first considering the preamble to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees …The 
French delegation would, indeed, find it impossible to give an opinion on the specific issue of the definition 
of the word “refugee” unless it could at the same time express its views on the refugee problem as a whole.” 
Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Fifty-Eighth Meeting, Economic and Social 
Council, E/AC.7/SR.158, 15 August 1950, p. 5. The French delegate was also sensitive to the fact that the 
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As with the brief discussion that had initially taken place when burden sharing was 
proposed for the substantive part of the 1951 Convention, in principle no delegation 
disagreed with the factual premise of recital 4. The United States, for example, noted that 
“[i]t went without saying that there should be international cooperation to alleviate the 
burden falling on certain countries because their geographical situation was such that an 
inordinately large number of refugees fled to them”.155 Some delegations went further, 
referring, in the case of Mexico, to the fact that the clause “had the further merit of seeking 
to awaken a feeling of collective responsibility”.156 Nonetheless, the discussions among 
the drafters of the 1951 Convention reveal certain ambivalences about the burden sharing 
provision, both in terms of form and substance.  
I address these issues in turn below. 
3.1 Questions of form: appropriateness of recital 4 for the preamble? 
As a first issue, there was significant discussion among delegations about the 
appropriateness of including the burden sharing provision in the preamble. This was 
because the provision arguably went beyond the scope of the 1951 Convention which, as 
outlined above, was essentially an agreement between States as to the standards of 
treatment to be applied to refugees found on their territory. For example, Belgium was 
“not opposed to the ideas expressed in the amendment, but considered that they had no 
place in the Convention”.157 Denmark noted that it “commended his entire support in 
matters of substance, but some of it perhaps went beyond what one would expect to find 
in a preamble, although the points covered would require consideration sooner or 
later”.158 Most clearly, the representative from Canada stated: 
… the draft Convention laid down a series of obligations towards refugees in any 
country, but contained no article regarding the distribution of refugees. The 
preamble should surely be directly related to the matter of the Convention. In short 
the paragraph amounted to an acceptance of a decision on high policy and was 
therefore unsuited to form part of a preamble to a convention conferring specified 
rights on specified categories of refugees.159  
As with initial discussions, delegations opposed to the clause largely advocated for its 
inclusion in a General Assembly resolution instead. The United States stated several times 
that “the substance of the text might be incorporated in a General Assembly resolution, 
                                                 
issue of admission was not governed by the Convention and that, in his view, receiving States would have 
“no choice” in this regard, an issue discussion in Part IV.D below. 
155 Economic and Social Council, United Nations Economic and Social Council Official Records, Eleventh 
Session, 406th meeting, E_SR.406_ENG, 11 August 1950, para. 84. 
156 E/AC.7/SR.166, Economic and Social Council, 22 August 1950, p. 13. 
157 Economic and Social Council, United Nations Economic and Social Council Official Records, Eleventh 
Session, 406th meeting, E_SR.406_ENG, 11 August 1950, para. 95. 
158 Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Seventh Meeting, Economic and 
Social Council, E/AC.7/SR.167, 22 August 1950, p. 5. 
159 Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, Economic and Social 
Council, E/AC.7/SR.166, 22 August 1950, p. 19. This statement was also supported by Belgium: Social 
Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, Economic and Social Council, 
E/AC.7/SR.166, 22 August 1950, p. 20. 
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where it would be more proper and effective”.160 India was “opposed to inserting 
something in the preamble which went beyond the scope of the definition or something 
which was not normally considered proper in such a preamble”,161 and likewise suggested 
that the reference would be better suited to a General Assembly resolution.162 One State 
– Belgium – took the opposite position, suggesting again that the clause be inserted in the 
substantive provisions of the Convention: “[t]his delegation, however, would like to go 
still further and insert after article 26 of the draft Convention another article drawn up in 
the same terms as those used in the fourth paragraph of the French amendment”,163 a 
proposal that ultimately not taken up by other delegations. 164  
France was over the course of the negotiations insistent on the inclusion of the burden 
sharing clause in the preamble and despite the concerns expressed by several delegations, 
it was France’s argumentation that ultimately prevailed.165 He was dismissive of 
including the burden sharing provision in a General Assembly resolution, noting: 
Since a preamble formed an integral part of a convention, it carried greater weight 
that a General Assembly resolution. Although he did not wish to cast doubts on 
the value of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly he ventured to suggest 
that in practice some of them had very little positive effect. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
160 Economic and Social Council, United Nations Economic and Social Council Official Records, Eleventh 
Session, 406th meeting, E_SR.406_ENG, 11 August 1950, para. 84. See also Social Committee, Summary 
Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, Economic and Social Council, E/AC.7/SR.166, 22 
August 1950, p. 13, with the United States again noting that his “only doubt whether those provisions 
should go into a preamble at all… much of what the French representative proposed to add would be better 
adopted in the form of a General Assembly resolution…”  
161 Economic and Social Council, United Nations Economic and Social Council Official Records, Eleventh 
Session, 406th meeting, E_SR.406_ENG, 11 August 1950, para. 101. 
162 Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, Economic and Social 
Council, E/AC.7/SR.166, 22 August 1950, pp. 18-19.  
163 Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, Economic and Social 
Council, E/AC.7/SR.166, 22 August 1950, pp. 16-17.  
164 Interestingly, despite France’s initial advocacy for burden sharing to be included in the operative part of 
the 1951 Convention, France also appeared to reject the Belgian suggestion to put the clause in a new 
article, although his reasoning for this was not exactly clear: noting simply it “would be difficult to find a 
suitable place for the fourth paragraph, relating to the undue burden certain countries had to bear, in the 
substantive portion of the Convention”. Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-
Sixth Meeting, Economic and Social Council, E/AC.7/SR.166, 22 August 1950, p. 17. The French delegate 
later noted that he would indeed have preferred to see the burden sharing provision in the substantive part 
of the 1951 Convention: “some provisions had been placed in the preamble which he would have preferred 
to see in the body of the Convention itself, particularly those stating the need for international cooperation.” 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the 
Thirty-First Meeting, A/CONF.2/SR.31, 29 November 1951, p. 25. 
165 The French delegate ultimately insisted on the inclusion of the provision, and threatened not to sign the 
Convention without it. The burden sharing clause was initially rejected by the Committee and watered down 
in the new draft proposed by the United Kingdom. See, e.g., Social Committee, Summary Record of the 
One Hundred and Seventieth Meeting, Economic and Social Council, E/AC.7/SR.170, 23 August 1950, p. 
8: “(t)hough the preamble had originally been based on a French proposal, it had emerged from the 
Committee shorn of a clause which he felt to be essential, and the French delegation would vote against it 
if it were put to the vote as it stood”; and “…his delegation was no longer in a position to discuss certain 
articles of the draft Convention, since neither in the preamble nor in the main body of the instrument was 
there any safeguarding clause relating to any exceptional situations which might later arise”: Social 
Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundredth and Sixty-Seventh Meeting, Economic and Social 
Council, E/AC.7/SR.167, 22 August 1950, p. 12. 
 61 
 
preamble being bound up with the Convention would have the same authority as 
the Convention itself. It was for that reason that the French delegation was 
pressing for the inclusion in the preamble of the ideas it had put forward, 
especially as the Convention itself would entail considerable obligations for the 
Contracting Parties.166  
He also stated that “[w]hereas the General Assembly's vote was binding only in the moral 
sense, signature and ratification [of the Convention] imposed financial and other 
contractual obligations”, and that “[t]hat was why, in the draft preamble that it had 
submitted, the French delegation had asked that the problem be presented in truly 
international and equitable terms”.167   
In sum, while the factual premise in terms of the need for international cooperation to 
support receiving States in certain circumstances was generally supported, it appears that 
many delegations recognized at the drafting stage an inherent inconsistency in inserting 
the burden sharing provision into the preamble, given this was unrelated to the purpose 
and goals of the substantive provisions of the 1951 Convention, which constituted an 
agreement as to the standards of treatment to be applied to refugees on any particular 
State’s territory. The fact that the burden sharing provision was ultimately retained in the 
preamble appears to represent a compromise: giving it more weight than a mere reference 
to the need for international cooperation in a General Assembly resolution, without going 
so far as to include the clause in the operative part of the 1951 Convention.  
3.2 Questions of substance: the scope and purpose of the burden sharing provision 
3.2.1 The intention of the French delegate - recital 4 as “safeguarding” or force majeure 
clause 
Compared to the questions of form, the discussion among delegations about the intended 
scope of the burden sharing provision and its practical implications for States was more 
limited. However, the travaux prépartoires leave open several questions in this respect. 
While the inclusion of the burden sharing provision in the preamble, as opposed to the 
operative part of the 1951 Convention, would suggest textually that the clause should be 
read as a mere rhetorical or hortatory appeal,168 the remarks of the French delegate 
indicate that he in fact had relatively ambitious legal and practical expectations from the 
inclusion of the clause. Namely, at many points he characterized recital 4 as a 
“safeguarding clause”, which could justify a State’s failure to implement some of its 
obligations under the 1951 Convention in certain circumstances.  
The obligations flowing from the Convention were such that the day might come 
                                                 
166 Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Seventh Meeting, Economic and 
Social Council, E/AC.7/SR.167, 22 August 1950, pp. 6-7. 
167 Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Fifty-Eighth Meeting, Economic and 
Social Council, E/AC.7/SR.158, 15 August 1950, pp. 6-7. 
168 See further, Part IV.C below. Indeed, as noted in Part II, even the Secretary-General in proposing the 
provision for the operative part of the treaty, suggested it would serve as a “guiding principle”, rather than 
as a legally binding obligation. 
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when certain countries might find it impossible to honour them: hence the 
necessity of certain safeguarding clauses. France herself could not be bound by 
the Convention were it one day to again be faced with an influx of refugees as 
large as was that of the Spanish Republican refugees, amounting to 500,000.169  
Further: 
For those States who were not in a position to give effect to every article of the 
Convention, investigation would then reveal that the problem was perhaps beyond 
these countries, and that it could not be considered that everything was cut and 
dried and that they were therefore failing in their duty by not applying the 
Convention in its entirety. It was obvious, therefore, that steps should be taken to 
ensure that the Convention was applicable in their case. Hence he felt that the 
mention of “international collaboration”, which had proved its efficacy should be 
retained, so that a State which failed to carry out its obligations under the 
Convention would not be regarded as at fault if it found itself in a position which 
was really beyond it.…It was not out of the question that France, for example, 
would have to deal with a huge influx of refugees. If so, international collaboration 
would be the only remedy. Without it, the Convention would be quite 
inapplicable.170 
This seems to suggest that, for the French delegate, recital 4 would in some instances act 
almost as a force majeure clause,171 excusing States experiencing large numbers of 
arrivals from the breach of at least certain of their obligations under the 1951 Convention. 
Consistent with this, at a later point in the discussions, the French delegate even sought 
to include in the Convention’s reservation clause a statement that reservations would not 
be permitted concerning the preamble or articles which included recommendations, an 
effort that was rejected by other States on the basis that the preamble did not did not 
impose any obligations.172   
The French delegate was, however, somewhat vague about exactly how the burden 
sharing provision would work as a force majeure clause to excuse States from their 
obligations in practice. At other points in the discussion he seemed to downplay the 
importance of the provision, characterizing it as “the recognition of a de facto situation, 
rather than a statement of a specific obligation”173 and “a minor matter compared with the 
                                                 
169 Economic and Social Council, United Nations Economic and Social Council Official Records, Eleventh 
Session, 406th meeting, E_SR.406_ENG, 11 August 1950, p. 276. 
170 Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Seventieth Meeting, Economic and Social 
Council, E/AC.7/SR.170, 23 August 1950, pp. 11-12. 
171 There are several definitions of “force majeure”. See, e.g. John Currie, Public International Law 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), p. 419, defining force majeure as “a justification advanced to counter a claim 
of state responsibility on the basis that the allegedly internationally wrongful act of a state is due to an 
unforeseen event or irresistible force, beyond the control of the state, which makes in materially impossible 
for the state to respect an international obligation”. 
172 See Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the Forty-Third 
Meeting, Economic and Social Council, E/AC.32/SR.43, 28 September 1950, p. 7. 
173 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of 
the Thirty-First Meeting, A/CONF.2/SR.31, 29 November 1951, p. 29. 
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obligations which it (France) was willing to accept”.174  
His delegation considered that the preamble represented the only return asked of the 
international community in exchange for the recognition of its right to determine the 
status of refugees in the reception countries, such return taking the form of a definition, 
not of the refugee himself but of the refugee problem, in fair and accurate terms in 
conformity with reality and the aims pursued. The preamble itself was a modest one, 
simply a compromise which the French delegation thought a sincere one and likely to 
prove acceptable to all in its entirety, since it formed a coherent whole.175   
The vagueness of the French position is best exemplified by the statement below – 
downplaying the insertion of the burden sharing provision on the one hand, but also 
reiterating that it would be a “safety clause” for certain States unable to implement their 
1951 Convention obligations on the other: 
The preamble was not a request to governments but only a statement of certain 
obvious truths, with an indication of certain situations which might arise and, in 
that event, of the conclusions to be drawn from them. Recalling once more the 
undue burden which France had had to bear in the matter of receiving refugees, 
he thought that all European countries which ran the same risks should be 
conscious of the need for including such a safety clause in the Convention.176  
In terms of specifying the scope of the provision that the French delegate had in mind, 
the below extract is probably the most helpful:  
…the original text, which alluded to the exceptional position of certain countries 
was, he felt, indispensable for continental countries liable to be faced with a large 
scale influx of refugees. It had been argued that the Convention did not govern 
the question of admission, but continental countries had no choice in the matter. 
When faced with a flood of refugees upon their frontiers they could not help but 
grant them a right of asylum, and possibly refugee status. In the case in point, the 
normal application of the Convention might be completely invalidated. If, for 
example as had already happened, a State was suddenly called upon to take in half 
a million refugees, certain provisions of the Convention, particularly those 
relating to housing and the right to work, could not be applied without presenting 
the country concerned with problems which, temporarily at least, would prove 
insoluble. In such a case there would have to be international collaboration, and it 
was therefore not demanding too much of countries of immigration to ask for the 
                                                 
174 Economic and Social Council, United Nations Economic and Social Council Official Records, Eleventh 
Session, 406th meeting, E_SR.406_ENG, 11 August 1950, para. 61. 
175 Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Fifty-Eighth Meeting, E/AC.7/SR.158, 
Economic and Social Council, 15 August 1950, p. 11. 
176 Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, E/AC.7/SR.166, 
Economic and Social Council, 22 August 1950, p. 22. Similarly: “The preamble to the Convention should 
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by exceptional circumstances from extending the benefits of the Convention to a few hundred or even a 
few thousand persons”. Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Seventh 
Meeting, Economic and Social Council, E/AC.7/SR.167, 22 August 1950, p.17. 
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implicit appeal … to be retained...177 
This statement by the French delegate is notable, in that he presumed that receiving States 
would have “no choice” in terms of the admission of refugees to their territory and the 
grant of asylum, even in cases of mass influx. Rather, the issue was which other 
obligations States may not be in a position to apply unless aid was forthcoming – and here 
France singled out the rights to housing and to employment as examples. I will return to 
this question, which has significance in the contemporary context, in Part IV below. 
It appears that no other State directly contested the force majeure characterization of the 
burden sharing provision asserted by the French delegate; although admittedly no State 
sought to clarify the scope of the provision either or pressed the delegate for more details 
on how a simple preambular recital could work to excuse a State from its obligations 
under the 1951 Convention, and in what circumstances. Only one State, the United 
Kingdom, offered an alternative interpretation of the clause, in justifying the removal of 
part of the burden sharing provision from the revised preamble at a certain stage of the 
discussions.178 The representative noted that while it “had not been omitted from the 
United Kingdom’s amendment by way of dissent from the statement of fact which it 
contained, which everyone fully recognized” the fact was that:  
…he had doubted the value of introducing in a few words the idea that some other 
form of international action was necessary. If the notion of international solidarity 
was retained, it would, he felt, be interpreted merely as referring to international 
solidarity achieved through the signing and ratification of the present 
Convention.179  
In other words, for the United Kingdom, the simple fact of signing the 1951 Convention 
was in itself the “international cooperation” that was referred to in the burden sharing 
provision of the preamble.  
While there was no direct reaction to this comment by the United Kingdom, the 
statements made by many other delegations in ultimate support of maintaining the burden 
sharing provision were arguably implicitly supportive of the French delegate’s 
characterization: Switzerland, for example, “warmly supported the French 
representative’s remarks”,180 as did Germany,181 Sweden,182 and the Netherlands.183  
                                                 
177 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of 
the Thirty-First Meeting, A/CONF.2/SR.31, 29 November 1951, p. 26. 
178 Specifically, the amendment proposed by the United Kingdom read: “Considering that a satisfactory 
solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot 
be achieved without international cooperation”: Alex Takkenberg and Christopher C. Tahbaz, The 
Collected Travaux Preparatoires of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Vol. III, “The 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 2-25 July 1951, 
Amsterdam 1989, page 29 (noting UK amendment made in A/CONF.2/99, para. 3). 
179 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of 
the Thirty-First Meeting, A/CONF.2/SR.31, 29 November 1951, p. 29. 
180 Id, p. 27. 
181 Id, p. 27. 
182 Id, p. 27. 
183 Id, p. 28. 
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3.2.2 The scope of “international cooperation”: establishing a positive obligation on other 
States to assist? 
In terms of the scope of recital 4, the focus of the French delegate as outlined above was 
on its potential to justify or excuse the failure by certain receiving States to uphold some 
of their obligations under the 1951 Convention in the event of mass influx. France did not 
go so far as to suggest that recital 4 of the preamble would establish a positive obligation 
on other States to come to the assistance of receiving States, although in practice this 
could be logically implied from his characterization of the provision – a fact that he 
acknowledges at one point in the discussions, describing the burden sharing provision as 
amounting to an “implicit appeal”.184  
The potential of the clause to establish a positive obligation on States to assist 
overburdened host countries was thus not discussed during the drafting of the preamble, 
with two exceptions. First, during a brief exchange on the language in the original draft 
proposed by France, which contained the qualifier that international cooperation would 
be undertaken to “redistribute refugees around the world”. In reaction to this, some States 
quickly noted that they would not be in a position to accept refugees from other countries, 
pursuant to the clause. China, for instance, stated that:  
…the reference in the fourth paragraph to the necessity for international 
cooperation to help to distribute refugees throughout the world…the Chinese 
Government was not in a position to accept refugees from other countries, though 
in the past China had played its full part by giving asylum, particularly to White 
Russians and Jews.185  
Ultimately, the reference to the redistribution of refugees around the world was removed 
by the drafting committee, leaving simply the reference to “international cooperation” 
without further elaboration.  
The question of whether recital 4 would establish a positive obligation on States to 
cooperate to assist overburdened host countries was also touched on in passing during a 
rather confusing exchange between the United States and France on the meaning of a 
“wide degree of international cooperation”.186 In response to a request from the US 
delegate to clarify this, France noted that: 
                                                 
184 Id, p. 26. 
185 Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, Economic and Social 
Council, E/AC.7/SR.166, p. 18. 
186 This exchange took place when the stand-alone burden sharing provision had been deleted from the draft 
preamble, and the French delegate had proposed to re-insert the notion of international cooperation between 
States into the provision regarding cooperation with UNHCR: Social Committee, Summary Record of the 
One Hundred and Seventieth Meeting, Economic and Social Council, E/AC.7/SR.170, 23 August 1950, p. 
10. The draft clause under discussion read: “The High Commissioner for Refugees will be called upon to 
supervise the implementation of this Convention, without losing sight of the fact that the effective 
implementation of this Convention can only be obtained with the full cooperation of States with the High 
Commissioner and with a wide degree of international cooperation”. Specifically, the United States asked 
“what was the exact significance of the proposed phase ‘a wide degree of international cooperation’ which 
was not altogether clear….”. 
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The term “solidarité” used in the French text (“collaboration” in English) was 
certainly wider than “cooperation”, which referred to States which would accede 
to the Convention, whereas the former might be extended to cover States which, 
while not signing the Convention, would be in a position to help in the solution of 
certain aspects of the problem. The word “requires” might well be used in 
connection with the cooperation of States signatory to the Convention…187 
The suggestion that cooperation could be said to be “required” of State signatories to the 
1951 Convention constitutes the only hint that a positive obligation to assist could be 
envisaged for non-receiving States party to the 1951 Convention, and in itself the 
discussion is unclear as to whether the requirement would simply be to cooperate with 
the High Commissioner for Refugees. The French delegate’s suggestion that international 
“collaboration” could extend to States who were not party to the 1951 Convention is also 
interesting, and indicates some potential terminological confusion between “cooperation” 
and “collaboration” in English, and “solidarité” in French, which is addressed in Part 
IV.B, below. 
More generally, there was discussion among the delegates about whether the burden 
sharing provision created “obligations”, however it appears this was not about whether 
the clause would bind other States to come to the assistance of overburdened countries. 
Rather, it related to concerns that the proposed language of the recital, referring to States 
that were overburdened “due to their geographical situation”, created obligations for such 
States with respect to the admission of refugees or their right to seek asylum – both of 
which were otherwise absent from the 1951 Convention.188 In response, the French 
delegate noted that: “the reference in the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the undue 
burden placed on certain countries was merely a statement of fact, and was in no way 
designed to create a legal obligation”;189 and he “proposed to remove all reference to 
geographical situation, and again noted that the adoption of the text would not be regarded 
as imposing on States any obligation in respect of the right of asylum”.190 In response to 
these concerns, the reference to the “right” to asylum was ultimately changed to the 
“grant” of asylum,191 and the reference to the burdens on States due to their geographic 
                                                 
187 Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Seventieth Meeting, Economic and Social 
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Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, Economic and Social Council, 
E/AC.7/SR.166, 22 August 1950, pp. 16-17. 
189 Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, Economic and Social 
Council, E/AC.7/SR.166, 22 August 1950, p. 15. 
190 Id, p. 17.  
191 The representative from the Netherlands proposed that the words “right of asylum” be replaced by the 
words “right to seek and to enjoy asylum in other countries” which was the wording used in paragraph 1 of 
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United Kingdom then suggested that the 
point made by the Netherlands may be met by the substitution of the word “grant” for the words “exercise 
of the right” in the first line. United Nations General Assembly, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
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situation was removed.  
In sum, the travaux préparatoires suggest that the substantive scope of the burden sharing 
provision, like its inclusion in the preamble, was the result of a compromise. Recital 4 did 
not go so far as to impose a positive obligation on other States to come to the assistance 
of overburdened receiving countries. Rather the focus, at least for the French delegate, 
was on its potential to excuse States receiving large numbers of refugees in the event that 
they failed to implement all of their obligations under the 1951 Convention, in the absence 
of support from other States. How this would work in practice was essentially not 
discussed during the drafting process.  
4. Relevance for contemporary understanding of the principle of burden sharing 
Based on the analysis above, the burden sharing provision contained in recital 4 of the 
preamble may be said to represent a “double compromise”. The first compromise was in 
terms of form: namely, its inclusion in the preamble, as a halfway point between exiling 
the reference to a General Assembly resolution and including it in the operational part of 
the 1951 Convention. The second compromise was in terms of substance: namely, 
claiming a “weak” force majeure effect from the provision to excuse States receiving 
large numbers of refugees from upholding their obligations in the absence of international 
assistance, without going so far as to create a positive obligation for such assistance to be 
provided. 
against this background, I wish to highlight four issues emerging from the travaux 
prépartoires with respect to recital 4 that have particular relevance to contemporary 
debates about the scope and nature of the burden sharing principle in the refugee regime: 
(1) lack of clarity about the actions that can be said to constitute “international 
cooperation”; (2) terminological confusion; (3) the legal value of the preamble; and (4) 
the ability of receiving States to condition compliance with non-refoulement obligations 
on receipt of international assistance. Together, these issues suggest that the “double 
compromise” with respect to the burden sharing provision in terms of form and substance 
when the 1951 Convention was drafted continues to have consequences for the principle 
of burden sharing today.  
4.1 First issue: what actions constitute “international cooperation”? 
Three language changes were made between the initial draft of the burden sharing clause 
first proposed by the French delegation for the preamble and the final version. First, as 
noted above, the reference to the “right to” asylum was changed to the “grant of” asylum; 
and the reference to certain countries being exceptionally burdened “due to their 
geographical situation” was removed. Both changes were made due to potential “legal” 
concerns for receiving countries, namely fears that this language created obligations for 
them in terms of admission. These changes reflected broader sensitivities during the 
drafting of the 1951 Convention, which deliberately avoided recognizing a “right” to seek 
asylum or dealing with the issue of admission (or otherwise) by States, and in that sense 
                                                 
Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the Thirty-First Meeting, A/CONF.2/SR.31, 
29 November 1951, pp. 28-29. 
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are relatively straightforward. 
More relevant for the purposes of this paper was the removal of the reference to the goal 
of international cooperation as being “to distribute refugees around the world”. In other 
words, the type of “cooperation” envisaged initially was explicitly the physical 
redistribution or resettlement of people out of countries that had become overburdened, 
consistent with the approach that had been taken under the IRO but which – as mentioned 
in Part II – the United States in particular was no longer prepared to support on a large 
scale. The removal of this language has rendered the scope what may constitute 
“international cooperation” more flexible, in terms of potentially encompassing more 
than the “sharing” of people, to include the provision of material and financial 
assistance.192  
Despite this, it remains the case that the “sharing” of people through the provision of 
places for resettlement or humanitarian admission is still seen as the ultimate form of 
burden sharing today; and whether burden sharing arrangements are assessed to have been 
successful or not is usually dependent primarily on the number of resettlement or 
relocation places that were offered by third States.193 The provision of financial and 
material assistance by governments to States hosting large numbers of refugees - through 
UNHCR, other UN agencies or NGOs, or directly via foreign assistance - takes place 
more or less routinely, 194 but on its own is rarely seen as sufficient to constitute “burden 
sharing”, and indeed sometimes leads to allegations of “burden shifting”. 195   
4.2 Second issue: terminology  
As suggested in the introduction, the varying terminology that is deployed with respect 
to the burden sharing principle is a key issue today, with several terms used 
interchangeably by governments and other actors, including solidarity, cooperation, 
responsibility sharing and burden sharing. This creates considerable confusion, as these 
terms arguably are not synonymous. 
Unfortunately, the travaux are not helpful in suggesting a preferred term or clarifying the 
difference between these variations. The drafters did not refer to a principle of “burden 
sharing” which only really began to be used in the 1970s with the onset of the “Indochina” 
crisis; let alone “responsibility sharing” which came into usage in the late 1990s, the result 
of an understandable yet perhaps ill-advised shift to reflect a growing distaste for the 
                                                 
192 See, e.g., UNHCR, International Cooperation to Share Burden and Responsibilities, June 
2011,  http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e533bc02.html, p. 15. 
193 For example, “successful” burden sharing arrangements such as the Comprehensive Plan of Action for 
Indochina and the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme for Kosovo both involved significant temporary 
relocation or resettlement efforts. See above, footnotes 9 and 10. 
194 Admittedly, chronic underfunding of humanitarian operations for refugees has become increasingly 
problematic: see, e.g., UNHCR, Global Appeal 2016-2017, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/ga16/index.xml.  
195 The arrangement between Turkey and the European Union has been a case in point. See, e.g., Jean-
Baptiste Farcy, ‘EU-Turkey agreement: solving the EU asylum crisis or creating a new Calais in Bodrum?’, 
EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 7 December 2015,  http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/eu-turkey-
agreement-solving-the-eu-asylum-crisis-or-creating-a-new-calais-in-bodrum/.  
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characterization of refugees as “burdens”.196 Most of the delegates used the term 
“international cooperation”, with also some references to “international solidarity” and 
“international collaboration”. However, the one discussion specifically on this issue 
between the United States and France197 suggests that there may actually be different 
meanings as between the final terms adopted in the French (“solidarité”) and English 
(“cooperation”) versions of the 1951 Convention.198 Notably, the French delegate 
suggested that “solidarité” in French would equate to the term “collaboration” in English, 
while “cooperation” would be narrower, only applying to State signatories to the 1951 
Convention. From an international legal perspective, the principle of “international 
cooperation” does have a narrower scope than “international solidarity”. Amongst other 
differences, “cooperation” is generally neutral as to outcome (i.e. States may have a duty 
to cooperate that could be satisfied regardless of the results of this cooperation), while 
“solidarity” tends to imply a normative obligation to support States that face particular 
difficulties. 199    
                                                 
196 “Ill-advised” because the introduction of a new principle of “responsibility sharing” (in a context where 
there were already three existing terms - cooperation, solidarity and burden sharing) may have distracted 
from efforts to better understand the broad principle of burden sharing in practice. Nonetheless, 
“responsibility sharing” appears to be the preferred term among many policy makers today. See, e.g., 
Secretary-General’s report, In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants, 
9 May 2016, http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/secretary-generals-report, paras. 69-70. For objections to the 
characterization of refugees as burdens see, e.g., Catherine Phuong, 'Identifying States' Responsibilities 
towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers', (date unknown), http://www.esil-
sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Phuong.PDF (“(i)t must be noted from the outset that the expression 
“responsibility-sharing” should be preferred to “burden-sharing”, which suggests that refugees are a burden 
on the community of states”); Gregor Noll, ‘Risky Games? A Theoretical Approach to Burden-Sharing in 
the Asylum Field?’, 16 Journal of Refugee Studies 236–252 (2003), p. 237 (“(t)he term “burden sharing” 
is a problematic one. It appears to suggest that refugee protection is necessarily burdensome. Whether this 
is indeed the case, depends much on the time frame one chooses to adopt…”); UNHCR, Global 
Consultations on International Protection/Third Track: Mechanisms of International Cooperation to Share 
Responsibilities and Burdens in Mass Influx Situations, 19 February 2001, EC/GC/01/7, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b35418.html, p. 1 (“The inclusion of “responsibility” along with 
“burden-sharing” reflects a more positive image of refugees and a stronger framework for international 
cooperation...”). At the same time, “(a)ttempts to replace the term in this area with a call for responsibility 
sharing or the equal “balance of efforts” between the Members States have had little impact on the way the 
public debate has been led.” Eiko R. Thielemann and Torun Dewan, 'Why States Don’t Defect: Refugee 
Protection and Implicit Burden-Sharing', 2013, http://personal.lse.ac.uk/thielema/Papers-
PDF/Thielemann-Dewan-WEP.pdf, p. 1 (footnote 2). 
197 See above, Part III.B(ii).  
198 Recital 4 of the preamble in French reads: “Considérant qu'il peut résulter de l'octroi du droit d'asile 
des charges exceptionnellement lourdes pour certains pays et que la solution satisfaisante des problèmes 
dont l'Organisation des Nations Unies a reconnu la portée et le caractère internationaux, ne saurait, dans 
cette hypothèse, être obtenue sans une solidarité internationale”. Interestingly, there is a further difference 
in the French language version, namely the addition of “dans cette hypothèse”, which loosely translated 
means “in this context”. This renders the link between countries being burdened and the need for 
international solidarity to achieve solutions “in this context” more explicit that is the case in English (which 
simply uses the term “therefore” to connect the burdens experienced by certain countries with the need for 
international cooperation to achieve solutions). 
199 Many authors argue that the principle of “international cooperation” is more firmly embedded in 
international law than “international solidarity”. See, e.g., Jost Delbrück, International Law of Cooperation 
and State Sovereignty: Proceedings of an International Symposium of the Kiel Walther-Schücking-Institute 
of International law, May 23-26 2001(Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 2002); Karel Wellens, ‘Revisiting 
Solidarity as a (Re-)Emerging Constitutional Principle: Some Further Reflections’, in Rüdiger Wolfrum 
and Chie Kojima (eds.), Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law (Heidelberg: Springer, 
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Broadly, however, it seems that – like many policy makers today – the drafters were 
simply not focused on the terminology issue. There was no attempt to specifically use the 
term “cooperation” to link the principle to, for example, the Charter of the United Nations, 
Article 1(3); 200 and there was also no explicit discussion on this aside from the exchange 
between the United States and France, which in any event related to draft language that 
was ultimately discarded. 
The fact that terminology was not clearly resolved at the time the 1951 Convention was 
drafted has both linguistic and substantive repercussions today, with the terminology used 
to describe the burden sharing principle continuing to shift, often according to rhetorical 
expediency. This is problematic because arguably the unclear nomenclature with respect 
to the burden sharing principle has an obfuscation effect on the identification of its 
normative content and what it requires of States. For if is not known what a principle, rule 
or obligation is called, it is difficult to be clear about what it requires of the actors that are 
subject to it. 
4.3 Third issue: the legal value of the preamble  
As demonstrated above, the focus of the objections of many States to recital 4 was that it 
was to be inserted in the preamble despite the fact that it was ostensibly unrelated to any 
of the operational provisions of the 1951 Convention. At the same time, almost all States 
agreed with the “factual” premise of the burden sharing provision, acknowledging indeed 
that in some cases of mass influx, where national capacities were overwhelmed, the 
provision of international assistance would simply be unavoidable if refugee rights were 
to be upheld. The inclusion of the recital 4 in the preamble was a compromise, giving it 
more weight and significance than if it had been relegated to a General Assembly 
resolution, without placing it in the operative text.  
Despite this, the inclusion of the burden sharing provision in the preamble is an anomaly. 
Generally, preambular recitals are aspirational and exhortative, and not capable of 
creating binding legal effects upon the parties or laying down legal obligations.201 
However, despite in early discussions recognizing that “there was too great a tendency to 
                                                 
2010), pp. 3–54; Abdul G, Koroma, ‘Solidarity: Evidence of an Emerging International Legal Principle’, 
in Holger P. Hestermeyer et al. (eds.), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber Amicorum Rüdiger 
Wolfrum (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishes, 2012), pp. 103–129; Jost Delbrück, ‘The International 
Obligation to Cooperate - An Empty Shell or a Hard Law Principle of International Law? - A Critical Look 
at a Much Debated Paradigm of Modern International Law’, in Holger P. Hestermeyer et al. (eds.), 
Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishes, 2012) pp. 3–16; Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Cooperation, International Law of’, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2012, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL; Danio Campanelli, 
‘Solidarity, Principle of’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2012, 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL. 
200 Article 1(3) of the UN Charter states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to “achieve 
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian 
character and in promoting and encouraging respect for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language or religion”: Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, 1945, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf.  
201 Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems, First Session, Summary Record of the 
Seventh Meeting, United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/AC.32/SR.7, 2 February 1950, para. 13. 
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express ‘pious hopes’ in the preamble which were often completely ignored”202 the 
French delegate appeared to envisage that the burden sharing clause could be relied upon 
by receiving States in certain circumstances to justify a failure to fulfil their obligations 
under the 1951 Convention. Thus, while the burden sharing provision may have fallen 
short of creating a positive legal obligation, it was intended by some delegates to have an 
operational effect in certain specific circumstances, notably cases of mass influx.203 
Although the comments of some of the delegates indicate that they were attuned to this 
ambivalence,204 how this would work in practice was not clarified. 
Appreciating the political compromise that this represented, by modern standards the 
inclusion the burden sharing provision in the preamble was in hindsight almost a drafting 
error in light of the “force majeure” function that it was intended to serve. Based on the 
travaux discussions, I would argue that recital 4 of the preamble should not be treated as 
an ordinary preambular paragraph. From the outset, it was intended to have more 
significance than a mere device for interpretation or a declaration of intention. While I 
am not seeking to argue that the recital 4 should be treated as a force majeure clause today, 
for the purposes of this paper I would simply note that the legal relevance of the principle 
of burden sharing – in the 1951 Convention itself, but also in the refugee regime as a 
whole – is not determined by the fact that the burden sharing provision was included in 
the preamble and not in the substantive parts of the 1951 Convention. 
4.4 Fourth issue: the ability of States to condition compliance with non-refoulement 
obligations on the receipt of international assistance 
The function envisaged for recital 4 of the preamble by the French delegation – as a 
“safeguarding” or “force majeure” clause that could excuse the violation of certain 
provisions of the 1951 Convention by host States in certain circumstances – is both 
surprising and familiar in light of contemporary discussions about the principle of burden 
                                                 
202 Indeed, during the discussion, the delegate from Pakistan noted that a preamble usually has two 
functions: to provide an account of historical antecedents of the operative part and to provide a key for its 
interpretation: Social Committee, Summary Record of the One Hundred and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, Economic 
and Social Council, E/AC.7/SR.166, 22 August 1950, p. 21. More generally, “(a) treaty’s preamble defines, 
in general terms, the purposes and considerations that led the parties to conclude the treaty…The preamble 
may also incorporate the parties’ motivations for concluding the treaty by describing the foundation of their 
past present and future relations in so far as it relates to the treaty. Preambles are thus indicia of the intention 
of the parties to a treaty.” Thus, “preambles often have primarily political significance and are concerned 
with explaining the policy rationale that led to the conclusion of the treaty, including the historical, 
economic and other policy considerations that led to its conclusion…”: Makane Mbengue, ‘Preamble’, Max 
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2012, http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL. 
203 The fact that the French delegate envisaged the burden sharing provision could potentially serve a force 
majeure function in cases of mass influx is interesting in light of contemporary claims that the 1951 
Convention was not designed to address large-scale refugee movements: see, e.g., Adrienne Millbank, The 
Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention, September 2000, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp
0001/01RP05.  
204 For example, the United Kingdom - in introducing a revised preamble - was at pains to note that 
“(a)lthough the preamble was of but slight legal significance and was merely introductory, it was 
nevertheless important that it should be fairly closely related to the origins of the work with which the 
Conference had been entrusted, and with the general purpose of the Convention”: Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the Thirty-First 
Meeting, A/CONF.2/SR.31, 29 November 1951, p. 24. 
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sharing. 
It is surprising to the extent that the specific characterization of the burden sharing 
provision as a force majeure clause with respect to 1951 Convention obligations has 
generally been lost in contemporary application. The focus in terms of burden sharing 
today is generally quite practical in terms of advocating or encouraging the establishment 
of burden sharing arrangements,205 in the absence of a strong positive obligation on States 
to participate, and critiquing the sufficiency or otherwise of the support provided to 
countries receiving large numbers of refugees. To the extent that there is a normative 
focus on burden sharing, this is often about using the principle as a basis to propose 
reforms to the way that the entire refugee protection system is structured,206 not about 
exploring the operation of the principle in the regime as currently designed. Accordingly, 
the legal soundness of treating the burden sharing provision in the 1951 Convention 
preamble as a force majeure clause has not been put to the test. This may also be because 
many countries receiving the largest numbers of refugees are not parties to the 1951 
Convention or already have explicit reservations to some of the rights that could be 
affected if the clause was applied in the way the French delegate had envisaged.207 
At the same time, there is one area where the function of the burden sharing provision 
envisaged by the French delegation has an echo in contemporary practice: namely, the 
potential conditioning of the willingness and ability of receiving States to respect the 
principle of non-refoulement contained in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention208 on the 
receipt of sufficient international assistance.   
As I have established above, for the French delegate the fact that receiving States would 
continue to allow refugees admission to their territory (and thus provide them with 
protection against refoulement, at least initially), regardless of the size of the influx, 
                                                 
205 See, e.g., UNHCR, International Cooperation to Share Burden and Responsibilities, June 
2011,  http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e533bc02.html; Secretary-General’s Report, In Safety and Dignity: 
Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants, 9 May 2016, 
http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/secretary-generals-report (although arguably this initiative of the Secretary-
General also has some normative ambitions). 
206 See, e.g., Atle Grahl-Madsen, 'Refugees and Refugee Law in a World of Transition', (1982) Michigan 
Yearbook of International Legal Studies, 65-90 (proposing refugee protection quotas for States based on 
gross national product and population); Astri Suhrke, ‘Burden-sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The 
Logic of Collective versus National Action’, 11 Journal of Refugee Studies 396–415 (1998); James 
Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized 
and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 115–211 (1997); Peter H. Schuck, 
‘Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal’, 22 Yale Journal of International Law 243–297 (1997); D. 
Anker, J. Fitzpatrick, and A. Shacknove, 'Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and Schuck', (Spring 
1988) 11 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 295-309. 
207 For the reservations to the 1951 Convention, see: 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-
2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en. Iran, for instance, has a reservation which states that Articles 17, 
23, 24 and 26 of the 1951 Convention are taken to be “recommendations only”; while Ethiopia has stated 
that Articles 8, 9, 17(2) and 22(1) are taken to be “recommendations, not legally binding obligations”. 
208 Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention provides that “No Contracting State shall expel or return (" refouler 
") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion”. Today, the non-refoulement obligation is understood to apply at the borders of a State and prior 
to admission; and also to apply to asylum-seekers prior to recognition of refugee status: James Hathaway, 
The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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appears to have been taken for granted.209 His concern was rather with being in a position 
to assure other 1951 Convention rights to large numbers once refugees were safely on 
French territory, and he singled out rights such as that to housing and labour market access 
which could potentially be compromised by receiving States in certain circumstances.   
Conversely, in the contemporary context the refusal of some host States experiencing a 
mass influx to continue to respect the principle of non-refoulement unless they receive 
support from other States has been a significant concern. Notably, there have been several 
instances in practice where receiving States have closed, or threatened to close, their 
borders to refugees unless increased international assistance was forthcoming.210 Indeed, 
some of the most well-known examples of successful large-scale burden sharing 
arrangements – including the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Vietnamese refugees and 
the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme for Kosovar refugees – were triggered by actual 
or threatened border closures by receiving States.211 It is arguably also selected border 
closures by countries such as Turkey212 that have been behind enhanced international 
efforts in 2016 to facilitate greater burden sharing for Syrian refugees.  
Some host States have gone further and explicitly sought to argue that violations by 
receiving countries of the principle of non-refoulement in the absence of sufficient 
support from other States would be a responsibility shared by the international 
community. Turkey speaking to UNHCR’s Executive Committee in 1987 argued as 
follows: 
[N]on-refoulement…had to be scrupulously observed. Nevertheless…countries 
of first asylum or transit…faced with the difficulties of repatriation and the 
progressively more restrictive practices of host countries, might find themselves 
unable to continue bearing the burden and, for want of any other solution, come 
to regard refoulement as the only way out. If that should occur, they would not be 
the only ones at fault since the responsibility for ensuring the conditions necessary 
for observance of the non-refoulement principle rested with the international 
community as a whole.213 
Some academics, while not going so far, have also suggested that burden sharing is a 
practical imperative in some cases to ensure that the principle of non-refoulement is 
respected. As Professor Fonteyne stated in the 1980s: “Burden sharing, certainly in cases 
of large scale refugee movements, is a virtual sine qua non for the effective operation of 
                                                 
209 See above, Part III.B(i), with the French delegate describing receiving countries as having “no choice” 
in terms of allowing admission. 
210 See generally: Katy Long, No Entry! A Review of UNHCR's Responses to Border Closures in Situations 
of Mass Influx, 2010, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c21ad0b2.html.  
211 Katy Long, No Entry! A Review of UNHCR's Responses to Border Closures in Situations of Mass Influx, 
2010, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c21ad0b2.html. 
212 See, e.g., with respect to Turkey: Sydney Morning Herald, Migrant crisis: Turkish border guards 'kill 
11 Syrian refugees, including women and children', 20 June 2016, http://m.smh.com.au/world/migrant-
crisis/migrant-crisis-turkish-border-guards-kill-11-syrian-refugees-including-women-and-children-
20160619-gpmvun.html. 
213 Cited in Guy Goodwin-Gill, Refugees - Challenges for Protection and Assistance in the 21st Century, 
Istanbul, June 2015.  
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a comprehensive non-refoulement policy”.214 
In response to such arguments, UNHCR’s Executive Committee, UNHCR itself, and 
others have, continually stressed that an absence of burden sharing does not justify a 
failure by a State to implement its fundamental refugee protection obligations, most 
notably access to asylum and respect for the principle of non-refoulement.215 For 
example, in Conclusion No. 85 (XLIX) (1998), paragraph (p), UNHCR’s Executive 
Committee:  
Recognizes that international solidarity and burden sharing are of direct 
importance to the satisfactory implementation of refugee protection principles; 
stresses, however, in this regard that access to asylum and the meeting by States 
of their protection obligations should not be dependent on burden-sharing 
arrangements first being in place, particularly because respect for fundamental 
human rights and humanitarian principles is an obligation for all members of the 
international community.216 
To reiterate, while it was suggested by some of the drafters of the 1951 Convention that 
the burden sharing provision in the preamble could operate as a force majeure clause with 
respect to certain of the obligations contained in the 1951 Convention, it does not appear 
that this was intended to apply to the most fundamental issues of access to asylum and 
                                                 
214 J. -P. L. Fonteyne, ‘Burden-Sharing: An Analysis of the Nature and Fuction of International Solidarity 
in cases of Mass Influx of Refugees’, 8 Australian Yearbook of International Law 162–188 (1978), p. 175. 
215 “Under the terms of international law, primary responsibility for protecting and assisting refugees and 
returnees lies with the States which are hosting them…While regional or international burden sharing 
initiatives may be needed to assist host States in fulfilling their obligations towards refugees and returnees, 
these should not be seen as in any way diminishing the responsibilities of host countries:” UNHCR, Annual 
Theme: International Solidarity And Burden-Sharing In All Its Aspects: National, Regional And 
International Responsibilities For Refugees, A/AC.96/904, 1998, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a54bc2f0.html, pp. 3-4. See also: J.N. Saxena, 'International Solidarity and 
the Protection of Refugees', Congress on International Solidarity and Humanitarian Actions, San Remo, 
1980, p. 303 (“Caution though that principle of burden sharing should not be regarded as a precondition to 
the observance of basic humanitarian principles [of non-refoulement and asylum]”); Guy Goodwin-Gill 
and Jane Mcadam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 339 
(“While as a matter of law, international protection is not contingent on burden sharing, there is some 
acknowledgment that practical responses to alleviate the pressure on countries of first asylum may be 
necessary to ensure that the principle is not violated”.) There are also those who suggest that the non-
refoulement obligation may be conditional in some circumstances: see, e.g., Michael Barutciski and Astri 
Suhrke, ‘Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovations in Protection and Burden-Sharing’, 14 
Journal of Refugee Studies 95–115 (2001), p. 108 (“Given the consensual nature of treaty law, we cannot 
expect states to assume an obligation to allow refugees admission onto their territory if there is a serious 
threat that this would lead to national destabilization. The most basic principle in international refugee law, 
non-refoulement, should be read in this perspective….”). See also: James Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees 
Under International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 358-359 (“The duty of state 
parties to respect the principle of non-refoulement (at least on a temporary basis) is in fact balanced against 
a duty of international solidarity owed by other state parties to the receiving country…”). Cf. Hurwitz, 
stating that “these views may be reconciled by differentiating non-refoulement and its corollary, the 
granting of temporary refuge or ‘admission’, which is absolute and unconditional, from asylum understood 
as a more permanent protection give to refugees and predicated on the existence of effective burden-
sharing”: Agnès Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 145. 
216 UNHCR, A Thematic Compilation of Executive Committee Conclusions, 7th edition, June 2014, June 
2014, http://www.refworld.org/docid/5698c1224.html, p. 42. 
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protection against refoulement. Nonetheless, the “compromise” adopted by the drafters 
of the 1951 Convention, implying a weak negative force majeure scope to the burden 
sharing provision with no positive obligation to assist on the part of other States, has 
arguably rendered such arguments a logical next step. Today, I would argue that the status 
of non-refoulement – as a principle of customary international law217 and arguably an 
emerging non-derogable or peremptory norm of international law218 – would in any event 
“trump” any right of receiving States to make respect for Article 33 contingent on the 
receipt of international assistance as a legal matter, even in cases of force majeure. In 
other words, even if the principle of burden sharing did justify the failure by receiving 
States to implement certain of their obligations under the 1951 Convention in cases of 
mass influx and in the absence of sufficient international support - and this would require 
further consideration - it is unlikely that this would extend to the non-refoulement 
obligation.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper has provided a textual analysis of the discussions among the drafters of the 
1951 Convention with respect to burden sharing provision contained in recital 4 of the 
preamble. This serves as a first step in reconsidering some of the preconceptions with 
respect to the principle of burden sharing in the contemporary refugee regime.  
The travaux préparatoires suggest that the insertion of the burden sharing provision in the 
preamble was an anomaly, resulting largely from compromise. In terms of form, there 
was significant ambivalence expressed by some delegations with respect to the disconnect 
between the inclusion of the clause in the preamble and the overall purpose of the 1951 
Convention as an agreement between States on how they would treat refugees. Further, 
the provision was intended to have a clearer function than would normally be attributed 
to a preambular recital. Notably, while not going so far as to establish a positive obligation 
to provide international assistance, some of the drafters believed that the clause could be 
relied on by receiving States to justify or excuse a failure to meet all of their obligations 
under the 1951 Convention in certain cases of mass influx, unless such international 
assistance was forthcoming. The potential of the burden sharing provision to act as a force 
majeure clause with respect to certain obligations under the 1951 Convention was not 
really clarified by the drafters at the time, and I have suggested that this failure has 
repercussions today in terms of the arguments made by some host countries with respect 
to the scope of the non-refoulement obligation.  
More generally, I argue that these discussions are reflective of a broader tension in the 
regime that has never been resolved. The purpose of the 1951 Convention regime was to 
render refugees the responsibility of the State which had jurisdiction over them, 
irrespective of the size of the refugee influx or how unevenly distributed these 
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upon the express consent of states”. 
 76 
 
responsibilities may be. But practically it is at a minimum inequitable, and in some 
circumstances impossible, to expect States to provide permanent asylum to large numbers 
of refugees, for increasingly protracted periods of time, without international support. 
With the significant scope and scale of the Syria crisis,219 as well as longstanding host 
States such as Kenya and Pakistan threatening to return all refugees on their territories,220 
this unresolved structural tension in the design of the 1951 Convention is arguably a 
challenge for the viability of the regime as a whole going forward.  
Despite this, the travaux préparatoires clearly confirm that neither the 1951 Convention 
regime generally, nor recital 4 in the preamble specifically, were designed to distribute 
responsibilities and burdens for refugees equally between States. In 1950, as is the case 
now, the political appetite to establish binding quotas to ensure the equitable distribution 
of refugees was not there. The French delegate insisted on the insertion of the burden 
sharing provision into the preamble based on an understanding that certain States would 
always be liable to receive more refugees than others by virtue of their geography. The 
burden sharing provision was simply designed to respond to potential issues for individual 
States that could result from this.  
That said, since the drafting of the 1951 Convention, the refugee regime has had over 65 
years to evolve and expand, with an abundance of developments in terms of normative 
instruments, institutional frameworks and State practice. The analysis of the travaux 
préparatoires contained in this paper is thus just the first step in seeking to resolve the 
question of the legal and normative relevance of the principle of burden sharing in the 
contemporary refugee regime.  
 
  
                                                 
219 See, e.g., UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, updated regularly, 
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Introduction 
When dealing with asylum claims, states parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention) can act in three possible ways. Most of the 
time, states act unilaterally, subject to their international obligations (i.e. non-
refoulement, non-discrimination, and non-penalisation for irregular entry) and their 
national refugee legislation. The next way to deal with asylum claims is through the 
multilateral regional cooperation mechanisms that are encouraged by the Preamble of the 
Refugee Convention.221 While regional refugee protection frameworks exist in Europe, 
Africa, and Americas, a similar framework has so far failed to be set up in Asia, the region 
that has been continuously hosting the largest refugee population.222 Moreover, the 
availability of a regional protection framework does not always result in effective 
cooperation and more efficient refugee protection: as one of the most recent examples of 
a failure to cooperate under a regional framework can be cited the EU’s plan to relocate 
refugees among EU member-states under the 2015 emergency relocation schemes.223   
The last remaining way to deal with asylum-seekers and refugees is through bilateral 
agreements. Bilateral agreements in managing migration, such as readmission 
agreements, are not new. Yet, in the past five years, a new type of bilateral agreements 
(including memoranda of understanding) is developing: an agreement for transfer and 
permanent settlement of refugees that aims specifically at finding a durable solution for 
refugees in a third country. The best known publicly available such bilateral agreements 
are the 2011 agreement between Australia and Malaysia224, the 2014 MOU between 
Australia and Cambodia,225 and the 2016 EU-Turkey deal.226  
There is another distinct group of bilateral resettlement agreements: the bilateral 
agreements of the United States of America (the US) with some 30 states in the world on 
resettlement of the Guantanamo asylum-seekers. The impact of these bilateral 
resettlement agreements on protection of human rights of Guantanamo asylum-seekers 
and raising protection standards in resettlement states with less developed asylum 
practices so far have gained limited scholarly attention. Thus, this paper explores whether 
bilateral refugee resettlement agreements can promote more efficient refugee burden-
sharing and durable solutions for refugees and raise refugee protection standards in states 
will less developed asylum practices. On the one hand, it might be easier for states to 
achieve cooperation on a bilateral than a multilateral level given that less individual 
                                                 
221 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 
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states’ interests need to be balanced out. On the other hand, such bilateral agreements 
should follow certain principles and safeguards to ensure a meaningful and durable 
solution for refugees.  
The discussion will be built around four parts. Part One will discuss why some of the 
Guantanamo detainees may have refugee claims and will provide an overview of the 
countries that reached bilateral resettlement agreements with the US to host the ex-
detainees. Part Two will provide an analysis of one resettlement agreement between the 
US and Kazakhstan, a country with a fairly new asylum system developed under the 
Refugee Convention regime. This Part will analyse the compliance of the US-Kazakhstan 
refugee resettlement agreement with international refugee law. Part Three will consider 
the implementation of the bilateral agreement in Kazakhstan. In particular, it will consider 
whether the legal status and treatment of the Guantanamo asylum-seekers is compliant 
with international refugee law and the national refugee legislation of Kazakhstan. Part 
Three will further provide conclusions whether the US-Kazakhstan bilateral agreement 
may have resulted in a durable solution for the Guantanamo ex-detainees and could be 
regarded as an efficient burden-sharing mechanism. Part Four will discuss broader 
implications of the use of privately negotiated bilateral resettlement agreements and the 
safeguards that should be included in such agreements to ensure a virtually durable 
solution for a refugee problem. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the bilateral 
resettlement agreements’ potential to expand refugee protection space in new regions if 
used in a strategic manner.  
The legality of bilateral agreements from the perspective of the US law and policy as well 
as the discussion of the US’s responsibility for creating multiple refugee situations will 
not be the focus of this paper. Rather the paper will approach the issue of the Guantanamo 
asylum-seekers from the following perspective: the US as an individual country has faced 
a need to resettle several asylum-seekers to whom it is not able to provide protection in 
its territory and approached other states for their assistance and cooperation in refugee 
burden sharing.  
1. Background for the US Bilateral Resettlement Agreements   
Guantanamo Detainees: Undesirable in the US and Non-Returnable to Home Countries 
The US detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was established in 2002 after the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and the subsequent US-led ‘war on terrorism’ 
in Afghanistan. The detention centre was meant for detention and interrogation of 
terrorism suspects and alleged members of al-Qaeda terrorist group. 227 Since 2002, there 
have been 779 detainees all of whom were labelled by the US as ‘enemy combatants’.228 
Following the interrogation, it was revealed that most of them had been detained by 
mistake merely because these people were ‘in the wrong place at the wrong time’.229 The 
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return of detainees started under the President Bush’s Administration with the majority 
of detainees having been transferred to their countries of origin. In 2009, the next US 
President Obama issued an order to close the Guantanamo detention centre that still had 
242 inmates.230 By September 2016, the facility contained 61 detainees.231  
Reportedly, since 2002, when the US authorities learned about the first detainees who had 
been captured mistakenly, they were looking for possibilities to return them to another 
safe country. In effect, the US became a custodian of a certain refugee population, whom 
it could either repatriate to their home states where they could be at risk of persecution or 
torture, or resettle them in the United States. However, in 2009, the US Congress 
effectively prohibited the release of any of the Guantanamo detainees to the territory of 
the US, sanctioning that the defence funds should not be used for such purposes.232 Some 
commentators further argued that the resettlement of the Guantanamo detainees to the US 
could create a ‘political firestorm’.233  
Determined to close the Guantanamo detention facility, the Obama administration has 
been actively exploring a third solution for Guantanamo detainees with refugee claims 
through permanent resettlement to third countries. Consequently, the US engaged in a 
long and challenging process of negotiating bilateral agreements with many other 
countries around the world. Negotiations were complicated by the fact that the US itself 
refused to give a refugee status to any of the detainees. Reportedly, all resettlement 
agreements were negotiated under a high level of secrecy and required from the US both 
diplomatic pressure and financial bargaining.234 While the texts of all resettlement deals 
may not be publicly available, US Special Envoy for the closure of the Guantanamo 
detention centre, Mr. Fried confirmed that the US had to negotiate extensive agreements 
with potential resettlement countries. The main negotiation points covered such issues as 
the immigration status the detainees would be afforded, repatriation costs covered by the 
United States, and the services the host country would provide to facilitate the detainees’ 
integration. In addition, the United States attempted to secure assurances from a potential 
resettlement state that the state would monitor the ex-detainees.235 Apparently, the 
condition on monitoring ex-detainees aims to avoid any residual risk of their 
(re)engagement in terrorist activity. On the other hand, this condition may exacerbate the 
stigma suffered by detainees even after their release.  
When implementing the plan on closure of the facility, the US authorities faced a problem 
that some of the remaining detainees, who had never been charged for any crime and were 
subsequently ‘cleared for release’, were non-returnable to their countries of origin. There 
were at least four underlying reasons: a reasonable risk of persecution of detainees if 
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returned to their countries of origin, the situation of generalised violence and insecurity 
in the country of origin, some detainees’ statelessness situation, and a risk of detainees’ 
(re-)engaging in terrorist activities. These reasons will now be discussed in more detail.  
The first reason why detainees could not be returned to their home countries was that they 
could face a reasonable risk of persecution there. Some of the supposed combatants turned 
out to have no connection to al-Qaeda or terrorism, but when ‘cleared for release’ they 
demanded not to be returned to their countries of origin due to a claimed fear of 
persecution.  
Among this category of non-returnable detainees, there were two sub-categories. The first 
sub-category included detainees, who originally escaped religious, ethnic or political 
persecution in their countries of origin and had been living in Afghanistan or Pakistan for 
a long time before they were sold to the US forces for a bounty.236 The most vivid example 
of such detainees was the nationals of China of Uyghur ethnicity. The US authorities 
established a reasonable risk that the Uyghur detainees could be subjected to trial and 
even execution in China based on separatism charges.237 
Another sub-category included detainees who may not have had any persecution risk in 
their home country before detention. But a reasonable risk of persecution arose due to the 
very detention and the prolonged incarceration in Guantanamo as terrorism suspects. 
There is documentary evidence that the ex-detainees returned to Tunisia, Libya, and 
Yemen were subjected to additional scrutiny and investigation, during which they were 
abused, tortured and in some instances killed.238 On several occasions, such abuse took 
place despite the diplomatic assurances earlier given to the US authorities.239 The US is 
a party to the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment240 and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees241 
whereby it is bound not to return or transfer people to a place where they could be tortured 
or persecuted. Among the cleared detainees, there were nationals of several other states 
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also known for widespread human rights abuses and documented instances of torture, and 
most of them were resettled to third countries.242  
The second reason for non-return of detainees was that some of them could not return to 
their home countries due to the general insecure situation in these countries or ongoing 
armed conflicts. This was the case of detainees were originating from Yemen, Tunisia, 
Libya, and Syria. These detainees could also be considered as refugees under extended 
refugee definition and qualify for other forms of international protection.  
The third reason for non-return was the de-jure statelessness of certain detainees. There 
were also detainees whose countries of nationality or habitual residence refused their 
return for being labelled ‘the worst of the worst’ and ‘terrorists’ by the US authorities, 
thus making them de-facto stateless.243 For example, one of the detainees was born in 
Saudi Arabia and lived there for 20 years. Also, he had a passport from the Palestinian 
Authority. However, Israel did not allow this detainee to return to Gaza, while Saudi 
Arabia did not agree to allow him to reunite with his family in its territory.244 
The fourth, and final, reason why detainees could not return to their countries of origin 
was due to a risk of their (re-)engagement in terrorist activities. Many of those detainees 
released under the Bush Administration returned to a normal life in their 
homelands.245 However, there have been exceptions. While it was easier to return 
detainees to their home countries, some of these countries lacked the motivation to 
monitor the ex-detainees to ensure that they would not (re)engage in attacks against the 
US forces in Afghanistan and other places.246 CIA data suggests that, of the inmates 
released under the Bush Administration, 21% were confirmed to have re-engaged in 
militant activity, while 14% were suspected of having done so. Of the releases under the 
Obama Administration, 5.6% were confirmed to have re-engaged in militant activity and 
6.8% were suspected of having done so. Overall, about 30% are believed to have done 
so.247 Re-engagement incidents were also reported to have occurred in the first six months 
of 2016.248 On the other hand, on some occasions the assessments on re-engagement were 
made on the basis of non-verified and single opinions and thus can be doubtful.249  
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Besides, another problem was that some of the detainees may not have been part of any 
terrorist organisation before their detention. But they could have become radicalised 
during their prolonged detention. Thus, some of the detainees may have participated in 
the attacks on the US forces abroad in revenge for this very detention. To mitigate this 
risk, the US authorities decided to discontinue transferring detainees of certain 
nationalities back to their countries of origin and were trying to resettle them in a third 
country. The CIA further recommended that the detainees be not transferred to ‘countries 
with ongoing conflict and internal instability’ due to the likelihood of reengagement in 
terrorism. The agency further makes an opinion that ‘some detainees who are determined 
to re-engage will do so regardless of any transfer conditions’.250  
This point is important for at least two reasons. First, it clearly shows that the US has 
never been absolutely sure whether and who of the remaining detainees were more likely 
to (re)engage in terrorism once released. Second, this point may be seen as a weak attempt 
to avoid any subsequent responsibility for resettling potentially dangerous detainees. At 
the same time, such recommendation further stigmatises all released detainees as potential 
terrorists regardless of any real intentions on their part to (re)engage in any terrorism 
activity. The following sections will demonstrate that this stigmatisation significantly 
impacted on the restriction of certain rights of the Guantanamo asylum-seekers resettled 
to Kazakhstan.  
As of August 2016, 124 Guantanamo detainees have been resettled to 30 states spanning 
all geographic regions, including 18 states in Europe (Bulgaria, Belgium, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, and Serbia), 3 states in Africa 
(Ghana and Senegal), 3 states in South America (El Salvador and Uruguay), 4 states in 
the Middle East (Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arabs of Emirates), 1 state in 
Asia (Kazakhstan), 2 island-states in the Atlantic Ocean (Bermuda and Cape Verde) and 
1 island-state in the Pacific Ocean (Palau). 251 As can be observed, these countries 
represent a diverse range of democratic and authoritarian regimes and are at various levels 
of socio-economic development. While most of the states are parties to the Refugee 
Convention and have quite developed asylum procedures, a few resettlement states are 
not parties to the Refugee Convention and its Protocol (e.g. Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
and UAE) or may have little experience in effective integration of refugees. Despite the 
obvious differences, all these states agreed to support the US in its goal to find a safe third 
country for Guantanamo asylum-seekers.  
Each of the bilateral resettlement agreement represents an interesting case for a more in-
depth analysis of their implementation as they may trigger refugee protection issues. This 
paper will be limited to the discussion and analysis of the implementation of only one 
bilateral agreement - with Kazakhstan, the only Refugee Convention state-party in Asia 
that agreed to cooperate with the US in resettling Guantanamo asylum-seekers. The 
analysis will be particularly aimed to assess whether this bilateral agreement has led or 
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may have prospects to lead to a durable solution for Guantanamo asylum-seekers in 
Kazakhstan.  
2. The US-Kazakhstan Bilateral Resettlement Agreement  
This section will start with consideration of the definition of ‘resettlement’ under 
international refugee law. Then it will proceed with an overview of the US-Kazakhstan 
resettlement agreement and Kazakhstan’s asylum system. After this, the section will 
discuss whether the concerned resettlement agreement is compliant with international 
refugee law. Two relevant debates will be explored to establish whether the agreement 
may be essentially a responsibility-shifting arrangement resulting in insufficient refugee 
protection for Guantanamo asylum-seekers and lead to violation of their human rights.   
2.1 Resettlement under International Refugee Law 
Resettlement is widely known as one of the three durable solutions for refugees, which 
UNHCR is mandated to undertake by its Statute and UN General Assembly 
Resolutions.252  Resettlement involves ‘selection and transfer of refugees from a State in 
which they have sought protection to a third State which has agreed to admit them – as 
refugees – with permanent residence status.’253 This status should comply with two 
requirements: 
1) It should protect a resettled refugee from refoulement, and 
2) It should provide a resettled refugee and his/her family or dependant with access 
to rights similar to those enjoyed by the nationals.254 
Apart from being a durable solution and a tool for international protection, resettlement 
is also recognised as a ‘tangible expression of international solidarity and a responsibility 
sharing mechanism, allowing States to help share responsibility for refugee protection, 
and reduce problems impacting the country of asylum.’255   
The following sections will discuss whether the US-Kazakhstan resettlement agreement 
can be considered an efficient durable solution and a responsibility-sharing mechanism 
from the international law perspective.  
2.2 Overview of the US-Kazakhstan Bilateral Resettlement Agreement 
Kazakhstan is a party to both the Refugee Convention and its Protocol and is thus bound 
by both instruments. The US is a party to a Refugee Protocol only, yet it is bound by the 
Protocol to observe Articles 2-34 of the Convention whilst being required cooperate with 
UNHCR.256 According to international law of treaties, the bilateral treaties as lex specialis 
or lex posterior should not lead to setting aside a general treaty; instead, the earlier and 
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general instruments should continue control the way the more specific rules under 
bilateral treaties are being interpreted and applied.257   
The US-Kazakhstan bilateral resettlement agreement represents an interesting case for 
several reasons. First, resettlement as a burden sharing mechanism has been arranged not 
within the same or a broader region what is characteristic for the Australia-Cambodia 
agreement or the EU-Turkey agreement, but between the countries in two distinct 
geographic regions (Americas and Asia). Second, resettlement is taking place from a state 
with more advanced asylum practices and more developed refugee integration 
programmes to a country with less developed asylum practices and without any 
experience in accepting refugees under resettlement programmes, what stands out from 
the usual resettlement practices administered by UNHCR. Third, resettlement and further 
integration of the Guantanamo asylum-seekers is taking place without cooperation with 
UNHCR.258 It appears that the case does not fit squarely into the general practice of 
refugee resettlement, for example as carried out under the UNHCR mandate. This might 
be explained by the unique circumstances that preceded the resettlement. It is the first 
time when a refugee situation arose not due to the actions of a country of origin or the 
first asylum country (in this case Afghanistan or Pakistan where asylum-seekers were 
captured), but by a third state’s actions – detention by the US forces, transfer to a 
detention facility under the US jurisdiction and effective control, subsequent prolonged 
incarceration without a trial, and refusal to allow a release of detainees into the US 
territory.259 Despite its exceptionality or rather abnormality, the situation has led to 
potential refugee claims on the part of some detainees. Given the predicament to which 
the Guantanamo asylum-seekers have already been subjected, it is highly important to 
ensure that their rights are no longer violated under international refugee law and human 
rights law frameworks following the resettlement under bilateral arrangements.  
2.3 Overview of Kazakhstan’s Asylum System and Practices 
Kazakhstan became a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol in 
1998 without any reservations.260 Since that time it has been slowly and cautiously 
developing its national asylum system. It took Kazakhstan 11 years to adopt its national 
refugee law in 2009 and a refugee status determination procedure pursuant to the Refugee 
Convention. While the text of the national refugee legislation is mostly compliant with 
international refugee law, the compliance with refugee law may be insufficient in 
practice, for example, when asylum is sought by nationals of neighbouring states.261 Next, 
according to the national law the Kazakhstani asylum authorities apply only a narrow 
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interpretation of the Refugee Convention262, thus applicants fleeing serious and 
indiscriminate threats to life and physical integrity resulting from generalised violence 
are not eligible for refugee protection in the country. Moreover, asylum authorities require 
that applicants provide sufficient documentary evidence that they may face individual 
persecution in their countries of origin. Consequently, majority of asylum-seekers fleeing 
internal conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan have been continuously rejected.263  
According to UNHCR’s data, as of July 2016 Kazakhstan had 653 convention refugees, 
‘most of which have been staying in Kazakhstan for more than 10 years’.264 Apparently, 
Kazakhstan has not been a popular destination for refugees. Yet, despite not having well-
developed practices in refugee protection, Kazakhstan has been actively participating in 
the regional consultative processes on the management of mixed migration flows. The 
most notable is the Almaty Process bringing together the four states in Central Asia and 
seven neighbouring states to ensure better protection for refugees and other vulnerable 
migrants found in mixed migration flows from Asia to Europe. The process was launched 
and operationalised during the 2011 and 2013 Regional Conferences on Refugee 
Protection and International Migration that were hosted by the Government of 
Kazakhstan and supported by UNHCR and IOM. Moreover, the Government of 
Kazakhstan agreed to host the Secretariat of the Process and serve as the first Chair for 
the initial period of two years.265  
2.4 Compliance with International Refugee Law 
According to UNHCR’s statistics, refugees under its supervision have been generally 
resettled from states with less developed asylum practices and less developed economies 
to states with more advanced economies and more favourable conditions for refugees.266 
The resettlement agreement between the US and Kazakhstan stands out from the 
UNHCR’s practice because under this deal the transfer took place from a state with more 
developed asylum practices and economy to a state with less developed economy, asylum 
practices and less favourable conditions for refugees. 
In this section, two main debates will be considered. The first debate is whether the 
resettlement from more economically developed states to states with less developed 
economies is compatible with international refugee law. The second debate is whether 
the US should continue bearing its responsibility for the resettled Guantanamo asylum-
seekers after their transfer to a state with a less developed asylum system. The discussion 
will enable us to assess whether the US-Kazakhstan bilateral agreement is compliant with 
                                                 
262
 Law of Kazakhstan No. 216-IV ЗРК as of 4 December 2009 on Refugees (Kazakhstan Refugee Law), 
art 1(1).  
263 Interviews with refugee lawyers (Kazakhstan, May 2016). 
264 Website of UNHCR Representation in Kazakhstan <http://www.unhcr.kz/rus/central-asia/kazakhstan/> 
accessed 1 October 2016. 
265 Cynthia Orchard, ‘The Almaty Process: Improving Compliance with International Refugee Law in 
Central Asia’ (2016) 28(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 55. 
266 UNHCR, Resettlement Statistical Database Portal 
<http://www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/unhcrstats/573b8a4b4/resettlement-statistical-database-portal.html> 
accessed 1 October 2016. 
 87 
 
international refugee law or whether it may lead to a violation of any of the obligations 
of the US or Kazakhstan under international refugee law.  
2.4.1 is resettlement of refugees from developed states to developing states compatible 
with international refugee law?  
When Australia entered in a bilateral resettlement MoU with Cambodia in 2014, this deal 
attracted massive criticism. UNHCR characterised this deal as ‘a worrying departure from 
international norms.’267 It further reminded that 87 per cent of refugees were being hosted 
in developing countries and it was crucial that countries do not shift their refugee 
responsibilities elsewhere.268  
The UNHCR’s criticism could be similarly applicable to the US-Kazakhstan deal since 
Kazakhstan is also much less economically developed than the US. On the other hand, if 
a receiving state is less developed than a sending state, this should not automatically lead 
to denouncing their bilateral resettlement arrangement. UNHCR’s statistics reveal that, 
while 86% refugees are located in developing states, 58% of world refugees under 
UNHCR’s mandate live only in 10 countries.269 This suggests that there are quite a few 
developing states that may be hardly hosting any refugees and who could potentially 
participate more in sharing the burden of hosting refugees with other states, both 
economically developed and developing. Economic development or underdevelopment 
should not be a criterion for states’ participation in burden-sharing mechanisms; to the 
contrary, the Refugee Convention encourages all states to cooperate in finding a solution 
to a refugee problem.270  
Moreover, it can be argued that resettlement of refugees from developed to developing 
states may yield positive changes in refugee-hosting countries. The financial and 
technical assistance of more developed states offered to developing states under bilateral 
resettlement agreements could help improve the standards of refugee treatment in a 
receiving state in the long run. On the one hand, a receiving state will be bound by the 
bilateral agreement to provide proper protection to the resettled refugees. This may 
translate into a more favourable national legal framework and integration programmes 
that over time can become available to all refugees in the territory and to newly arriving 
refugees. The financial assistance of the sending state can further improve the standards 
of living of the local population. On the other hand, appropriate safeguards should be in 
place to avoid monetisation of refugees’ lives and ensure that the economic development 
of a receiving state takes place not at the expense of refugees, but together with refugees. 
Finally, the bilateral resettlement agreements may arguably change the perception of 
developing states of seeing refugees not as a burden but as an opportunity for 
development. 
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There is a related question whether the resettled refugees should be provided with the 
same level of socio-economic benefits to which they would have been entitled in a 
sending state. In the abovementioned UNHCR’s statement, UNHCR emphasises that the 
refugees to be transferred to Cambodia under the bilateral resettlement arrangements 
originally sought protection in Australia271 implying that the choice of the refugees should 
have been given certain consideration.  
In this respect, there is a scholarly opinion that refugees are not expected to ‘enjoy the 
same overall quality of life in the destination country as in the sending state’.272 While 
the receiving state is expected to provide refugees with access to the same range of rights 
to which they would have been entitled in the sending state depending on their level of 
attachment,  the content of the concerned rights should be established by the level 
generally provided to other aliens in the territory of the receiving state or its nationals.273 
Therefore, under this bilateral deal, Kazakhstan is not obliged to accord more favourable 
treatment to the Guantanamo asylum-seekers than is generally accorded to other foreign 
nationals or nationals of Kazakhstan depending on the right in question.  
Based on the above analysis it can be concluded that the parties to the US-Kazakhstan 
agreement have not contravened any international refugee law principles and the 
Guantanamo detainees’ rights under the Refugee Convention.   
 
2.4.2 Should the US keep its responsibility towards the Guantanamo asylum-seekers 
resettled to countries with less developed asylum systems?  
According to UNHCR, ‘it is generally recognised that a State has jurisdiction, and 
consequently is bound by relevant international and regional refugee and human rights 
law obligations, if it has de jure and/or effective de facto control over a territory or over 
persons. This includes situations where a State exercises jurisdiction outside its 
territory’.274 According to Hathaway, the type and scope of the rights accorded to asylum-
seekers and refugees in the territory of a sending state depends on their level of 
attachment, from being physically present to lawfully residing.275 The Refugee 
Convention imposes only one duty upon a sending country, that is to ensure that a person 
will not be transferred to the country of origin where he/she may be at risk of 
persecution.276  
Refugee law scholarship further argues that, with respect to acquired rights, if a sending 
state wishes to transfer its protective responsibilities to another state, it has a duty of 
‘anxious scrutiny’ to ensure that each of the entitlements - to which asylum-seekers would 
be entitled once under a state party’s jurisdiction, is honoured in the destination country, 
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and not just that there is protection against the risk of refoulement there.277 Given that the 
Guantanamo asylum-seekers were under US jurisdiction, though outside its territory, the 
US is obliged to ensure that the resettled asylum-seekers would be granted the same range 
of rights if they would have been entitled to them in the US: including non-discrimination 
in respect of other refugees in the destination country (Article 3), religious freedom 
(Article 4), respect for personal status (Article 12), access to courts (Article 16), access 
to administrative assistance (Article 25), issuance of identity documents (Article 27), non-
penalisation for illegal entry or presence and freedom from arbitrary detention (Article 
31), and consideration for assimilation or naturalisation (Article 34).278 Though, as was 
noted above, the scope and content of these rights should be established by the level 
generally provided to other aliens in the territory of the receiving state or its nationals.279  
There is another argument why a sending state with more developed asylum practices 
should retain its responsibility towards refugees resettled to a state with less developed 
asylum practices. Otherwise, potential poor treatment of refugees in a new destination 
state may force them to seek asylum elsewhere. If the onward movements continue, such 
settlement will not be a durable situation. Thus, the sending state should be obliged to 
keep its responsibility and monitor the integration of refugees in the new state for at least 
some period to ensure that they receive adequate treatment. Moreover, though resettled 
refugees under bilateral agreements are no longer under the jurisdiction of a sending state, 
each state has a right to demand and enforce the proper implementation of an agreement. 
If a sending state provides financial assistance to a receiving state in the interests of the 
beneficiaries, i.e. refugees, the sending state should have a right and a bear a duty to 
monitor that the obligations assumed by the receiving state in respect of the refugees are 
fully carried out. To ensure proper monitoring, a bilateral agreement should stipulate a 
complaint mechanism whereby the resettled refugees could contact the sending state and 
draw its attention to any violation of their rights in the destination state. Finally, through 
this proper monitoring, the states with developed asylum practices can contribute to 
raising the refugee protection standards in receiving states and enhancing the overall 
refugee protection in other regions. 
As has been mentioned earlier, there is an important difference between the bilateral 
resettlement agreements negotiated by the US for the Guantanamo detainees and other 
known bilateral resettlement agreements, such as EU-Turkey and Australia-Cambodia 
arrangements: the refugee problem of Guantanamo detainees was created with the direct 
involvement of the US. From the international refugee law perspective, resettlement of 
Guantanamo asylum-seekers is an unprecedented case. Some scholars find that the US is 
morally responsible for finding a solution for the Guantanamo asylum-seekers.280 
Moreover, the fact that the US cannot provide asylum to the Guantanamo asylum-seekers 
in its territory due to its internal policy should not be seen as a valid argument for shifting 
the US’s responsibility to third states. Therefore, there is a valid argument that the US 
should continue to be responsible for the Guantanamo asylum-seekers under all its 
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bilateral agreements; at least until their refugee problem is solved either through their 
permanent settlement or voluntary repatriation to a country of origin.  
Regarding the specific US-Kazakhstan agreement, it should also be noted that before 
hosting the Guantanamo asylum-seekers, Kazakhstan has never had any resettlement or 
specific refugee integration programmes. Yet, Kazakhstan agreed to participate in this 
bilateral agreement and support the US in finding a solution for the Guantanamo asylum-
seekers. On the one hand, this demonstrates that Kazakhstan, though still developing its 
national asylum system, is ready to support the refugee problems common to the 
international community. On the other hand, the country may not have adequate 
resources, both legal and non-legal, to provide efficient integration and permanent 
residency to the Guantanamo asylum-seekers. That is why the US should monitor the 
integration of Guantanamo asylum-seekers in their new asylum state to ensure that their 
rights are duly observed. Finally, the US itself is one of the top resettlement countries in 
the world.281 Given the US’s extensive expertise in integration of resettled refugees, the 
US could also provide Kazakhstan with technical assistance in developing its refugee 
integration programme and improving refugee protection standards and practices in 
general.  
3. Implementation of the US-Kazakhstan Resettlement Agreement  
The text of the US-Kazakhstan bilateral agreement itself is not publicly available. 
Nonetheless, there have been a few media reports about the situation of the Guantanamo 
asylum-seekers in Kazakhstan and their integration-related concerns. This part will 
explore some of the concerns voiced by the Guantanamo asylum-seekers to establish 
whether there has been any breach of their rights under international refugee law and the 
national legislation of Kazakhstan. This analysis is important to ascertain the practical 
effect of the bilateral resettlement agreement, whether it has resulted or will result in a 
durable solution for the Guantanamo asylum-seekers and, consequently, whether it can 
be regarded as a good practice of expanding refugee protection space in new regions.  
3.1 The Sources for Analysis 
The five Guantanamo detainees of Yemeni and Tunisian origin arrived in Kazakhstan in 
December 2014.282 This was the only news that appeared in the local media as well. No 
more information about the Guantanamo asylum-seekers, their status in Kazakhstan has 
ever been the focus of attention of the Kazakhstani officials, local NGOs or media. In the 
absence of the text of the bilateral resettlement agreement in the public domain, the only 
sources of information that are available for analysis are the interviews of one 
                                                 
281 UNHCR (n 49) 3. 
282
 ‘Five Guantánamo Prisoners Flown to Kazakhstan for Resettlement’ The Guardian (31 December 
2014) < https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/31/five-guantanamo-prisoners-flown-to-
kazakhstan-for-resettlement> accessed 1 September 2014. 
 91 
 
Guantanamo ex-detainee, Mr Lufti Bin Ali, given to the Vice News in 2015283 and the 
most recent given to the Guardian in 2016.284  
According to the above-mentioned sources, the Guantanamo ex-detainees arrived in 
Kazakhstan as asylum-seekers and were issued asylum-seeker’s certificates. They were 
then settled into low-populated parts of Kazakhstan that are remote from the two largest 
cities of the country. The Guantanamo asylum-seekers are provided with free housing, 
local languages classes, and access to healthcare and medicine. They are free to leave 
their flat, attend a mosque, but are not allowed to leave their cities and travel to other 
places either within or outside Kazakhstan allegedly until the end of their two-year 
integration programme. Moreover, according to media reports, ex-detainees remain under 
constant surveillance by local police. The integration programme for the Guantanamo 
asylum-seekers is administered not by the national authorities, but by the Kazakhstani 
Red Crescent Society, a member of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies.  
This paper does not aim establish the accuracy of statements made in the media reports. 
Yet, these statements raise several concerns that the treatment of Guantanamo asylum-
seekers may not be fully compliant both with the Kazakhstan’s international refugee law 
obligations and its national legislation. The next section will explore these concerns to 
establish whether the Guantanamo asylum-seekers may be found in a legal limbo.   
3.2 The Legal Status of the Guantanamo Asylum-Seekers in Kazakhstan 
3.2.1 The asylum-seeker’s status and access to the national RSD procedure 
According to media reports, the Guantanamo ex-detainees hold an asylum-seeker’s 
certificate and it is not clear whether they have had or plan to have any refugee status 
determination (RSD) interviews with the local asylum authorities. This statement raises 
a concern because, in Kazakhstan, the status of an asylum-seeker is of a temporary 
nature285 and does not lead to a permanent settlement, what is contrary to the objectives 
of resettlement as a durable solution.  
Domestic refugee law stipulates that the decision on an asylum claim should be taken 
within three months since its registration, and this period can be extended only up to one 
calendar year if an additional background check is needed.286 In case of the Guantanamo 
asylum-seekers, the fact that they hold an asylum-seeker certificate implies that they have 
formally applied for protection and their claims have been registered. Yet, if no decision 
has been taken on their asylum applications after almost two years since their arrival in 
Kazakhstan, this further implies the breach of the national RSD procedure. On the other 
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hand, if duly processed through the national RSD procedure, the Guantanamo asylum-
seekers would hardly be eligible for a refugee status. While they may satisfy the eligibility 
criteria287 for refugee status which are equivalent to the criteria under Article 1A(2) of the 
Refugee Convention, they may further fall under one or more of the exclusion criteria288 
in Article 1F of the Convention. The fact that the US has not granted refugee status to any 
of the Guantanamo detainees in its territory and has never fully acquitted any of them of 
terrorism coupled with the US CIA’s reports on ex-detainees’ reengagement in terrorism 
can be regarded by Kazakhstani asylum decision-makers as serious reasons for excluding 
the Guantanamo detainees from a refugee status.  
Next, Kazakhstani legislation provides asylum-seekers only with the following socio-
economic rights: a right to work and entrepreneurial activity, access to healthcare, and 
access to free interpretation services. Yet, the law does not provide any access to social 
protection, public housing, public aid or any other form of public relief to both asylum-
seekers and convention refugees. In practice, housing and financial assistance to the most 
destitute asylum-seekers and refugees is provided by UNHCR through its implementing 
partners, one of whom is the Red Crescent Society of Kazakhstan.289 Media reports 
suggest that the Guantanamo asylum-seekers have access to public relief and public 
housing. In this context, on the one hand the integration programme for the Guantanamo 
asylum-seekers with its housing benefits and monthly allowances can be argued to offer 
better treatment than is generally provided to other asylum-seekers and convention 
refugees in the country. On the other hand, the better social protection provided to the 
Guantanamo asylum-seekers does not resolve the main concern with their status: the 
asylum-seeker’s status is temporary and does not give grounds for a permanent residence 
status which is pre-requisite for naturalisation. This may be indicative of the intentions of 
Kazakhstan not to give any permanent status to the Guantanamo asylum-seekers, with its 
role being limited to offering an integration or rehabilitation programme. In this case, the 
resettlement of the Guantanamo asylum-seekers in Kazakhstan cannot be regarded as a 
durable solution for their refugee situation.    
3.2.2 Restriction of the rights to move within the country and leave the country 
Media reports suggest that Guantanamo asylum-seekers are not allowed to leave 
Kazakhstan or move and settle in another part of the country allegedly until the end of 
their two-year integration programme. Two important aspects need to be analysed here: 
the legality of the restrictions imposed by the Kazakhstani authorities on asylum-seekers’ 
right to leave the country and their right to move within the country.  
Re the latter, it is a well-recognised principle of international law that ‘everyone has the 
right to leave any country, including his own’ and to return to his country’290 and that ‘no 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country’.291 The Refugee 
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Convention itself does not explicitly provide that a refugee has a right to leave the country 
of asylum. Yet, this right can be presumed from the content of Article 1C(4) that applies 
to those refugees who have left the country of asylum and re-established themselves in 
their country of origin and Article 28 (travel documents) that is applicable to those 
refugees who wish to travel outside the asylum country ‘unless compelling reasons of 
national security or public order otherwise require’.292 It follows that under international 
refugee law any refugee has a right to leave their country of asylum and return to their 
home country despite any existing risk of persecution. The Kazakhstani national refugee 
law explicitly recognises the right of any asylum-seeker to voluntary return to the country 
of origin or travel to another country.293 It might be assumed that the restriction of the 
Guantanamo asylum-seekers’ right to leave Kazakhstan, at least until the end of an 
integration or rehabilitation programme, was demanded by the US294. However, as was 
discussed earlier, a bilateral agreement must not violate the states’ obligations under the 
multilateral treaty that is the Refugee Convention.295Therefore, any restriction of the 
Guantanamo asylum-seekers’ right to leave the country should be regarded as non-
compliant with international refugee law.  
On the second point, the Refugee Convention provides that ‘each Contracting State shall 
accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence and 
to move freely within its territory subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally 
in the same circumstances.’296 Here, it is important to evaluate whether the movement of 
the Guantanamo asylum-seekers could be restricted due to any internal regulations 
applicable to other asylum-seekers or aliens with a temporary status in the country.  
Domestic refugee law does not restrict refugees’ and asylum-seekers’ right to move and 
choose a settlement location in its territory apart from the requirement that asylum-
seekers and refugees should inform the migration authorities on the change of their 
address within five working days thereof.297 The l Law on the Legal Status of Aliens in 
Kazakhstan further confirms a general right of any alien to freely move and choose the 
settlement location within the territory of Kazakhstan ‘subject to limitations that can be 
imposed only for considerations of maintaining national security, public order, health and 
morality of the population and protection of rights of the nationals of Kazakhstan and 
other people’.298  
It appears that Kazakhstan as a resettlement state may deny the Guantanamo asylum-
seekers’ right to move within the territory and choose another location only if there are 
any compelling reasons to do so due to the national security or public order 
considerations. According to a scholarly view, the movement and residence of asylum-
seekers can be restricted only when it is necessitated by concrete circumstances and 
justified/proportionate in relation to such circumstances, e.g. in the aftermath of a refugee 
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influx, and any restriction should not last longer than necessary.299 Thus, it is important 
to understand whether Kazakhstan may have any compelling reasons to deny the 
Guantanamo asylum-seekers’ right to move within the territory and what could constitute 
these compelling reasons. 
As has been discussed in the previous point, the fact that the US has never acquitted any 
Guantanamo detainee as not being an ‘enemy combatant’300 and the reports about the re-
engagement of some of the released detainees in terrorism can be seen by local decision-
makers as compelling reasons to restrict the movement of the detainees on the grounds of 
security considerations.  Nonetheless, such restriction should not be indefinite and should 
not lead to indefinite denial of a right to leave the territory of Kazakhstan. Otherwise, 
such restriction will contravene both states’ obligations under international refugee law 
and human rights law. It would be rather regrettable if instead of a cell, now the whole 
country may become a detention centre for the Guantanamo ex-detainees.   
 
3.2.3 Other prospects for permanent residence in Kazakhstan 
As has been discussed above, an asylum-seeker’s status does not provide an automatic 
right to permanent residence in Kazakhstan. It is important to consider whether 
Guantanamo asylum-seekers may have other ways to get a permanent residence in 
Kazakhstan and thus find a durable solution in this country.  
Under domestic law, refugee status, like an asylum-seeker’s status, is of a temporary 
nature.301 All convention refugees are obliged to undergo an annual review of their status 
at the Ministry of Interior. The purpose of this review is to verify whether there have been 
any significant changes in a refugee’s country of origin that would justify the cessation 
of a refugee status.302 Moreover, a refugee status holder is not automatically accorded a 
permanent residence status, a pre-requisite for naturalisation, irrespective of the period of 
stay in the territory. A Convention refugee must apply for a residence permit on the same 
grounds as other aliens. As part of this procedure, all aliens must provide a bank statement 
on sufficient financial solvency and a written consent of the state of origin or an 
equivalent document confirming his/her right to permanently leave his/ her country of 
origin.303 UNHCR finds that these general requirements in effect bar refugees and 
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asylum-seekers from obtaining permanent residency in Kazakhstan since they are often 
unable to obtain these required documents due to the very nature of their status.304 
It can be concluded that irrespective of an asylum-seeker or refugee status, the 
Guantanamo ex-detainees will not be able to obtain permanent residency in Kazakhstan 
under the national laws.  
3.2.4 Does the US-Kazakhstan Agreement Lead to a Durable Solution? 
The analysis of the implementation of the US-Kazakhstan resettlement agreement implies 
that it cannot be regarded as a durable solution for the Guantanamo asylum-seekers due 
to certain restrictions and legal gaps in the national legislation. The same concern has 
been voiced by Jens-Martin Mehler, Deputy Head of the ICRC regional delegation in 
Central Asia that administers the integration programme for the Guantanamo asylum-
seekers, who finds that the Guantanamo asylum-seekers have no future in this country 
due to the restrictions of the Kazakhstani government.305  
Virtually, the US-Kazakhstan bilateral agreement has put the Guantanamo asylum-
seekers in a legal limbo: if the agreement does not specifically demand that Kazakhstan 
provide a permanent residency status to the ex-detainees, they will never be able to get it 
pursuing only local mechanisms designed for aliens in general.  
The situation of the Guantanamo asylum-seekers could be resolved if Kazakhstan 
regularises this grey area by adopting relevant legislation on humanitarian asylum and 
integration of resettled refugees. Such internal legislation could ensure that the rights of 
the resettled refugees are duly observed and the integration process is carried out in a 
meaningful and efficient manner.  
4. Bilateral Resettlement Agreements: Broader Implications for Refugee Protection  
It follows from the analysis in the preceding part that the US-Kazakhstan bilateral 
resettlement agreement has not resulted in a durable solution for the Guantanamo asylum-
seekers, and as such, it cannot be regarded as a good practice of refugee protection. Yet, 
this agreement, together with other US resettlement agreements with 29 countries, 
presents broader implications for a more efficient use of bilateral agreements in refugee 
protection in new regions.  
First, the US-Kazakhstan bilateral resettlement agreement demonstrates that inter-state 
cooperation in refugee matters not only within the same region but between two distinct 
geographic regions is more than a mere theoretic possibility. Next, this agreement 
together with other similar bilateral US agreements implies that such cooperation is 
implementable as long as it serves the self-interests of the participating states. In the 
present case, the self-interest of the US’s executive is explicitly evident, i.e. the closure 
of the Guantanamo detention facility. The self-interests of other participants are not 
                                                 
304 UNHCR, Submission by UNHCR for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ 
Compilation Report – Universal Periodic Review: Kazakhstan (UNHCR 2014) < 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5541e1a24.pdf> accessed 1 October 2016. 
305 Owen (n 65). 
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anywhere expressed, but it appears that the US has succeeded in addressing the self-
interests of some 30 states that agreed to support the US and host the Guantanamo 
refugees. Therefore, to achieve more progress on inter-state cooperation in refugee 
matters, such cooperation should be seen not as the end but rather as the means for 
achieving the states’ self-interests.  
Second, the US bilateral resettlement agreements have shown that, privately negotiated 
asylum for concrete asylum-seekers are a new form of inter-state cooperation in refugee 
protection. Yet, it is important to include several safeguards in such agreements to avoid 
monetisation of refugees’ lives and responsibility-shifting: 
a. A sending state must ensure that a refugee in a receiving state would be entitled 
by law and in practice to the same range of rights that he/she would have been 
entitled in the sending state and that the scope of treatment of the refugee will not 
be less favourable than generally accorded to other aliens and refugees in the 
receiving state. To this end, the sending state should be kept responsible for 
refugees for at least some period to ensure that their situation has been 
permanently resolved. Such safeguards will ensure that a resettlement agreement 
will not end up in shifting the responsibility from the sending state.   
b. The sending state should be bound to monitor the implementation of a bilateral 
agreement by the receiving state. Such monitoring will ensure that a receiving 
state will not use resettlement as an opportunity to improve its economic situation 
but would indeed provide meaningful protection to refugees.  
c. A refugee should have a right to know what he/she is entitled to in a resettlement 
state and should have a right to complain to the sending state if the receiving state 
has been violating a refugee’s rights. 
d. Resettled refugees should be allowed to voluntarily leave the resettlement country 
and return either to their country of origin or seek asylum in a third country. This 
provision will ensure that the refugees will not end in a situation of an indefinite 
detention and their rights are duly respected.  
Third, bilateral resettlement agreements may be used to encourage non-party states to 
follow the standards set by the Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol. For 
example, an agreement can contain a clause that the treatment of refugees in the receiving 
state should comply with the principles and standards set by the Refugee Convention. A 
similar practice exists in international commercial law where pre-defined INCOTERMS 
rules developed by the International Chamber of Commerce are regularly incorporated 
into international sales contracts to avoid uncertainties arising at the stage of contract 
performance, and thus these rules become binding on the parties.306  
Fourth, a bilateral agreement can stipulate higher standards of refugee protection than 
otherwise provided by the Refugee Convention. Moreover, it can stipulate a monitoring 
mechanism and provide more leverage over the non-compliant states that is absent under 
the Refugee Convention regime. Such monitoring mechanism will ensure that the 
                                                 
306 Jan Ramberg, ICC Guide to Incoterms 2010: Understanding and Practical Use (ICC Publishing 2011). 
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bilateral agreement is properly implemented by the receiving state and the rights and 
interests of the beneficiaries are duly observed.  
Long-term Effects of Bilateral Resettlement Agreements 
There is a scholarly opinion that a ‘novel and long-range thinking’ should be called for 
when addressing the contemporary refugee issues.307 Thus, the impact of bilateral 
resettlement agreements should be evaluated not only on a short-term basis but also on a 
long-term basis. In the short term, a bilateral resettlement agreement may benefit only a 
small number of resettled refugees. Yet, in the long run, the sending states with more 
developed asylum systems can influence the positive changes in the overall refugee 
protection standards and practices in states with less developed asylum systems. For 
example, the US has one of the largest resettlement programmes in the world. Annually, 
it provides tens of thousands of quotas for UNCHR-administered resettlement of refugees 
from other parts of the world. In 2015 as well, the US accepted the highest number of 
refugees as a resettlement country (66,500 persons).308 Given the US’s expertise in the 
integration of resettled refugees, it could provide the essential technical assistance and 
advisory support to the states with less developed refugee integration programmes.  
Unfortunately, there is nothing to suggest that forced displacements will cease in any 
foreseeable future. Such population displacements will continue putting more and more 
burden on both developing and developed states. Thus, it appears of paramount 
importance to build the capacity and resilience of a bigger number of states to ensure 
more efficient and balanced inter-state cooperation globally. UNHCR has been playing 
the leading role in providing immediate protection to refugees in many developing states. 
However, if the UNHCR’s annual budget (USD 7,232 billion in 2015)309 were divided by 
the number of the refugees under its mandate (16.1 million in 2015)310, UNHCR can 
roughly spend only 12 US cents per day to take care after each of a mandate refugee in 
poorer states. Apparently, this amount is unlikely to lead to any efficient structural 
changes in refugee protection and treatment in developing states.  
Ultimately, providing refugees with primary protection rests with states. That is why 
states can and should be more proactive in promoting better refugee protection in 
developing states both within the same region and even between different regions. In this 
respect, through bilateral agreements and their built-in enforcement mechanisms more 
developed states can exert much more influence than UNHCR on raising refugee 
treatment and human rights standards in the states with less developed refugee and human 
rights practices. Provided the safeguards to avoid monetisation of refugees are in place, 
the strategic use of bilateral resettlement agreements can promote more efficient refugee 
protection and support the development of host countries and host communities in the 
                                                 
307 Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘International Refugee Law – Yesterday, Today, but Tomorrow? (2016) 
<https://www.blackstonechambers.com/news/international-refugee-law-yesterday-today-tomorrow/> 
accessed 1 October 2016. 
308 UNHCR (n 49) 3. 
309 UNHCR, ‘Update on Budgets and Funding for 2015 and 2016 EC/67/SC/CRP.7’ (2016) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/excom/standcom/570272579/update-budgets-funding-2015-2016.html> accessed 
1 October 2016. 
310 UNHCR (n 49) 13. 
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long run. Bilateral resettlement agreements can thus expand protection space in the 
existing and new regions. 
5. Conclusions  
This paper aimed to assess whether bilateral resettlement agreements privately negotiated 
by the US for Guantanamo ex-detainees may have resulted in efficient refugee protection 
and a durable solution of their refugee situation. It further aimed to examine to what extent 
and under what conditions bilateral resettlement agreements could promote more efficient 
refugee protection in regions with less developed asylum practices. 
To this end, the paper has analysed a bilateral resettlement agreement between the US 
and Kazakhstan, pursuant to which five ex-detainees of the US detention facility in 
Guantanamo Bay were transferred to Kazakhstan in 2014. The analysis has established 
that this agreement cannot be regarded as a good practice of refugee resettlement under 
bilateral arrangements at least for two reasons. First, due to restrictions of the Kazakhstani 
national legislation, the Guantanamo asylum-seekers will hardly get any permanent 
settlement in this country. Thus, their resettlement cannot be considered as a durable 
solution for a refugee problem. Second, restriction of some of the rights of the 
Guantanamo asylum-seekers, such as the right to freedom of movement and the right to 
leave the resettlement country, raises a concern as contravening international refugee and 
human rights law and the national legislation of the receiving country.     
Nonetheless, the US-Kazakhstan agreement presents several important implications for 
the use of bilateral resettlement agreements in general. If used in a strategic manner and 
with a due regard to human rights, it is argued that bilateral resettlement agreements in 
general have a potential to become an efficient mechanism of inter-state cooperation in 
refugee protection not only within the same region but also between diverse geographic 
regions so long as such cooperation serves the self-interests of the participating states. 
Next, bilateral resettlement agreements can provide more efficient refugee protection and 
offer a durable solution, subject to introducing safeguards to avoid monetisation of 
refugees and responsibility-shifting. Such safeguards could include the introduction of a 
monitoring mechanism for proper implementation of states’ refugee obligations that is 
absent in the Refugee Convention. Finally, in the long run, such bilateral agreements can 
improve asylum practices and raise refugee protection standards in states with developing 
asylum systems. Through bilateral agreements, the sending states with developed asylum 
systems could play a key role in building the capacity and resilience of the resettlement 
states and expanding protection space in new regions. Thus, the bilateral resettlement 
agreements have a potential to achieve more meaningful refugee protection not only for 
the existing but also for future refugee situations. 
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Abstract 
Cornerstone of refugee protection, the principle of non-refoulement prohibits the 
expulsion of an individual to any territory where his life or freedom may be threatened 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion; or where he may be submitted to torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatments or punishments. 
First established in Article 3 of the 1933 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
the prohibition of refoulement has been reaffirmed in international law during the last 
century, be it through its progressive “positivization” in several treaties and soft-law 
instruments, or by its crystallization in customary international law. For its humanitarian 
character, the principle was rapidly transposed to the other regimes of the protection of 
the human person (e.g., human rights law and international humanitarian law). As a direct 
consequence of this expansion, the principle had its scope and content enlarged to 
embrace other persons rather than just refugees and asylum seekers. 
As an open concept, prescribed in general and abstract terms, especially in human rights 
treaties, the scope of the protection deriving from non-refoulement may change depending 
upon the interpretation given by the relevant authorities and tribunals to terms such as, 
inter alia, “torture,” “inhuman and degrading treatment,” “persecution,”. This subjectivity 
confers to international supervisory organs a distinct role in delineating the scope of the 
principle within their jurisdictions. 
In this sense, the purpose of this work is to identify the scope and content of non-
refoulement under the Inter-American Human Rights System. The article so concludes 
that the dimension of non-refoulement under the IAHRS is particularly broader than in 
other jurisdictions.  
Key words 
Non-refoulement, IAHRS, 1933 Convention, persecution, torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment 
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1. Introduction 
Non-refoulement is a cardinal principle of refugee law. It protects a refugee from 
devolution or expulsion to any territory where he may suffer persecution or may be 
subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments or punishments. 
First proclaimed in Article 3 of the 1933 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,311 
the prohibition of refoulement has been reaffirmed in international law throughout the last 
century – be it through its progressive positivization in several treaties and soft-law 
instruments, or by its crystallization in customary international law.312 For its 
humanitarian character, the principle of non-refoulement did not stay circumscribed to 
the realm of refugee law; on the contrary, it was rapidly absorbed by other branches of 
international law, e.g., human rights law and international humanitarian law. As a major 
consequence, it had its scope expanded to embrace other persons rather than just refugees 
and asylum seekers.  
As an open concept, prescribed in general and abstract terms, especially in human rights 
treaties, the scope of the protection deriving from non-refoulement may change depending 
upon the interpretation given by the relevant authorities and tribunals to key terms such 
as “torture,” “inhuman and degrading treatment,” “persecution,” among others.313 This 
subjectivity confers to international courts and national authorities enough leeway to 
expand the scope of the principle according to the cas d’espèce. 
In this sense, the purpose of this article is to identify the contours of non-refoulement 
under the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS). Attention will at first be 
turned to the progressive evolution and consolidation of the concept of non-refoulement 
in International Law. It then shifts to analyse non-refoulement under international law of 
human rights – both universally and regionally – focusing mainly on the role of the 
regional systems of human rights protection. 
Secondly, the work will analyse the structure of the IAHRS in order to investigate non-
refoulement in the light of the inter-American corpus juris. The author dwells upon 
regional treaties and the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IAComHR) concerning the topic 
as to determine the dimension of the principle within the region. The article so concludes 
that the dimension of non-refoulement under the IAHRS is particularly broader, both 
ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione loci, than in other jurisdictions. It does 
not mean, however, that the dimension of non-refoulement has been exhausted: on the 
contrary, the principle/rule is still expanding its scope and content, and Latin America has 
proven to be a fertile terrain. 
                                                 
311 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees (adopted 28 October 1933) League of 
Nations, Treaty Series Vol. CLIX No. 3663 (henceforth ‘1933 Convention’).  
312 UNHCR Refugee Policy and Practice, ‘The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Norm of Customary 
International law’, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/437b6db64.html>. 
313 J Pirjola, ‘Shadows in Paradise – Exploring Non-refoulement as an Open Concept’ (2007) 19 IJRL 
639-60, 644. 
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2. Non-refoulement in Refugee Law 
The idea that a State shall not expel an individual to other territories under certain 
circumstances is relatively recent.314 In the beginning non-devolution reflected a 
widespread sentiment that those fleeing their own governments were somehow worthy of 
protection.315 However, it was not until 1933 that non-refoulement gained the status of a 
treaty-based provision in Article 33 of the 1933 Refugee Convention. In litteris: 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or keep from its territory 
by application of police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance at the 
frontier (refoulement), refugees who have been authorized to reside there 
regularly, unless the said measures are dictated by reasons of national security or 
public order.316 
Even counting on less than fifteen ratifications, the 1933 Convention represented an 
important step towards the consolidation of the principle of non-refoulement in 
International Law.317 
Following the end of World War II, a new age in international law started to flourish. 
Inaugurated with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,318 this 
epoch would be marked by the elevation of the human person to the center of the 
international legal order, a process called the humanization of international law.319 
In this sense, the humanitarian crises that engulfed Europe in the period demanded a new, 
and sophisticated, legal instrument to address the challenges of refugee protection. The 
1951 Convention, elaborated under this context,320 has enlarged the scope of refugee 
protection while extending the legal definition of a refugee.321 Unlike its predecessor, the 
1951 Convention was ratified by almost 150 States remaining one of the most universally 
accepted treaties in contemporary international law. 
                                                 
314 G S Goodwin-Gill and J McAdam, The Refugee in International law (Oxford University Press, 3rd 
edn., 2007) 202.  
315 ibid.  
316 Article 3 of the 1933 Convention. 
317 It would be reaffirmed in several other documents, such as Article 4 of the Provisional Arrangement 
Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany (1936), and Article 5 of the Convention 
Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany (1938). 
318 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) 
('Universal Declaration'). 
319 T Meron, The Humanization of International law (Martins Nijhoff Publishers, 2006). 
320 Humanitarian in character, the 1951 Convention is one of the most widely accepted treaties in 
contemporary international law, binding upon around 150 States. 
321 Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention reads as follows:“the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to a person who 
(…)owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” 
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Among other innovations brought about by the 1951 Convention, Article 33(1) prescribes 
non-refoulement in the following terms:  
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return "refouler" a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.322 
As one may perceive, the first part of Article 33 states that “in any manner” a Contracting 
State will expel or repel a refugee to a territory in which he fears persecution. Article 
42(1) also reinforce this interdiction while prohibiting reservations to Article 33.323 
However, the second part of the provision excludes from the protection against 
refoulement those persons who do not deserve refugee protection for having committed 
serious international crimes, actions against the principles and purposes of the UN, or 
who are seeking to evade legitimate prosecution for serious domestic crimes.324 It 
corroborates with the idea that the principle of non-refoulement as prescribed in Article 
33 will not encompass those who do not meet the criteria established in Article 1(A)(2) 
of the 1951 Convention.325 
Therefore, one can conclude that the scope of the principle of non-refoulement conceived 
under the corpus juris of refugee law is limited to those individuals who have successfully 
fulfilled the criteria contained in the legal definition of refugee, or who are waiting for its 
recognition (e.g., asylum seekers). 
However, for its humanitarian character, non-refoulement transcended refugee law 
finding eloquent expression in other branches of international law. In this sense, it was 
rapidly incorporated into human rights treaties326 and international humanitarian rules.327 
Besides the 1951 Convention, a myriad of other treaties forbids the practice. At the 
universal level, three are the main treaties prohibiting refoulement: the Fourth Geneva 
Convention (1949), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),328 
and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (1984).329 In Africa: the OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of 
                                                 
322 Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. 
323 Article 42 (1) states that: [a]t the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make 
reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16 (1), 33, 36-46 inclusive. 
324 J C Hathaway and M Foster, The Law of Refugee Status (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 2014) 
524. 
325 Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention.  
326 Unlike Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, non-refoulement under human rights law do not comport 
exceptions, as we will see below. 
327 Article 45 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (or simply ‘Fourth Geneva Convention’). 
328 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (1976) 999 UNTS 171, (hereinafter ICCPR). 
329 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 189 
UNTS 150, (henceforth Convention Against Torture or CAT). 
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Refugee Problems in Africa (1969)330 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (1981).331 Within the Inter-American jurisdiction: the American Convention 
on Human Rights (1969),332 the Inter-American Convention on Extradition (1981),333 the 
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985),334 and the Cartagena 
Declaration (1984). In Europe: the European Convention on Human Rights (1950).335 
Non-refoulement is also well crystallized in customary international law.336 
3. Non-refoulement in International Human Rights Law  
As already mentioned, the principle of non-refoulement can be identified in several 
contexts; from refugee law to human rights treaties and humanitarian norms.337 In a 
human rights context, non-refoulement is regarded as an obligation not to expel, which 
can be distinguished – for didactic purposes – in two categories: a prohibition corollary 
of the human right to asylum, and one implicitly inferred as an essential obligation of an 
absolute prohibition (e.g., torture, and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments or 
punishments). 
Another distinction concerns the scope of the protection provided by human rights law: 
differently from refugee law,338 in a human rights context, the focus is centered on the 
individual as a human, irrespectively of his migratory status. In other words, even if a 
refugee has lost his status – losing the protection provided by refugee law – he will be 
protected by human rights law. Therefore, international human rights law ends up serving 
as a safe-net to those individuals who do not benefit from refugee protection. 
This section will now examine non-refoulement under the light of human rights law – 
both universally and regionally. 
3.1 The Universal Level 
At the universal plane, as already mentioned, there are several human rights treaties and 
soft-law instruments forbidding refoulement. Among those, one could select two widely 
                                                 
330 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, (1974) 1001 UNTS 45 
(hereinafter ‘OAU Convention’). 
331 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (1986) 21 ILM 58 (henceforth ‘African Charter’, 
‘Banjul Charter’ or simply ‘ACHPR’). 
332 American Convention on Human Rights, (1978), B-32 OAS Doc OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1.doc.65, Rev 1, 
Corr 1 of 1 of 7 Jan 1970.  (henceforth ‘American Convention’, ‘Pact of San Jose’ or simply ACHR). 
333 Inter-American Convention on Extradition, (1992) B-47 OAS Treaty Series n 60 (henceforth 
‘Convention on Extradition’). 
334 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, (1987) A-51 OAS Treaty Series n 67 
(henceforth ‘Inter-American Convention’). 
335 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (henceforth 
ECHR). 
336 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Norm of 
Customary International law. Response to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional 
Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cases 2 BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93, 31 
January 1994, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/437b6db64.html [accessed 22 September 
2015]. 
337 S Jaquemet, ‘The cross-fertilization of humanitarian law and international refugee law’ (2001) 83 
RICR 658-64. 
338 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 22, 159. 
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accepted treaties: the ICCPR,339 and the Convention against Torture.340  
3.1.1 The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 
The Convention against Torture is clear while prohibiting a State to “expel or extradite a 
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that [s]he would 
be in danger of being subjected to torture”,341 independently of her past activities.342 The 
scope of protection guaranteed under CAT is considerably wider than the one provided 
by the 1951 Convention.343 
Differently from Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, Article 3 of CAT does not comport 
exceptions to the prohibition of refoulement, and it is widely accepted that the prohibition 
of torture is jus cogens. It also encompasses the so-called chain refoulement (or indirect 
refoulement), meaning that a State shall not send an individual to a country from where 
he can be subsequently expelled to a third country, where he may suffer torture.344 
In this context, non-refoulement is strictly circumscribed by the definition of torture 
contained in Article 1 of the Convention, which reads: 
[T]he term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him 
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, 
or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.345 
One may extract from the aforementioned definition three main features of the protection 
guaranteed by CAT: non-refoulement may not encompass protection against cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatments or punishments;346 torture shall be conducted by the 
State or have its acquiescence; any pain or suffering arising only from lawful sanctions 
does not amount to torture.347  
                                                 
339 Binding upon 168 States. All States that have ratified or adhered to the American Convention have 
equally ratified the ICCPR. 
340 Binding upon 158 States. From all States that have ratified the American Convention, only Barbados, 
Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica and Suriname did not ratify the CAT.  
341 Article 3(1) of the Convention against Torture. 
342 A Duffy ‘Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in International law’, (2008) 22 IJRL 380. 
343 B Gorlick, ‘The Convention and the Committee against Torture: A Complementary Protection Regime 
for Refugees’, (1999) 11 IJRL 481. 
344 UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, Korban vs. Sweden, Judgment of 16 Nov. 1998, 
CAT/C/21/D/088/1997.  
345 Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture. 
346 A Duffy, above n 48. 
347 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 6, 302.  
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3.1.2 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
Article 7 of the ICCPR states: 
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to 
medical or scientific experimentation.348 
In this regard, according to the ICCPR, it is forbidden to expel an individual to a territory 
where he may be submitted to those ill-treatments.349 In this case, the prohibition on 
refoulement is inferred as a component of the absolute prohibition of torture as well as 
inhuman and degrading treatments.350 Assume the contrary would confront the very spirit 
of the Covenant. One may see that the threshold between torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatments does not exist under ICCPR. Thus, non-refoulement under Article 
7 of the ICCPR is broader than the one enshrined in Article 3(2) of the Convention 
Against Torture.  
3.2 The Regional Level 
The regional systems of human rights protection emerged in the awakening of the already 
mentioned process of humanization of International Law, marking the emancipation of 
the human person vis-à-vis her own State.351 Each system counts upon judicial and quasi-
judicial institutions to fulfill its ultimate aims: to safeguard, supervise and enforce 
fundamental rights as prescribed in regional human rights treaties. They have been 
serving, grosso modo, as instruments to penalize States vis-à-vis human rights violations 
perpetrated against individuals or groups of individuals – who have locus standi before 
those instances. One shall perceive that the primary consequence of the abovementioned 
process is also a central feature of those systems: the reaffirmation of the individual as 
subject and the ultimate addressee of International Law. 
One can identify three regional systems of human rights protection: the European system, 
structured upon the European Convention; the inter-American system, based upon the 
American Convention; and lastly, the African system, incumbent to safeguard the Banjul 
Charter. 
Once non-refoulement is prescribed in one of those treaties, States may now be held 
responsible, before an international court, for its violation. Those institutions are also 
incumbent to interpret regional human rights instruments and – consequently – key terms 
as “torture”, “inhuman treatment”, “persecution”. 
In this topic, we will dedicate our attention to the European and African systems and their 
relation to non-refoulement. The next section is entirely devoted to analyzing the inter-
American system. 
                                                 
348 Article 7 of the ICCPR. 
349 A Duffy, above n 48, 382. 
350 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 6, 208. 
351 C Trindade, above n 2, 590.  
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3.2.1 The European Human Rights System (EHRS) 
The European Human Rights System (EHRS) is erected upon the European Convention, 
adopted in 1950. Its judicial body is the European Court of Human Rights (ECrtHR). For 
its maturity, the decisions adopted by the European Court have a considerable influence 
in other jurisdictions, serving, not rarely, as parameters to other international and national 
tribunals. 
The case-law of the ECtHR referring to non-refoulement encounters strong support in the 
absolute prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments or 
punishments, prescribed in Article 3 of the European Convention.352 Like Article 7 of the 
ICCPR, the prohibition on refoulement under the ECHR is implicitly regarded in the 
absolute prohibition of torture as well as other cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatments.353  
In the case of Soering v. UK, the Court understood that extraditing a person to a territory 
where he would suffer torture or other inhuman or degrading treatments or punishments 
would breach the very spirit of Article 3.354 In the case of Chahal v. UK, the ECtHR had 
the occasion to affirm that the absolute prohibition contained in the wording of Article 3 
encompasses expulsion, independently of the past activities of the individual.355 The 
Court stated that:  
The prohibition provided by Article 3 against ill-treatment is equally absolute in 
expulsion cases. Thus, whenever substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment 
contrary to Article 3 if removed to another State, the responsibility of the 
Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is engaged in the 
event of expulsion. In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in 
question, however, undesirable or dangerous cannot be a material consideration. 
The protection afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) is thus wider than that provided by 
Articles 32 and 33 of the UN 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.356 
More recently, in the case of Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, the ECtHR had the occasion to review 
the extraterritorial application of the principle of non-refoulement.357 
Besides the European Convention, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU also has 
provisions prohibiting refoulement. Articles 18 and 19 recognize the right to asylum as a 
human right while interdicting the removal, expulsion or extradition of an individual “to 
                                                 
352 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 6, 311. 
353 Article 3 of the European Convention reads: “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” 
354 ECtHR, Soering v. UK, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Judgment of 7 July 1989, Appl.no.14038/88, para 
88. 
355 ECtHR, Chahal v. UK, above n 60, para 80. 
356 ibid. 
357 G S Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Right to Seek Asylum: Interception at Sea and the Principle of Non-
Refoulement’ (2011) 23 IJRL 450. 
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a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, 
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”358 
3.2.2 The African Human Rights System (AHRS) 
Erected upon the Banjul Charter – one of the most widely accepted treaties in Africa – 
the African system is the newest and consequently the less developed regional system of 
human rights protection. The Charter was adopted under the auspices of the former 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), in 1981, entering into force five years later. 
Besides prescribing civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, the Charter also 
has provisions relating to peoples’ rights.359 To supervise those fundamental rights, the 
Charter counts upon the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR) 
and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR)360 – this last having 
contentious, conciliatory and advisory powers.361  
Under the Banjul Charter, one could identify non-refoulement implicitly inferred in the 
absolute prohibition of torture (Article 5), and as an essential part of the right to asylum 
(Article 12).362 However, neither the ACmHPR nor the ACtHPR had the opportunity to 
determine the dimension of the principle within their jurisdiction. One shall not forget 
that the ACtHPR is still in statu nascendi. 
Besides the Banjul Charter, another widely accepted treaty in Africa is the OAU 
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted in 
1969. More than a replica of the 1951 Convention, the OAU Convention tries to address 
regional issues linked to refugee protection in Africa. If nowadays the refugee problem is 
regarded from a human rights perspective, the approach chosen by the OAU Convention 
was heavily influenced by the context of the epoch, i.e., wars of independence and the 
process of decolonization.363 Among the innovations brought about by the OAU 
Convention, one could identify the extended refugee definition which heavily influenced 
the Cartagena Declaration. By expanding the refugee definition, the Convention 
consequently expands the scope of non-refoulement, prescribed in its Article II (3).364 
4. The Inter-American Human Rights System  
In order to duly determinate the dimension of non-refoulement under the IAHRS, it is 
imperative to analyze – preliminarily – the structure, functions and legal basis of the inter-
                                                 
358 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (2012), 2012/C 326/02, Article 19(2). 
359 Article 20(1) of the Banjul Charter. 
360 The ACtHPR was created by the Burkina Faso Protocol. Only 26 States have ratified the Protocol 
since its adoption in 1998. 
361 M Shaw, above n 20, 394. 
362 According to Article 12(2) of the Banjul Charter: “Every individual shall have the right to leave any 
country including his own, and to return to his country. This right may only be subject to restrictions, 
provided for by law for the protection of national security, law and order, public health or morality.” 
363 M Sharpe, ‘Organization of African Unity and African Union Engagement with Refugee Protection: 
1963-2011’, 21.1 AJICL (2013) 57. 
364 Article II(3) states that: “[n]o person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as 
rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory 
where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Art I, paras 1, 2.” 
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American institutions.  
4.1 The structure and functioning of the Inter-American Human Rights System 
One can identify the political origins of the inter-American system already in the 
nineteenth century.365 However, the current inter-American system of protection of 
human rights would start to be erected not before 1948, with the adoption of the OAS 
Charter366  and, subsequently, the American Declaration. The IAHRS would be entirely 
structured in the second half of the twentieth century following the creation of the 
IACmHR367 and the adoption of the American Convention, establishing the IACtHR – a 
genuine judicial apparatus for the supervision and enforcement of fundamental rights 
within the region.368  
The normative core upon which the system operates is composed of treaties, soft-law 
instruments, judicial decisions and other documents; forming a truly body of law, the 
inter-American corpus juris. Besides the treaties already mentioned, the inter-American 
corpus juris also encompasses the two Additional Protocols to the American Convention, 
the Inter-American Convention against Torture, the Inter-American Convention on 
Extradition, the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, the 
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention of Violence against Women, the Cartagena 
Declaration, among others.369  
As already mentioned, the IAHRS has a dual structure. All OAS member States370 have 
human rights obligations under the OAS Charter, whilst some have assumed additional 
obligations under the American Convention371 and other human rights treaties.   
Consequently, the IACmHR has a dual nature: it is an autonomous organ of the OAS and 
has a mandate founded in the American Convention. The Commission is incumbent upon 
the “promotion of the observance and defense of human rights” within the inter-American 
                                                 
365 S Davidson, ‘The Inter-American Human Rights System’ (Aldershot, 1997), 1. 
366 All OAS member States have human rights obligations under the OAS Charter. However, some have 
voluntarily assumed additional obligations under the American Convention and other human rights 
treaties.  
367 The IACmHR was created by a resolution of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs at Santiago in 1959. It would be incorporated into the structure of the OAS not before 
1967, with the adoption of the Protocol of Buenos Aires.  
368 The American Convention was largely influenced by the American Declaration. Even devoid of 
binding force, the Declaration has a distinguished legal status deemed as an authoritative interpretation of 
the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 5(k) of the OAS Charter. The Court had the occasion to 
acknowledge its normative status in its tenth advisory opinion. See also IACtHR, Interpretation of the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, Colombia, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Judgment of 14 July 
1989, Series A n 10, IHRL 3429 (IACHR 1989). 
369 According to one commentator, the inter-American corpus juris also comprehends: the statutes of both 
the IACtHR and the IACmHR, their case law, and agreements and recommendations from different OAS 
organs. In: L Burgorgue-Larsen and A Úbeda de Torres, 'Les Grandes décisions de la Cour 
interaméricaine des droits de l’homme', (Bruxelles, 2008).  
370 The member States are: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, United States, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican 
Republic, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.  
371 Davidson, above n 74,8. 
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region.372 To duly perform its duties, the IACmHR possesses functions of both political 
and quasi-judicial nature.373  
While exercising its political functions, the Commission can publish reports in respect of 
human rights violations in particular countries,374 conduct in loco observations in a State, 
and serve the OAS as an advisory organ.375  
When performing its quasi-judicial or semi-jurisdictional functions, the IACmHR can 
analyse individual petitions376 and claims pertaining to human rights violations, demand 
data, and make recommendations to States once it verified the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies;377 it can also submit cases before the IACtHR378 – acting as a kind of Parquet. 
One shall notice that the Commission is not a titulaire of rights, it is rather a mechanism 
through which the alleged victims – the real addressees of the Law – can access the Court. 
Also, in accordance with Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure, the Commission can adopt 
precautionary measures when the circumstances may pose a “risk of irreparable harm to 
persons or to the subject matter of a pending petition or case before the organs of the 
inter-American system”.379 Once refoulement consists of a summary reconduction,380 
those measures can be especially helpful to asylum seekers facing an imminent risk of 
expulsion.  
The IACtHR is the adjudicatory organ of the IAHRS. It is an autonomous judicial 
institution whose primary purpose is the application and interpretation of the American 
Convention.381 Contrary to the IACmHR, the IACtHR was created by the Convention, 
operative since 1981. To duly perform its mandate, the Court exercises its jurisdiction in 
two capacities: an advisory capacity382 and an adjudicatory or contentious capacity.383  
In its adjudicatory capacity, the Court hears cases relating to violations to the American 
Convention and its Protocols.384 The IACtHR also has competence ratione materiae to 
assess violations to other treaties,385 such as the Inter-American Convention against 
                                                 
372 Article 1(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the IACmHR. 
373 It is noteworthy that the functions of the IACmHR may vary depending upon the ratification – or not – 
of the American Convention and the recognition of the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the IACtHR. 
374 In the light of Article 60(c) of its Rules of Procedure, the Commission has discretionary powers to 
decide to – and how – publish its reports. This leeway can be used, as already mentioned, in a way as to 
penalize States who are in disagreement with their human rights obligations, or the other way around. In 
this way, if the Commission perceives that a particular State has been adopting substantive measures in 
order to repair human rights violations, it can decide not to publish them.  
375 Article 18 of the Statute of the IACmHR. 
376 As an OAS organ, the IACmHR can analyze individual petitions relating to violations to the American 
Declaration vis-à-vis OAS member States. As a creature of the American Convention, the Commission is 
competent to assess individual claims against States for violations to the American Convention, even if 
they are not parties to the Pact of San José.  
377 Article 20(c) of the Statute of the IACmHR. 
378 Article 61(1) of the American Convention. 
379 Article 25 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACmHR. 
380 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 6, 201. 
381 Article 1 of the Statute of the IACtHR. 
382 Ruled by Article 64 of the American Convention. 
383 Ruled by Articles 61, 62 and 63 of the American Convention. 
384 Article 63(1) of the American Convention. 
385 Burgorgue-Larsen also observes that the IACtHR can analyze violations to other inter-American 
treaties rather than just to the American Convention, once fulfilled two conditions: the treaty ought to 
foresee the competence of the Court; the State accused must be part to the treaty. In: L Burgorgue-Larsen, 
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Torture.386 However, the Court will only judge cases where the State in question is party 
to the American Convention and had voluntarily accepted the contentious jurisdiction of 
the IACtHR. The decisions adopted by the Court are definitive and binding upon those 
States. For that, its adjudicatory jurisdiction ought to be expressly accepted by the States. 
It is noteworthy that, of the states that have ratified the American Convention,387 a robust 
majority have recognised the contentious jurisdiction of the IACtHR.388  
The Court’s advisory capacity is broader, encompassing the inter-American corpus juris. 
It is intended to “assist the American States in fulfilling their international human rights 
obligations and to assist the different organs of the inter-American system to carry out the 
functions assigned to them in this field.”389 Even devoid of binding force, the advisory 
opinions adopted by the Court have the status of authoritative interpretations. Responding 
to requests of both member States and OAS organs,390 the IACtHR can interpret 
provisions of the American Convention as well as from other treaties concerning the 
protection of fundamental rights within the inter-American states. The Court can also 
provide opinions regarding the compatibility of any domestic laws with the 
abovementioned treaties – something close to a judicial review.391 In this sense, the Court 
can interpret other instruments comprehended by the inter-American corpus juris.  In its 
first advisory opinion, the Court have considered the meaning of the expression other 
treaties, contained in Article 64(1) of the American Convention. It was then decided that 
the Court can receive a request for an advisory opinion concerning a human rights treaty 
applicable to an American State, even if non-American States are also parties to this 
instrument and even if it was not adopted under the auspices of the inter-American 
system.392 
 
4.2 Non-refoulement in the light of the inter-American corpus juris  
Like other bodies of law already mentioned, the inter-American corpus juris provides 
several ways to protect an individual against refoulement. Both the American Declaration 
and the American Convention have provisions prohibiting – both implicitly and explicitly 
– the expulsion of migrants under certain conditions. Non-refoulement is explicitly 
                                                 
El Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos: entre classicismo y creatividad. In : 
<https://www.univ-paris1.fr/fileadmin/IREDIES/Contributions_en_ligne/L._BURGORGUE-
LARSEN/12_Burgorgue-Larsen_CIDH.pdf>. 
386 IACtHR, Vélez Loor vs. Panamá, Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgement 
of 23 Nov. 2010, Series C No. 218, paras 33-34. See also: IACtHR., Case of 'the Street Children' v. 
Guatemala, Merits, Judgement of 19 Nov. 1999, Series C No. 63, para 249. IACtHR., Case of the''White 
Van v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgement of 8 Mar. 1998, Series C No. 37, para 136.  
387 Ratified or adhered to the American Convention: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Uruguay. Trinidad and 
Tobago and Venezuela have dennounced the Convention.  
388 Only Dominica, Grenada and Jamaica did not recognize the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the IACtHR. 
389 IACtHR, “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Article 64 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights), Peru, Advisory Opinion AO-01/82, 24 Sept. 1982, Series A No. 
1, para 25. 
390 Article 64(1) of the American Convention. 
391 Article 64(2) of the American Convention.  
392 IACtHR, Other treaties, above n 99, para 48.  
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prescribed as an essential part of the right to seek and receive asylum.393 Under Article 
22(8) of the American Convention, the obligation not to expel is broader in meaning and 
scope than the one prescribed in refugee law.394 Non-refoulement can also be inferred as 
an obligation derived from the prohibitions comprehended by the domain of jus cogens, 
e.g., the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments.395  
Alongside the substantive prohibition on refoulement, the principle also encounters strong 
support on the procedural guarantees inherent to the due process of law,396 thus having a 
procedural dimension that shall be observed. In this sense, no one can be expelled without 
an adequate and individualised analysis of his request.397  
4.2.1. Non-refoulement and the right to seek and receive asylum 
Asylum was once considered as the protection provided by a State to an individual in its 
territory or some other places under the control of its organs;398 a genuine expression of 
the principle of national sovereignty. In Latin America, asylum is a long-standing 
tradition – perhaps the only region in the world were asylum has been exhaustively 
codified. First prescribed in Articles 15 and 16 (territorial asylum) and Article 17 
(diplomatic asylum) of the Montevideo Treaty on International Penal Law (1889), asylum 
was the central topic of a myriad of regional treaties, such as the Havana Convention on 
Asylum (1928), the Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum (1933), the Montevideo 
Treaty on Asylum and Political Refuge (1939), the Convention on Diplomatic Asylum 
(1954), and the Convention on Territorial Asylum (1954). 
Differently from Europe – where asylum has a religious character – in Latin America 
both diplomatic and territorial399 asylum evolved together, and they are two sides of the 
same coin, i.e., asylum.400 As part of the process of humanisation of international law, 
alongside the elevation of the human person to the center of the international legal order 
– asylum emerged as a human right, the right to seek and enjoy asylum.401  
The human right to asylum is expressly prescribed in Article XXVII of the American 
                                                 
393 Article XXVII of the American Declaration and Article 22(7) of the American Convention. 
394 IACtHR, Rights and Guarantees of Children in The Context of Migration and/or in Need of 
International Protection, Argentine, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, Advisory Opinion No. 21, 14 Aug. 
2014, Series A No. 21, para 215. 
395 Article 5 of the American Convention. 
396 Article XVIII of the American Declaration, and Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention.  
397 IACtHR, Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration, above n 106, para 210. 
398 M T Gil-Bazo, 'Asylum as a General Principle of International law', (2015) 27 IJRL 7. 
399 In the region, territorial asylum is used interchangeably as refuge. 
400 For a detailed study on the origins and development of asylum in Latin America, see: H G Espiell, ‘El 
Derecho Internacional Americano sobre Asilo Territorial y Extradicion en sus Relaciones con la 
Convencion de 1951 y el Protocolo de 1967 sobre Estatuto de los Refugiados’ in, Asilo y Protection 
Internacional de Refugiados en America Latina (1982), 33-81.  
401 The UNHCR Executive Committee once acknowledged that: “the institution of asylum, which derives 
directly from the right to seek and enjoy asylum set out in Article 14(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, is among the basic mechanisms for the international protection of refugees.” UNHCR, 
EXCOMM Conclusion on Safeguarding Asylum (XLVIII)(1997), para (b). 
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Declaration402 and Article 22(7) of the American Convention.403 However, the IACmHR 
notes that, to duly enjoy this right one shall fulfill two cumulative criteria: first, asylum 
must be in harmony with domestic law; secondly, it shall be in accordance with 
international law.404 
It is unequivocal that the prohibition on refoulement under the IAHRS encounters strong 
support in the right to asylum, and vice-versa. The IACtHR has affirmed that the principle 
of non-refoulement is “an effective measure to ensure the right to seek and receive 
asylum.”405 In the case of the Pacheco Tineo Family v. Bolivia, the IACtHR had the 
occasion to recognize that the scope of non-refoulement under the IAHRS is broader than 
in other contexts, covering not just refugees but also asylees and asylum seekers. This 
unique dimension, stated the Court, is a consequence of the complementarity that exists 
between human rights law and refugee law.  The Court went further to assume that the 
principle of non-refoulement “is also a customary norm of International Law, and is 
enhanced in the inter-American system by the recognition of the right to seek and to 
receive asylum.406 This amelioration can be regarded in the very wording of the American 
Convention. Right after prescribing the individual right to asylum, Article 22(8) of the 
American Convention expressly forbids refoulement, by establishing that: 
In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless of whether 
or not it is his country of origin, if in that country his right to life or personal 
freedom is in danger of being violated because of his race, nationality, religion, 
social status, or political opinions.407 
One shall perceive that Article 22(8) makes no distinction between refugees, asylees or 
asylum seekers. Furthermore, as already mentioned, non-refoulement covers any alien 
and not just a specific category of aliens.408 In the Advisory Opinion of 24.08.2014 on the 
Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration, the IACtHR reaffirmed 
this understatement, stating that the term alien should be understood as any person, 
therefore encompassing non-nationals and perhaps those not considered nationals on 
grounds of domestic law.409 In this sense, any person under the aforementioned conditions 
shall enjoy the protection against refoulement under the IAHRS.  
If the scope of the protection contained in Article 22(8) is broader vis-à-vis the passive 
pole (i.e., the persons protected against refoulement); other inter-American instruments 
                                                 
402 Article XXVII of the American Declaration states that: “[e]very person has the right, in case of pursuit 
not resulting from ordinary crimes, to seek and receive asylum in foreign territory, in accordance with the 
laws of each country and with international agreements.”  
403 Article 22(7) of the American Convention, on its turn, establishes that: “[e]very person has the right to 
seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance with the legislation of the State and 
international conventions, in the event he is being pursued for political offenses or related common 
crimes.” 
404 IACmHR, Haitian Interdiction v. United States, Case 10.675, Report No. 51/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, 
doc. 6 rev. (1997), para 151.  
405 IACtHR, Rights and Guarantees of Childreen in the Context of Migration, above n 106, para 209. 
406 The idea that the individual right to asylum provokes a change on how one may regard the principle of 
non-refoulement under the IAHRS was stressed by the Court in the case of Tineo Family v. Bolivia. In: 
IACtHR, Pacheco Tineo Family v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment of 25 Nov. 2013, Series C No. 272, para 151. 
407 Article 22(8) of the American Convention. 
408 IACtHR, Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration, above n 106, para 215. 
409 ibid, para 218. 
 128 
 
also fortified the principle by enlarging its content regarding the situations from which 
one may not be submitted. The Cartagena Declaration is one of them.  
Even devoid of binding force, the Cartagena Declaration operated an important process 
of amelioration of refugee protection across the continent, heavily influencing municipal 
law on the topic.410 One of the greatest achievements of the Declaration was the expansion 
of the definition of refugee, encompassing – similarly to the OAU Convention – those 
fleeing wars, massive human rights violations and serious disturbances of public order.411  
Considering this latter aspect of refugee protection in Latin America and bearing in mind 
the already mentioned scope ratione personae of the prohibition on refoulement under 
Article 22(8), the Court understood that: 
States are bound not to return or expel a person – asylum seeker or refugee – to a 
State where her or his life or liberty may be threatened as a result of persecution 
for specific reasons or due to generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal 
conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have 
seriously disturbed public order, nor to a third State from which she or he may 
later be returned to the State where she or he suffered this risk – a situation that 
has been called indirect refoulement.412 
In the abovementioned advisory opinion, the Court had the occasion to dwell upon the 
extraterritorial applicability of the principle, recognizing that any alien over whom the 
State exercises authority or who is under its control can invoke the protection against 
refoulement, independently if he is on the land, rivers, sea or in the air space of the 
State,413 same conclusion reached by the IACmHR in the case of the Haitian Interdiction 
v. the United States.414 
Also comprehended by the inter-American corpus juris, the Inter-American Convention 
on Extradition has a specific provision on non-refoulement. Article 4(5) of the 
Convention states that extradition will not be granted once “inferred that persecution for 
reasons of race, religion or nationality is involved.”415 
4.2.2 Non-refoulement as a component of the absolute prohibition of torture and other 
practices 
After the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the IACtHR 
is the international tribunal that most contributed to the expansion of the material content 
of jus cogens in the last decades.416 Denying the alleged exclusiveness of the ICJ in the 
recognition and identification of peremptory norms, the inter-American Court arrogates 
                                                 
410 Almost 15 countries have domestic laws broadening the refugee definition: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and 
Uruguay. 
411 Article III(3) of the Cartagena Declaration. 
412 IACtHR, Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration, above n 106, para 212. 
413 ibid, para. 219. 
414 IACmHR, Haitian Interdiction v. United States, above n 116, paras 156-157. 
415 Article 4(5) of the Inter-American Convention on Extradition.  
416 A A C Trindade, 'Une Ere d'avancees Jurisprudentielles et Institutionnelles: souvenirs de la Cour 
interamericaine des droits de l'homme' in L Hennebel and H Tigroudja (eds), Le particularisme 
interamerican des droits de l’homme (2009) 7-73, 37. 
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to itself the competence to apply, within the inter-American jurisdiction, imperative 
norms of general international law.  
The first stage of the abovementioned conceptual evolution of jus cogens in Latin 
America occurred through the reiterated affirmation, in the case law of the IACtHR, of 
the absolute prohibition on torture as well as other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments 
or punishments.417 
The right to integrity under the IAHRS is comprehended in a broader sense. The wording 
of Article 5 of the American Convention corroborates with this conclusion, stating that 
“every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected.” 
The provision goes on to state that “no one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading punishment or treatment.” One promptly finds that the right in question is a 
right to personal integrity, embracing not just physical, but also moral and psychological 
integrity.  
One shall notice that the abovementioned provision does not comport a precise definition 
of torture and of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatments or punishments. To determine 
the content of these concepts, the IACtHR occasionally uses the Inter-American 
Convention on Torture as a parameter. In this regard, Article 2 of the Inter-American 
Convention defines torture as: 
[A]ny act intentionally performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is 
inflicted on a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of 
intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a penalty, or for 
any other purpose. Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon 
a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his 
physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental 
anguish.418 
Like the ICCPR, the Inter-American Convention makes no clear distinction between 
torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments or punishments. Once the threshold 
between torture and other inhuman treatments is not tangible in practice, there was no 
other choice to the Court but to consider them as having the same degree of punishability, 
thus pertaining to the domain of jus cogens. In the case of Tibi v. Ecuador, the IACtHR 
had the occasion to recognize that: 
There is an international legal system that absolutely forbids all forms of torture, 
both physical and psychological, and this system is now part of jus cogens. The 
prohibition of torture is complete and non derogable, even under the most difficult 
circumstances, such as war, the threat of war, the struggle against terrorism, and 
any other crimes, state of siege or of emergency, internal disturbances or conflict, 
suspension of constitutional guarantees, domestic political instability, or other 
public disasters or emergencies.419 
                                                 
417 ibid.  
418 Article 2 of the Inter-American Convention against Torture. 
419 IACtHR, Tibi v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 7 Sep. 
2004, Series C No. 114, para 143.  
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In the case of Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, while discussing the universality of the 
prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatments, the IACtHR 
reaffirmed the former obiter dictum, stating that: 
There is a universal prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, independent of any codification or declaration, since all 
these practices constitute a violation of peremptory norms of international law 
(…) a State Party to the American Convention, in compliance with its obligations 
arising from Articles 1(1), 5(1) and 5(2) of that instrument, is under an obligation 
erga omnes to abstain from imposing corporal punishment, as well as to prevent 
its administration, for constituting, in any circumstance, a cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.420  
Thus, the absolute prohibition of torture, as well as other cruel inhuman and degrading 
treatments or punishments is well crystallized in the inter-American corpus juris.421 
Once recognized as a rule of jus cogens – from which no derogation is permitted – those 
practices are prohibited under all circumstances, irrespectively of the level of urgency of 
the situation. Notably, jus cogens is rather a matter of international responsibility, thus 
impelling erga omnes obligations upon the international community.422  
In this regard, the Court had the occasion to acknowledge that one of the international 
obligations associated with the prohibition of torture is the principle of non-
refoulement.423 In this sense, one can infer that a State that expels, extradites or returns424 
a person to a territory where she may be submitted to torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatments or punishments is, par consequence, violating a peremptory norm 
of International Law.425  
An essential component of the absolute prohibition on torture, and other cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatments or punishments, non-refoulement is, consequently, non 
                                                 
420 IACtHR, Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 11 Mar. 2005, 
Series C No. 123, para 70. 
421 IACtHR, De la Cruz v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 18 Nov. 2004, Series C No. 
115, para 125. IACtHR, Lori Berenson Mejia v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 25 
Nov. 2004, Series C No. 119, para 99. IACtHR, Fermin Ramirez v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment of 20 Jun. 2005, Series C No. 126, para 117. IACtHR, Garcia Asto and Ramirez Rojas v. 
Peru, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 25 Nov. 2005, Series C No. 
137, para 22. IACtHR, Baldeon Garcia v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of 6 Apr. 2006, 
Series C No. 147, para 117. IACtHR, Penal Miguel Castro Castro v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment of 25 Nov. 2006, Series C No. 160, para 271. IACtHR, Masacre de la Rochela v. Colombia, 
Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 28 Jan. 2008, Series C 
No. 163, para 132. IACtHR, Buenos-Alves v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of 11 
May 2007, Series C No. 164, para 76.  
422 J Crawford, State Responsability, The General Part (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 378-90. 
423 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion No. 21 on the Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of 
Migration, above n 106, para 225.  
424 Corroborating with this conclusion, Article 13(4) of the Inter-American Convention states that: “[e]xtradition shall not be granted nor shall the person sought 
be returned when there are grounds to believe that his life is in danger, that he will be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or that he 
will be tried by special or ad hoc courts in the requesting State.” 
425 Article 41 and 42 of the Draft State Responsibility.  
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derogable and even deemed as a peremptory norm of International Law.426 In other words; 
the accessory obligation was infected by the peremptory nature of the norm. 
The same reasoning applies to cases involving other prohibition of jus cogens, those from 
which no derogation is permitted. Thus, States are bound not to send a person to a territory 
where she may be submitted to slavery, apartheid, genocide, or other practice prohibited 
by imperative law. Therefore, the dimension of non-refoulement is intrinsically linked to 
the current process of expansion of the material content of jus cogens. 
4.2.3 Non-refoulement and the due process of law 
Besides its material content, non-refoulement has a procedural dimension, based on the 
minimum guarantees of the due process of law. Thus, even if the individual is not covered 
by the protection of the abovementioned provisions he is still protected by basic 
procedural guarantees, prescribed in Article 8 of the American Convention,427 i.e., he may 
not be expelled without due process. In this sense, in any administrative or judicial 
proceedings that may culminate with the expulsion of the individual, the State shall 
strictly observe the guarantees arising from the due process of law, judicial protection and 
respect for human dignity, regardless of the legal situation or migratory status of the 
migrant.428  
In Tineo Family v. Bolivia, the IACtHR had the occasion to deal with the minimum 
guarantees permeating the procedures that may result in expulsion or deportation. In sum, 
the Court established that any proceeding relating to the expulsion of a person must be 
individualized, allowing personal circumstances to be assessed, and observing the 
following basic guarantees: 
a) The individual must be informed – expressly and formally – of the charges 
against him, if applicable, and the reasons for the expulsion or deportation. This 
notification must include information on his rights, among them, the possibility of 
requesting and receiving legal assistance, even by free public services if applicable 
and, if necessary, translation and interpretation, as well as consular assistance, 
when required; 
b) In the case of an unfavorable decision, he must have the right to submit the case 
to review before the competent authority, and appear or to be represented before 
the competent authorities for this purpose; 
c) The eventual deportation may only be carried out following a reasoned decision 
in keeping with the law, which has been duly notified.429  
Therefore, if a State fails to observe those basic procedural guarantees, it will be violating 
                                                 
426 IACtHR, Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration, above n 106, para 225. 
427 Article 8(1) of the American Convention states as follows: “[e]very person has the right to a hearing, 
with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, 
previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against 
him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.”  
428 IACtHR, Família Tineo Pacheco v. Bolivia, above n 118, para 129. 
429 ibid, para 133. 
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the very principle of non-refoulement.430  
5. Final remarks 
As already mentioned, the principle of non-refoulement is plainly crystallised in 
International Law. Once respected the international minimum standard, the scope and 
content of the principle may be expanded depending on the interpretation given by 
international courts and local authorities to the cas d' espèce.  
In this regard, the scope of non-refoulement under the IAHRS is particularly larger than 
the one prescribed on the universal plane and even broader comparing to other regional 
systems. First, in its dimension ratione personae; as article 22.8 of the American 
Convention covers any person. Secondly, in its dimension ratione materiae; once States 
are bound not to send a person back to persecution or to a territory where her life may be 
affected by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive 
violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public 
order, or to another state where she may face indirect refoulement. Thirdly, in its 
dimension ratione loci; as any alien over whom the State exercises authority or who is 
under its control can invoke the protection against refoulement, independently if he is on 
the land, rivers, sea or in the air space of the State. Fourthly, in its procedural dimension, 
which imposes the observance of due process in any administrative or judicial 
proceedings that may culminate with the expulsion of the individual. 
Non-refoulement under the IAHRS has not been exhausted. On the contrary, it is still 
expanding its scope and content. Thus, the dimension of the principle of non-refoulement 
under the IAHRS will be enlarged, pari passu, as the inter-American judge extends the 
meaning of key concepts or provisions as to contribute to the construction of an individual 
subjective right to asylum431 or to the expansion of the material content of jus cogens. 
The enlargement of the dimension of the principle under the IAHRS may also occur 
horizontally, through its “positivization” in domestic law. One shall not forget the 
important role played by lawmakers in internalizing International Law, and the work of 
the national judge in interpreting and enforcing international norms. They are responsible 
to enlarge the boundaries of the principle within their respective jurisdictions. It is, thus, 
comforting to perceive that a considerable portion of the inter-American republics have 
already considered it.432 One may conclude that the inter-American jurisdiction is, 
therefore, a fertile terrain to erect a truly and broad right not to be refouled. 
  
                                                 
430 IACtHR, Rights and Guarantees of Children in the Context of Migration, above n 106, para 231. 
431 IACtHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Mexico, Advisory 
Opinion No. 18, 17 Sep. 2003. Series A No. 18, Concurring Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, 
paras 31-43.  
432 From the States that have ratified the American Convention, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname and Uruguay have domestic laws prescribing – directly or 
indirectly – the principle of non-refoulement. 
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This paper explores whether, under international law, the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) has the power to address massive flows of refugees by issuing 
resolutions obligating UN member states to resettle displaced persons - particularly since 
resettlement has no basis in international law and is, in part due to a lack of political will, 
the least utilised of the three durable solutions in UNHCR’s mandate.  
 
The legal viability of the UNSC to issue resolutions that obligate states to resettle 
displaced persons is explored under its UN Charter powers. The combined determination 
of a threat to peace and security of Articles 39 and utilisation of measures not involving 
the use of armed force of Article 41. This exploration shows that, a qualified power to 
issue such resolutions does exist. Specifically, while it is within the UNSC power to issue 
resolutions on resettlement, those resolutions would, at this stage, be purely exhortatory 
rather than obligatory. This finding is confirmed by a detailed analysis of around 55 
UNSC resolutions on durable solutions and resettlement, showing that the UNSC has, in 
fact, begun to issue exhortatory resolutions regarding resettlement of displaced 
populations, although primarily focusing on local resettlement of internally displaced 
persons.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
One of the challenges of our time has been the plight of Syrian refugees and the world’s 
inaction with respect to their protection. The situation has become quite dire, with nearly 
twelve million people displaced as a result of the conflict since 2011.433 In April 2015, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) Special Envoy for 
Refugee Issues, Angelina Jolie Pitt, admonished the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council (UNSC) for its lack of action regarding Syrian refugees, stating that “[t]he 
Security Council has powers to address these threats to international peace and security – 
but those powers lie unused” due to a “lack of political will”.434  
This statement raises several questions, particularly: what powers does the UNSC have 
with regards to refugees and the displaced, since this issue is the purview of UNHCR, 
which is subsidiary organ of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and not the 
UNSC? In fact, no mention is made of the UNSC either in the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) or in the Statute of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR Statute).435 In fleshing out how the 
powers of the UNSC can be utilised for the benefit of, not only people displaced by the 
Syrian conflict, but in any situation of mass displacement of people, this paper is 
attempting to answer the following question: Under international law, can the UNSC 
issue resolutions obligating UN member states to resettle displaced persons in certain 
situations, such as that of mass influx? 
1.2 What is resettlement?  
UNHCR Resettlement Handbook states: 
Resettlement involves the selection and transfer of refugees from a State in which 
they have sought protection to a third State which has agreed to admit them – as 
refugees – with permanent residence status…Resettlement also carries with it the 
opportunity to eventually become a naturalized citizen of the resettlement 
country.436   
This should not be confused with “‘resettlement’ in another part of the country”437 (or 
local resettlement) of internally displaced persons (IDPs) that appears in the Guiding 
                                                 
433 UNHCR, ‘Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2015’, 2015, 6 (UNHCR 2015 Global Trends). 
434 ‘Open Briefing on the Humanitarian Situation in Syria, Remarks by Angelina Jolie Pitt, UNHCR Special 
Envoy for Refugee Issues’, 24 April 2015, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 7433rd Meeting, New 
York, <http://www.unhcr.org/553a459d6.html> (accessed 22 July 2015). 
435 UNGA, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 14 December 1950, 
Resolution 428 (V) (UNHCR Statute); see Christiane Ahlborn, The Development of International Refugee 
Protection through the Practice of the UN Security Council, The Graduate Institute, 2010, 14. 
436 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Resettlement Handbook’, 2011 <http://www.unhcr.org/4a2ccf4c6.html> (accessed 
22 January 2017), 3 (UNHCR Resettlement Handbook). 
437 Id., 26, note 33. 
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Principles on Internal Displacement.438 While the latter is discussed in section 3.2.2 
below, resettlement to a third state is the focus of this paper.  
The paper focuses on resettlement to discover a way to overcome not only resettlement’s 
lack of basis in international law, but also the associated lack of political will for 
resettlement. To this end, the paper will explore the ability of the UNSC to issue 
resolutions obligating states to resettle displaced people. Specifically, Part 2 will explore 
whether the limitations in the protection of displaced persons by member states can be 
addressed by the UNSC. Specifically, the Part attempts to answer the question of whether 
it is within the power of the UNSC to issue resolutions obligating states to resettle 
displaced persons. It is important to note that this part does not attempt to assess whether 
the UNSC should obligate states. The focus of the part is instead on the legal viability of 
the UNSC to issue such resolutions. This will be done through an analysis of the powers 
of the UNSC as they relate to the issue of refugees, particularly, Articles 39 (threat to 
international peace and security) and 41 (measures not involving the use of armed force) 
of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter).439  
Having established the power of the UNSC under the UN Charter, Part 3 will explore the 
practice of the UNSC through an analysis of its resolutions pertaining to the issue of 
durable solutions and resettlement. This analysis will identify what has already been 
achieved with regards to displaced populations, finding that it is in line with, but does not 
go beyond, the UNSC powers identified in Part 2. 
Finally, Part 4 attempts to combat the lack of political will through suggestions of 
incentivised implementation of UNSC resolutions. Without claiming to offer any 
comprehensive solutions, Part 4 commences a conversation of how implementing such 
resolutions may be made palatable to the international community. In doing so, it will 
explore three ways of “sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably and 
strengthening capacities to receive and protect refugees”.440 The first method suggests that 
the UNSC resolutions can be used as a trigger for activating a prearranged system of 
international cooperation by member states, such as temporary protection. The second 
method suggests a resettlement-focused mission emulating a recent Ebola mission to 
West Africa. The third method suggests that resettlement through UNSC resolutions can 
be incorporated as one of the roles open to states in discharging their peacekeeping 
responsibilities.   
1.3 Why resettlement? 
The Refugee Convention and its definition of refugee has several limitations, the main 
one being territorial. Specifically, an obligation to determine a person’s claim to asylum 
is only triggered once a person is about to or has already crossed into the territory of a 
contracting state. This can be seen in Article 31 of the Refugee Convention regarding not 
punishing “illegal entry or presence”. This is further exacerbated by the fact that in 2014, 
a third of the world’s refugees were hosted by states who are not parties to the Refugee 
                                                 
438 UN, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, (1998) E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2. 
439 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter). 
440 UNGA, ‘Agenda for Protection’, October 2003, 3rd Edn 
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Convention.441 This is an important note when considering why resettlement is the 
durable solution being advocated. 
Resettlement itself lies within the core mandates of UNHCR, specifically, providing 
persons under its competence with international protection, humanitarian protection as 
well as permanent (also called durable) solutions.442 These solutions all have in common 
the fact that they give displaced persons either permanent residency or the protections of 
citizenship. There are three durable solutions that UNHCR seeks to attain: voluntary 
repatriation, local integration, and resettlement to a third country.443  
Voluntary repatriation as a durable solution has a basis in international law. Specifically, 
“[v]oluntary repatriation hinges on the human right to return to one’s country of origin – 
be it of nationality or habitual residence – and hence on the obligation of states (of origin) 
to accept their nationals and habitual residents.”444 However, while the situation of armed 
conflict or human rights abuses continues within a country, this solution is not an option. 
This is especially the case because, as identified by the UN Secretary-General, “[c]ivilian 
populations are being specifically targeted and the forced displacement of civilian 
populations is now often a direct objective, rather than a by-product, of war.”445 
Consequently, according to UNHCR, in 2014, “only 126,800 refugees were able to return 
to their country of origin during the year, the lowest annual level in three decades.”446 
The drop in returns has meant that more than 45% of refugees are living in protracted 
situations, defined by UNHCR as being exiled in a country of asylum for five or more 
years.447  
The second durable solution is local integration into communities of first asylum (usually 
of neighbour states in the region). This particular durable solution does not have an 
explicit basis in international law. Although Article 34 of the Refugee Convention does 
express an obligation to facilitate naturalisation for refugees by contracting states, it limits 
that requirement by the words “as far as possible”. While it cannot be argued that a right 
to local integration exists, the practice of many (developed) states is to implement ad hoc 
naturalisation or regularisation programmes for certain groups of irregular or 
undocumented migrants or failed asylum seekers who are not able to be returned to their 
country of origin.448  
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According to UNHCR, for local integration “to be a viable solution” in countries of first 
asylum, “it requires (i) agreement by the host country concerned; and (ii) an enabling 
evironment”.449 However, when a conflict generates the enormous number of refugees 
that, for example, the Syrian conflict has, the mass influx of people into neighbouring 
countries destabilises the entire region, to the extent that it has been declared by the UNSC 
a threat to peace and security (see Part 2 for details). Of the nearly five million Syrian 
refugees displaced by the conflict, about 4.8 million are accommodated in the region, 
primarily by neighbouring countries.450 In Lebanon, for example, the Syrian refugee 
population is nearly a fifth of the country’s population.451 This situation makes local 
integation a far from viable option.   
When displaced persons are not able to return to their country of origin and the region is 
unable to absorb the number of persons that are displaced, resort must be had to the third 
durable solution, being resettlement to third countries. According to a 1991 Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme (ExCom) Conclusion, resettlement 
was a solution of “last resort”.452 Until recently, resettlement was considered the “least 
preferred option” of the three durable solutions.453 This is partly due to the fact that apart 
from being a mandate of UNHCR, resettlement has no basis in international law, being 
“essentially based on the goodwill of states.”454 Even in UNHCR’s Resettlement 
Handbook, in addition to being a durable solution and a tool of international protection, 
the fucntion of resettlement is identified as being “a tangible expression of international 
solidarity and a responsibility sharing mechanism”.455  
However, with the difficulties facing the implementation of the other two durable 
solutions, “resettlement as both burden-sharing and a protection tool is increasingly 
gaining ground”.456 In 2000, UNHCR, supported by the ExCom and the UNGA,457 
adopted an Agenda for Protection.458 The Agenda for Protection identified six main goals, 
two of which related to the issue of resettlement. These two goals were “redoubling the 
search for durable solutions” and “sharing burdens and responsibilities more equitably 
and strengthening capacities to receive and protect refugees” of which one of the main 
objectives was using resettlement as a more effective tool of burden-sharing.459  
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The 2010 Review of the Agenda for Protection also identified not only a doubling of 
resettlement submissions, but also the “upgrading of the resettlement function”.460 
Furthermore, UNHCR’s Resettlement Handbook stipulates that: 
[t]here is no formal hierarchy among the durable solutions. … The three solutions 
are complementary in nature and, when applied together, can form a viable and 
comprehensive strategy for resolving a refugee situation.461  
Resettlement as a durable solution is most useful in situations of mass influx of 
displacement as well as protracted refugee situations.462  
Having established resettlement as a viable and useful durable solution, it must be noted 
that few people qualify for resettlement. A person must (1) be determined to be a 
refugee463 and (2) resettlement – based on seven categories464 – must be deemed the “most 
appropriate solution”.465 However, the figures show that one of the main limitations of 
resettlement is a lack of political will. In 2015, of the 142 signatories of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, only 33 countries resettled refugees (an increase from 
27 in 2014).466 Of the millions of people that are displaced and under UNHCR mandate, 
only 107,100 were resettled in 2015.467  
1.4 The term “displaced” 
While the terms “Convention refugees”,468 “mandate refugees”,469 “forcibly displaced 
persons”470 and “populations of concern to UNHCR”471 refer to distinct categories of 
people, there is considerable overlap between them. For the purposes of this paper, the 
term “displaced” persons will be used throughout. This term is intentionally broad, to 
encompass people are both covered and outside UNHCR mandate, but excludes those 
that have already found a durable solution. While not currently within the ambit of the 
UNCHR,472 for the purposes of this paper, the term “displaced” will also include people 
displaced due to environmental disasters473 as well as man-made ones.  
1.5 Methodology for analysis of UNSC Resolutions 
Around 1420 resolutions were looked at since 1993 (soon after the link was made between 
refugee flows and a threat to peace and security) the latest being Resolution 2292 (2016) 
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of 14 June 2016 on the situation in Libya. These resolutions were checked for whether 
they contained the terms “refugee” or “displaced”, which narrowed the analysis to 444 
resolutions. These resolutions were then further narrowed down based on the content of 
their provisions. Consequently, while it is significant that International Refugee Law 
(IRL) is mentioned in around 100 provisions and the Refugee Convention in a further 17 
provisions, that information does not have a direct bearing on the question of this paper. 
Where they are relevant to the question, the provisions of the identified resolutions have 
been analysed in detail (see Part 3). 
 
2. Security Council Powers 
In asking the question whether resettlement can be bolstered through UNSC resolutions, 
especially by way of obligating states to resettle displaced persons in certain situations, 
such as that of mass influx, it is important to note that the UNSC involvement in refugee 
issues is limited by the fact that there is no mention of the UNSC in either the Refugee 
Convention or UNHCR Statute.474 Conversely, there is also no mention of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL) or IRL in the UN 
Charter. In fact, “[t]he Security Council is the only organ of the United Nations which 
has no explicit authority to deal with human rights.”475 Nonetheless, it will be shown that 
UNSC practice through resolutions as well as Article 39 determinations has brought 
certain areas of IRL under the umbrella of its peace and security mandate. 
One of the main reasons for relying on the UNSC is that, while the UNGA is not 
powerless, the UN Charter permits the UNSC to create obligations for member states 
outside of the internal legal order of the UN.476 The UNSC “possesses decisional powers 
in the ‘operational’ realm of international peace and security”477 and exercises this power 
in the form of resolutions, which have been described as unilateral instruments of an 
international organisation.478 The UNSC acquires its powers from Article 24 of the UN 
Charter which entrusts it with primary responsibility for “international peace and 
security” – an undefined phrase479 – as well as specific powers provided in Chapters VI, 
VII, VIII and XII.  
To exercise its specific powers on member states, especially under Chapter VII, the 
UNSC must first determine pursuant to Article 39 that a situation constitutes a threat to 
peace and security. Such a determination can then be followed by either a 
recommendation regarding what measures should be taken or a decision on measures that 
do not involve armed force, in accordance with Articles 41. This Part will therefore set 
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out the legal framework that will be relied on with a view of the UNSC’s ability to bind 
and obligate states, through the UN Charter Articles 24, 25, 39 and 41.  
2.1 Binding nature of UNSC resolutions 
In ascertaining whether UNSC resolutions can be used to obligate states to resettle 
displaced persons, the first issue is whether UNSC resolutions are binding.  
It has been suggested that in an ideal situation, whether a resolution is binding can be 
ascertained by seeing if it includes:  
a determination of the existence of a threat to international peace, a breach of the 
peace or an act of aggression in accordance with article 39; the chapeau “acting 
under Chapter VII;” and the verb “decides” in the resolution’s relevant operative 
paragraphs.480 
However, usually, a resolution will contain different elements and will, in its different 
provisions, “respectively recommend, decide or declare”.481 It must also be noted that 
UNSC resolutions do not carry “overriding binding force” as that “would give a 
secondary source of UN law (decisions) a greater normative value than many primary 
sources of international law (treaties).”482 Alternatively put, UNSC resolutions “though 
binding, do not have any direct effect.”483  
It is generally accepted that, unlike recommendations, which have been argued to be more 
authorising in nature484 and do to an extent create “some legal obligation” if only to 
require states to give the recommendation “due consideration in good faith”,485 UNSC 
decisions are binding on member states pursuant to Article 25 (as well as Articles 48 and 
49).486   
The binding effect of Article 25 is dependent on the decision’s compliance with the 
Purposes and Principles (as per Articles 1 and 2) of the UN Charter,487 including Article 
2(1) (state sovereignty). Furthermore, while binding on states to the extent that non-
compliance can result in a declaration of a breach of peace and security and consequent 
imposition of measures. However, the decisions of a resolution still need to be 
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implemented into domestic laws by each of the UN member states.488 This means that 
while the powers of the UNSC in making binding decisions are indeed broad, neither they 
nor the powers conferred to effectuate them are unlimited.489  
2.2 Article 39 Determinations 
An Article 39 determination of the threat to the peace by the UNSC usually appears at the 
end of the resolution preamble. The paragraph is usually formulated as “[d]etermining 
that the [current/present] situation [continues to] constitute[s] a threat to international 
peace and security”. The term “international threat to peace and security” itself has not 
been defined. Consequently, determination of a threat to peace by the UNSC is:  
more of a political concept. But the determination that there exists such a threat is 
not a totally unfettered discretion, as it has to remain, at the very least, within the 
Purposes and Principles of the Charter.490   
Nonetheless, during the 1990s it was acknowledged the definition of peace was expanded 
beyond the mere absence of war. The notion of positive peace was formulated in 1992 as 
follows:  
the absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure 
international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the 
economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace 
and security491  
Since that time, the UNSC has declared numerous non-war-like situations to be a threat 
to international peace and security. For example, terrorism,492 proliferation and use of 
chemical weapons,493 HIV/AIDS,494 and the Ebola outbreak495 have all been determined 
to be a threat to international peace and security. In the situation of Ebola, a UN Mission 
for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the first-ever UN emergency health mission 
was established to deal with the situation.496 This mission will be discussed in more detail 
in Part 4. 
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2.2.1 Refugee flows as a threat to peace and security 
It has been widely acknowledged497 that the first UNSC Resolution creating the link 
between “massive flow of refugees” and a threat to international peace and security is 
Resolution 688 (1991) on Iraq. In the preamble, the UNSC put forward that it was: 
Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts 
of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas, which led to a 
massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-
border incursions which threaten international peace and security in the region498 
Thus, the UNSC brought the issue of mass displacement under its mandate and within its 
competency and power.499  
This link has been a long time in the making and is a direct result of the UNSC’s 
increasing role in the protection of civilians in armed conflict.500 In the 1970s, the UNSC 
did, albeit inconsistently, start mentioning IHL and IHRL in passing in its resolutions,501 
as well as starting to refer to refugees, for example, the right of return of Cypriots.502  
From the late 1980s the UNSC has increasingly called on states to ratify IHL, IHRL and 
IRL conventions, and to respect the contents of those conventions,503 including containing 
specific rules such as those prohibiting directly targeting civilians,504 forced 
disappearances,505 as well as, at a later stage, the principle of non-refoulement.506 The late 
1980s was also the time when the link with refugee flows and international peace and 
security was made, albeit initially by the UNGA.507  
After the Iraq resolution, the link between mass displacement and a threat to peace and 
security determination was reiterated in resolutions regarding Haiti,508 Rwanda,509 
Kosovo,510 Central African Republic511 and most recently Syria.512 As with the resolution 
on Iraq, the determinations that linked the flows of refugees to the threat of peace and 
security identified “grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law” 
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as the cause.513 These determinations were made “even in the context of intra-State 
conflicts” and have triggered sanctions,514 the utilisation of the use of force515 and 
“mandates for robust peace operations to protect humanitarian activities in countries of 
origin and complex peace-building missions with far-reaching administrative powers.”516  
This is especially relevant as it has been shown that the UNSC has contributed to the 
strengthening of the protection of civilians in armed conflict regime517 by “enforcing, 
developing and even creating norms that place the individual at the center of the 
international security agenda.”518 Furthermore, the UNSC has contributed to the 
development of a number of other IHL principles, such as protection of access to 
humanitarian assistance519 and the safety of humanitarian personnel.520 Similarly, 
regarding IRL, the UNSC, through its resolutions, is helping to endorse and strengthen 
the developing rights of IDPs521 as well as the durable solution of the right to return.522  
As can be seen, there are now many examples of the UNSC practice of determining that 
displacement and mass exodus of refugees due to conflict or serious IHRL and/or IHL 
violations as being a threat to international peace and security, which have been followed 
by enforcement action. This bodes well for the argument that the UNSC is a viable avenue 
to pursue the development of the durable solution of resettlement.  It is therefore worth 
exploring whether it is within the UNSC’s power to obligate member states to resettle 
displaced persons. 
2.3 Obligations of UNSC resolutions 
It has been stated that “[a] resolution is ‘binding’ when it is capable of creating obligations 
on its addressee(s).”523 While the UNSC often only states that it is “[a]cting under Chapter 
VII” without specifying which provision of the Chapter is being relied on,524 it is 
important to identify those provision when discussing as yet unexplored obligations, such 
as resettling displaced persons to a third country, since it has been acknowledged that “the 
Security Council is bound to act within legal limits”.525  
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2.3.1 Article 41 measures not involving the use of armed force 
Since the question of this paper pertains to binding obligations of resettlement, the most 
appropriate basis to investigate is therefore Article 41 of the UN Charter, which states the 
following:  
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations. 
As with the link between refugee flows and an Article 39 determination, the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait was the marker of an increased use of Article 41 to impose economic 
sanctions.526 Like the expansion of the applicability of Article 39 determinations, Article 
41 applicability has also been expanded to a wide variety of uses.527 
The UNSC has often been criticised for pushing the boundaries of what Article 41 was 
theoretically initially set up to achieve.528 One of these uses has been the establishment 
of international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia,529 Rwanda530 and 
Lebanon.531 The establishment of these tribunals has been argued to be connected to the 
UNSC mandate of maintaining the peace even though they are not strictly enforcement 
measures.532 Furthermore, the ICTY, determining that it was legally created, posited that: 
the measures set out in Article 41 are merely illustrative examples which 
obviously do not exclude other measures. All the Article requires is that they do 
not involve "the use of force." It is a negative definition. … nothing in the Article 
suggests the limitation of the measures to those implemented by States. The 
Article only prescribes what these measures cannot be. Beyond that it does not 
say or suggest what they have to be.533 
The breadth of possibilities envisaged by the ICTY has been reflected in UNSC practice. 
Other applications of Article 41 in UNSC resolutions have been settlement of 
compensation between Kuwait and Iraq, as well as quasi-judicial decisions regarding 
Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait being “null and void”.534 
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2.3.2 Article 41 laws of general applicability 
A notable example of the UNSC extending the use of Article 41 obligations is the setting 
up of terrorism-related sanctions committee that places and removes individuals to/from 
a sanctions list and that obligates states to enforce travel bans and asset freezes.535 One 
response to the critique that the UNSC acted as a legislator536 was that terrorism 
resolutions did not create new laws but merely stated existing ones.537 This argument, 
however, does not address the issue of general applicability of the terrorism resolutions. 
The position is also undermined by the UNSC’s subsequent resolutions on weapons of 
mass destruction, which “goes significantly beyond…existing instruments on 
proliferation”.538 Finally, the reluctance of UNSC members to issue any more resolutions 
of this kind has undermined the arguable unanimity of their original passing.539  
Although it would be ideal if resolutions that emulate legislation could be utilised to 
realise the paper’s question, it is important to remember that with the lack of political will 
and the falling out of favour of resolutions of general applicability, it is unlikely that this 
kind of application of the Article could be relied upon. 
2.3.3 Article 41 implementation mechanisms 
Article 41 has been relied upon in relation to sanctions, especially to create “effective 
implementation mechanisms” to manage those sanctions: 
Such as capacity-building, broader market regulation, the development of best 
practices, and the establishment of subsidiary bodies to identify sanctions 
violators and tackle structural problems.540 
A specific example is the setting up of a “monitoring and reporting mechanism on 
children in armed conflict”541 While this does not in itself create obligations for states to 
resettle, it allows for the creation of the mechanism by which resettlement can take place 
once the obligation is created (see section 4.1 for a discussion of how these measures can 
assist with resettlement). 
2.3.4 Article 41 enforcement of implementation 
Article 41 is not without limits. It is the “purpose of sanctions … to modify the behaviour 
of a party that is threatening international peace and security”.542 Therefore it is highly 
unlikely that Article 41 measures will be directed against unoffending member states 
specifically when, while:  
                                                 
535 UNSC, Resolutions 1267(1999) and 1373(2001).  
536 Krisch, above note 94, 1324. 
537 Ibid. 
538 Ibid. 
539 Ibid. 
540 Id., 1309. 
541 Ahlborn, above note 3, 37 referring to Resolution 1612(2005). 
542 Karel Wellens, ‘The UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the Future’, Journal 
of Conflict and Security Law (2003) 8, 37. 
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the link made by the Security Council and the UN Secretary-General between 
grave breaches of IHL (and serious violations of human rights) and refugee 
outflows is clear, [it] may not be sufficient to create an obligation for the receiving 
state to accept the refugees. On rare occasions, the Security Council has expressed 
its concern at the withdrawal of refugee status by the country of refuge, but this 
was done in a language of regret rather than firm condemnation.543 
Of note is that the inadequacy of this action was with regards to a state of first asylum.  
The type of enforcement action the UNSC can and would take in the case of non-
implementation if it were able to obligate member states to resettle is rather unclear: while 
member states are bound to implement sanctions, irrespective (within reason) of those 
sanctions having an adverse effect on the implementing state,544 implementation is often, 
for a variety of reasons both ineffective545 and mostly without repercussions for the non-
implementing state.546 
2.4 Conclusion 
This part has been able to show that, while it is not legally impossible for UNSC 
resolutions to obligate member states to resettle displaced persons, the Article 41 measure 
would have to be of a legislative nature (in the vein of Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 
(2001)), imposing laws of general applicability. When considering the current lack of 
political will to resettle refugees, it is both improbable and unlikely that such resolutions 
would be issued. In the current political climate, resolutions on resettlement are more 
likely to exhort rather than obligate member states to resettle displaced persons to a third 
country. This conclusion is supported by UNSC practice, analysed in the next Part. 
 
3. Analysis of Security Council Resolutions 
Having set out the legal framework relied on by the UNSC, this Part conducts an analysis 
of selected UNSC resolutions to ascertain whether any measures have been taken with 
regards to the resettlement of refugees. To do so effectively, the Part will first look at the 
method of interpretation it is necessary to apply in order properly assess the legal effects 
of UNSC resolutions. As with the UNGA, UNSC resolutions can constitute emerging 
opinio juris, which in time and state practice can lead to CIL.547 Finally, due to the 
numerous extracts from UNSC resolutions, a blanket ‘emphasis added’ (italics) is being 
relied on throughout this section. 
                                                 
543 Jaquemet, above note 65, 93 providing as an example President of the Security Council, Croatia’s 
withdrawal of refugee status from refugees from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 October 1995, 
S/PRST/1995/49. 
544 Krisch, above note 94, 1312.  
545 Id., 1324. 
546 Wellens, above note 110, 38. 
547 Id., 19 referring to Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Volume I: Rules) (2005), for instance, at 194-202; ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf 
(Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Rep 3 (North Sea 
Continental Shelf Judgment), para 77. 
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3.1 Interpretation of UNSC Resolutions 
3.1.1 Method of interpretation 
The general rules of treaty interpretation are contained in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),548 which are a codification of CIL.549 In 
referring to the VCLT, it must be borne in mind that UNSC resolutions are not bi- or 
multilateral treaties, but are unilateral instruments of an international organisation, 
created in a different manner and serving a different role.550 Consequently, it has been 
argued that the VCLT does not apply directly to UNSC resolutions, but should only be 
used as a general guideline.551  
This argument is supported in the jurisdiction of the ICJ and the ICTY. Note, especially, 
the ICJ’s Namibia Advisory Opinion552 in which the ICJ discussed its method of 
interpretation of UNSC resolutions. Although it was not the first case to analyse UNSC 
resolutions, it was the first instance in which the ICJ “explained its approach to 
interpretation.”553 Uncharacteristically, the ICJ did not rely on the VCLT.554 This can be 
partly explained by the fact that the ICJ was referring to a particular resolution rather than 
making a statement about resolution interpretation in general.555 However, the lack of 
reference to the VCLT is also in line with later interpretations of UNSC resolutions by 
the ICJ556 and other Tribunals, such as the ICTY in Tadic.557 In the Namibia Advisory 
Opinion, laying out its interpretation of UNSC resolutions, the ICJ instructed that: 
The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed 
before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect. In view of the nature of 
the powers under Article 25, the question whether they have been in fact exercised 
is to be determined in each case, having regard to the terms of the resolution to be 
interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in 
general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal consequences 
of the resolution of the Security Council.558 
Additional guidelines can be found in the jurisprudence of the ICJ,559 the work of Wood 
on the interpretation of Security Council resolutions,560 as well as Security Council 
                                                 
548 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT). 
549 ICJ, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Rep 7, 
para 104 referring to the ICJ, Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
v Iceland), Judgment of 2 February 1973, ICJ Rep 1973, para 36s. 
550 Wood, above note 44, 85-86. 
551 Ibid. 
552 Namibia Advisory Opinion. 
553 Wood, above note 44, 75 and 76. 
554 Id., 75. 
555 Id., 75. 
556 Kosovo Advisory Opinion. 
557 Wood, above note 44, 76 referring to Tadic, para 419. 
558 Namibia Advisory Opinion, para 114 (emphasis added). 
559 In particular Namibia Advisory Opinion, paras 53; East Timor (Portugal v Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 
90, at 104, para 32; and Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para 117. 
560 Wood, above note 44. 
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Action under Chapter VII paper.561 Thus, the issues to consider when interpreting UNSC 
resolutions can be summarised as follows: 
a. Intent of the UNSC in drafting the resolution; 
b. the terms/language used in the resolution; 
c. the Charter provisions invoked;  
d. the discussions leading to the resolution562 and following its adoption;563 
e. the overall context564/all circumstances565 (including other resolutions in the 
series).566  
By assessing these issues during the analysis of UNSC resolutions on resettlement, it will 
be possible to determine both who is bound by the resolution and what obligation they 
are bound by.567  
3.1.2 Terms used in the resolution 
There is little available guidance on “the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms”568 
used in UNSC resolutions and/or how they are to be understood. For the purposes of this 
paper, the following informed assumptions are made regarding these terms.569 
Binding terms are: 
 determining/determines570 
 decides571 
 demands572 
 shall573 
 requires574 
Permissive but not binding term is: 
 authorizes575 
                                                 
561 UNSC, Security Council Action under Chapter VII: Myths and Realities, 23 June 2008, Security Council 
Special Research Report No 1, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special-research-report/lookup-c-
glKWLeMTIsG-b-4202671.php> (UNSC, Chapter VII), 1. 
562 Namibia Advisory Opinion, para 114. 
563 UNSC, Chapter VII, above note 129, 1. 
564 Ibid. 
565 Namibia Advisory Opinion, para 114. 
566 Wood, above note 44, 86-87. 
567 Öberg, above note 45, 880 referring to 163. 
568 VCLT, Article 31(1). 
569 Where it is argued that the terms may mean something else, this will be made clear in the text. 
570 Wood, above note 44, 82. 
571 UNSC, Chapter VII, above note 129, 9; Wood, above note 44, 82. 
572 UNSC, Chapter VII, above note 129, 11; Schotten and Biehler, above note 43, 313. 
573 Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law (APCML), Rapporteur’s Report, Australian Cross-Sector Seminar 
on International Law (ACROSS): Interpreting United Nations Security Council Resolutions, held 16 
November 2012, 6 (APCML Rapporteur Report). 
574 UNSC, Chapter VII, above note 129, 11. 
575 Wood, above note 44, 79; APCML Rapporteur Report, above note 141, 8. 
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Exhortatory but not binding terms are: 
 requests576 
 urges577 
 calls for578 
 recommends579 
 invites580 
The terms that are ambiguous and must be assigned the intent behind the content of the 
paragraph which they introduce are: 
 calls upon581 
 endorses582  
3.2 Analysis of UNSC resolutions on resettlement 
It has been acknowledged that there is a growing body of UNSC resolutions (strongly) 
condemning and expressing general concern regarding forced displacement,583 with the 
UNSC indicating its “readiness to impose sanctions on persons designated by the 
Sanctions Committee as responsible for violations of applicable international law… 
including forced displacement”584 and its “determination to “prevent” the displacement 
of civilians.”585  
This analysis of UNSC resolutions however, concerns itself with resolutions containing 
provisions on durable solutions, particularly resettlement as a durable solution. Of 444 
UNSC resolutions that mentioned “refugee” and “displaced”, 55 were identified as 
discussing resettlement and/or durable solutions. It is important to note that while the 
durable solution of return was mentioned for the first time in Resolution 361 (1974) on 
Cyprus and the durable solution of resettlement was first586 mentioned in Resolution 872 
(1993) on Rwanda, durable solutions as a concept was not itself mentioned until as 
recently as Resolution 1902 (2009) on Burundi.  
This analysis was approached systematically by asking whether the resolution (or a series 
of resolutions) contains a determination of a threat to peace and security; whether the key 
provisions themselves use binding language; what obligations are contained in these 
provisions; and who the addressees are of these provisions.  
                                                 
576 Schotten and Biehler, above note 43, 313. 
577 UNSC, Chapter VII, above note 129, 9. 
578 Schotten and Biehler, above note 1, 313. 
579 Öberg, above note 45, 880. 
580 UNSC, Chapter VII, above note 129, 9. 
581 Ibid. 
582 Id., 9 and 11. 
583 United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Security Council Norms and 
Practice on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Analysis of Normative Development in Security 
Council Resolutions 2009-2013’ (2014) 008 OCHA Policy and Studies Series, para 46. 
584 Id., para 47. 
585 Id. para 48. 
586 Within the period of analysis, being from 1993 until June 2016 (Resolution 2292(2016)). 
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The resolutions in question concerned the situations in Afghanistan,587 Angola,588 Bosnia 
and Herzegovina,589 Burundi,590 Central African Republic,591 Chad, the Central African 
Republic and the subregion,592  Côte d'Ivoire,593 Democratic Republic of the Congo,594 
Haiti,595 Iraq,596 Mali,597 Liberia,598 Libya,599 Mozambique,600 Rwanda601 Somalia,602 
Sudan and South Sudan,603 Syria,604 Timor-Leste/East Tajikistan,605 The Great Lakes 
region,606 Timor,607 and themed resolutions regarding Maintenance of international peace 
and security,608 Women and Peace and Security,609 Children and armed conflict610 and 
refugee camps in Africa.611  
3.2.1 Binding terms “decides” and “demands” 
Of the resolutions analysed in detail, two types of resolutions used binding language. The 
first were the UNSC resolutions that used the term “decides” in their provisions (in 
addition to the determination of a threat to peace and security).612 These provisions were 
addressing peacekeeping missions by outlining their mandates. Specifically, these 
resolutions addressed the missions to Mali (MINUSMA),613 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUSCO),614 Central African Republic (MINUSCA),615 Rwanda 
(UNAMIR),616 South Sudan (UNMISS)617 and Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).618  
                                                 
587 UNSC, Resolutions 2274(2016); 2210(2015); 2145(2014); 2096(2013). 
588 UNSC, Resolutions 1149(1998); 1135(1997); 1118(1997); 1087(1996); 1075(1996); 1064(1996). 
589 UNSC, Resolution 1088(1996). 
590 UNSC, Resolutions 1959(2010); 1902(2009); 2279(2016). 
591 UNSC, Resolutions 1923(2010); 1861(2009). 
592 UNSC, Resolution 2217(2015). 
593 UNSC, Resolutions 2284(2016); 2285(2016); 2226(2015); 2162(2014); 1479(2003). 
594 UNSC, Resolutions 2277(2016); 2211(2015); 1925(2010). 
595 UNSC, Resolutions 2070(2012); 2012(2011); 1944(2010). 
596 UNSC, Resolution 2233(2015). 
597 UNSC, Resolutions 2227(2015); 2164(2014). 
598 UNSC, Resolutions 2239(2015); 1020(1995). 
599 UNSC, Resolutions 2292(2016); 2259(2015); 2238(2015). 
600 UNSC, Resolutions 916(1994); 898(1994); 882(1993). 
601 UNSC, Resolution 872(1993). 
602 UNSC, Resolutions 897(1994); 2275(2016). 
603 Sudan and South Sudan: UNSC, Resolutions 2265(2016); 2252(2015); 2241(2015); 2228(2015); 
2223(2015); 2173(2014); South Sudan: UNSC, Resolutions 2287(2016); 2290(2016); 2113(2013); 
2063(2012); 2003(2011); 1935(2010). 
604 UNSC, Resolutions 2258(2015); 2191(2014). 
605 UNSC, Resolution 1030(1995). 
606 UNSC, Resolutions 1653(2006); 1078(1996). 
607 UNSC, Resolutions 1480(2003); 1410(2002); 1319(2000); 1272(1999). 
608 UNSC, Resolution 2240(2015). 
609 UNSC, Resolutions 2242(2015); 1325(2000). 
610 UNSC, Resolution 1261(1999). 
611 UNSC, Resolution 1208(1998). 
612 Except for the resolution on Rwanda, which established the peacekeeping operations prior to the 
determinations of a threat of peace and security in resolutions UNSC, Resolutions 929(1994) and 
918(1994). 
613 UNSC, Resolutions 2227(2015); 2164(2014). 
614 UNSC, Resolutions 1925(2010). 
615 UNSC, Resolution 2217(2015). 
616 UNSC, Resolution 872(1993).  
617 UNSC, Resolutions 2252(2015); 2241(2015). 
618 UNSC, Resolution 2284(2016). 
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In both MINUSMA resolutions, the UNSC decided that part of the mission’s mandate 
was: 
In support of the Malian authorities, to contribute to the creation of a secure 
environment for … the voluntary, safe and dignified return or local integration or 
resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination 
with humanitarian actors619  
Part of the MONUSCO mandate was decided to be, under the section on protection of 
civilians, to:  
Support the Government’s efforts, along with international partners and 
neighbouring countries, to create an environment conducive to the voluntary, safe 
and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees, or voluntary 
local integration or resettlement;620 
Similarly, part of the MINUSCA mandate was to: 
improve coordination with humanitarian actors, to facilitate the creation of a 
secure environment for … the voluntary safe, dignified and sustainable return or 
local integration or resettlement of internally displaced persons or refugees in 
close coordination with humanitarian actors;621 
Part of the UNAMIR mandate was: 
To monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and resettlement of 
displaced persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner;622 
Finally, part of the UNOCI mandate was: 
To facilitate … the provision of humanitarian assistance and to support the Ivorian 
authorities in preparing for the voluntary, safe and sustainable return of refugees 
and internally displaced persons in cooperation with relevant humanitarian 
organizations, and in creating security conditions conducive to it;623 
It is clear from the contents of these provisions that even though the language used to 
mandate the various peacekeeping operations is binding, the actual mandate with respect 
to durable solutions is to “support”,624 “improve coordination”625 and “monitor”,626 which 
suggests a lack of direct participation. Instead, the actors who are being supported, and 
are therefore impliedly identified by the UNSC as responsible for carrying out durable 
                                                 
619 UNSC, Resolutions 2227(2015), para 14(f)(i); 2164(2014), para 13(c)(vii). 
620 UNSC, Resolution 1925(2010), para 12(g). 
621 UNSC, Resolution 2217(2015), para 32(c). 
622 UNSC, Resolution 872(1993), para 3(f). 
623 UNSC, Resolutions 2284(2016), para 15(e); 226(2015), para 19(h); 2162(2014), para 19(h); 2112(2013), 
para 5(g); 2000(2011), para 7(h). 
624 UNSC, Resolutions 2284(2016), para 15(e); 2227(2015), para 14(f)(i); 2226(2015), para 19(h); 
2164(2014), para 13(c)(vii); 2162(2014), para 19(h); 2112(2013), para 5(g); 2000(2011), para 7(h); 
1925(2010), para 12(g). 
625 UNSC, Resolution 2217(2015), para 32(c). 
626 UNSC, Resolution 872(1993), para 3(f). 
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solutions are Malian authorities together with humanitarian actors,627 DRC government 
“along with international partners and neighbouring countries”,628 CAR and humanitarian 
actors629 and “Ivorian authorities … in cooperation with relevant humanitarian 
organizations”630 as well as presumably the displaced persons themselves.631 
The second type of resolution concerned the situation in Sudan. The term “demands”, 
which denotes a mandatory action, was used. The term appeared in a standard set of 
phrases repeated throughout a series of resolutions. The phrases were: 
Stresses the importance of achieving dignified and durable solutions for refugees 
and internally displaced persons, and of ensuring their full participation in the 
planning and management of these solutions, demands that all parties to the 
conflict in Darfur create the conditions conducive to allowing the voluntary, safe, 
dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons or 
their local integration;632 
Later resolutions merely added “informed” to voluntary return;633 and “where 
appropriate” in front of “their local integration”.634  
Clearly, the demand on all parties to the conflict does not incorporate any obligations of 
resettlement, since the demand relates to the conditions conducive for durable solutions 
rather than those solutions themselves.  
3.2.2 Use of the term “resettlement” 
UNHCR suggests that the term “resettlement” means “relocation to a third country”.635 
This Part conducts a detailed analysis of the 55 UNSC resolutions that have been 
identified as mentioning “resettlement” to ascertain if any resolutions have been issued 
by the UNSC that obligate states to resettle displaced persons to a third country. 
It has been pointed out by Wood in his work on UNSC resolution interpretation that: 
[i]n an ideal world, each resolution would be internally consistent, consistent with 
earlier Council action on the same matter, and consistent with Council action on 
other matters. … [SC resolutions] are frequently not clear, simple, concise or 
unambiguous.636  
This is indeed seen in resolutions mentioning resettlement. In those resolutions, the 
UNSC uses a variety of words interchangeably to mean the same thing, particularly 
“return”, “resettlement”, “reintegration” and “repatriation”. However, each of these 
                                                 
627 UNSC, Resolutions 2227(2015), para 14(f)(i); 2164(2014), para 13(c)(vii). 
628 UNSC, Resolution 1925(2010), para 12(g). 
629 UNSC, Resolution 2217(2015), para 32(c). 
630 UNSC, Resolution 2284(2016), para 15(e). 
631 UNSC, Resolution 872(1993), para 3(f). 
632 UNSC, Resolutions 1935(2010), para 15; 2003(2011), para 18. 
633 UNSC, Resolutions 2252(2015), para 23; 2241(2015), para 25; 2063(2012), para 18; 2113(2013), para 
21.  
634 UNSC, Resolutions 2228(2015), para 23; 2173(2014), para 23. 
635 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 26, note 33. 
636 Wood, above note 44, 82. 
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words has its own meaning and connotation, and it is unclear whether the choice of a term 
over another has been made consciously. Conversely, resettlement has been used by the 
UNSC to carry several meanings (this analysis has identified four). Each of these four 
meanings will be discussed below to be able to isolate those resolutions that use the term 
in the sense intended by UNHCR to mean relocation to a third country.   
3.2.2.1 Resettlement and ex-combatants 
The first meaning, and one that has is not being considered by this paper, is often used 
for armed groups. Specifically, when referring to the “Disarmament, Demobilization, 
Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration (DDRRR)” of armed groups.637 It is 
important to note, however, that the UNSC has previously been “strongly criticized for 
making unwarranted links between refugee status and terrorism in its counter-terrorism 
resolutions … which may have contributed to the erosion of established refugee 
protection standards”.638 Although the UNSC often addresses a number of issues in one 
provision, care must be taken not to create “unwarranted links”, in particular between 
combatants and the civilian displaced population. Consequently, a provision that: 
Urges the international community to provide assistance to facilitate the 
demobilization and social reintegration of ex-combatants, demining, the 
resettlement of displaced persons and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the 
Angolan economy in order to consolidate the gains in the peace process;639  
is clearly listing the steps that need to be taken in order to restore and maintain peace and 
security. However, a resolution that: 
Calls upon the countries of the region to continue in their efforts to create 
conducive conditions for voluntary repatriation, safe and durable integration of 
refugees and former combatants in their respective countries of origin. In this 
regard, calls for commensurate international support for refugees and 
reintegration and reinsertion of returnees, internally displaced persons and 
former combatants;640 
is unintentionally but recklessly creating a link between refugees, IDPs and former 
combatants. This is particularly important, since the terms “repatriation”, “resettlement” 
and “reintegration” are all used for both the displaced and ex-combatants, while the 
processes associated with these terms are different for each group of people and should 
not be intermixed at the risk of creating inappropriate standards and processes.641 
3.2.2.2 Local resettlement of IDPs 
                                                 
637 See, for example, UNSC, Resolution 1417(2002). 
638 Ahlborn, above note 3, 8. 
639 UNSC, Resolutions 1149(1998), para 10; 1135(1997), para 11; 1118(1997), para 15. 
640 UNSC, Resolution 1653(2006), para 15. 
641 See, for example, Vincenza Scherrer, ‘The Democratic Republic of the Congo’ in Alan Bryden and 
Vincenza Scherrer (eds), Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform: 
Insights from UN Experience in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2012, 146. 
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The second meaning that is used in UNSC resolutions is the meaning of resettlement 
contemplated in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,642 as ““resettlement” 
in another part of the country”.643 UNHCR criticised the use of this term, suggesting that: 
[g]iven the specific meaning of “resettlement” in the refugee context as relocation 
to a third country, UNHCR refers to, and would generally recommend, that in 
contexts of internal displacement, the IASC Framework for Durable Solutions for 
IDPs terms “local settlement” and “settlement elsewhere” be used instead.644 
Nonetheless, UNSC resolutions use the term resettlement to apply to both local 
resettlement of IDPs and UNHCR-used resettlement to a third country (the latter is the 
obligation, the existence of which this paper is trying to identify).  
The use of the term to mean local resettlement is sometimes clearly specified, especially, 
in post 2011 resolutions regarding the Côte d’Ivoire and Afghanistan, where the 
Secretary-General’s Policy Committee Decision on Durable Solutions645 is currently 
being implemented.646 Other cases are not as clear cut regarding whether UNHCR 
resettlement or local resettlement is intended. The meaning can usually be divined by the 
content of the provision. Specifically, local resettlement is likely intended where, as in 
the UNMIR mandate, the subjects of resettlement are IDPs (with no reference to 
refugees).647  
Another way by which local resettlement can be identified is by looking at the target of 
the provision. This is particularly helpful when both IDPs and refugees are mentioned in 
the provision. For example, if a provision of the resolution is addressed at the county of 
origin of the displaced persons or, in some cases, the neighbouring countries in the region, 
it is likely that local resettlement is being contemplated by the resolution. This can be 
seen in resolutions on Sudan and South Sudan,648 Côte d’Ivoire,649 East Timor650 and 
Mozambique.651  
3.2.2.3 Local resettlement and environmental disaster IDPs 
The third meaning is in fact identical to the second in referring to local resettlement. 
However, the use of this form of resettlement in this instance is not associated with 
displacement due to conflict, but also due to environmental disaster. This use of 
                                                 
642 UN, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, (1998) E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2. 
643 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 26, note 33. 
644 Ibid. 
645 UN Secretary-General, ‘Policy Committee Decision on Durable Solutions’, 4 October 2011, 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-
1265299949041/6766328-1265299960363/SG-Decision-Memo-Durable-Solutions.pdf> (accessed 10 
August 2010). 
646 Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Transitions and Durable Solutions for Displaced Persons: 21 Reasons for Optimism’, 
Transitions and Solutions Roundtable, organized by UNHCR and UNDP, Amsterdam, April 18-19 (2013), 
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2013/04/18-durable-solutions-displacement-ferris> 
(accessed 10 August 2010). See, eg, UNSC, Resolutions 2226(2015), Preamble; 2162(2014), Preamble; 
2210(2015), Article 45; 2145(2014), Article 46; 2096(2013), Article 46. 
647 UNSC, Resolutions 1923(2010), para 3(i); 1861(2009), para 25(a); 1020(1995), para 15.  
648 UNSC, Resolution 2228(2015), Annex 1, Benchmark 2. 
649 UNSC, Resolution 1479(2003), para 10. 
650  UNSC, Resolutions 1480(2003), preamble; 1410(2002), para 12; 1319(2000), paras 4, 11. 
651 UNSC, Resolution 916(1994), para 18. 
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resettlement (to mean local resettlement) has been applied in UNSC resolutions post the 
Haiti earthquake of 2010. It is important to note that, while the determination of a threat 
of international peace and security for Haiti existed for many reasons, the UNSC 
supported the “Government’s resettlement strategy for displaced persons”, 652 at the same 
time as acknowledging the dependency of Haiti’s IDPs and (in the same preambular 
paragraph) their “extreme vulnerability to natural disasters”.653 The importance of 
Resolution 2012 (2011) in making the link to environmental disaster vulnerability, a 
determination of threat of peace and security and local resettlement is that the resolution 
is taking a step towards the protection of displaced persons as a result of environmental 
disasters. This is particularly important because, as mentioned previously, 
environmentally placed persons do not fall under UNHCR mandate.  
3.2.2.4 Resettlement to a third country 
The final meaning of resettlement is the one contemplated by UNHCR and the meaning 
of which is being explored by this paper; specifically, resettlement to a third state offering 
protection. As has been highlighted above, it is not always clear which resettlement is 
being referred to by the UNSC in their resolutions. This analysis puts forward that this 
definition of resettlement is explicitly contemplated by only three UNSC resolutions. Two 
of which being UNSC Resolutions 2191(2014) and UNSC Resolution 2258(2015) on 
Syria, that share the preambular paragraph: 
Noting with concern that the international response to the Syrian and regional 
crisis continues to fall short of meeting the needs as assessed by host governments 
and the United Nations, therefore urging once again all Member States, based on 
burden-sharing principles, to support the United Nations and the countries of the 
region, including by adopting medium and long-term responses to alleviate the 
impact on communities, providing increased, flexible and predictable funding as 
well as increasing resettlement efforts, and taking note in this regard of the Berlin 
Communiqué of 28 October 2014, … 
There are several issues being given voice in this paragraph, which sits in a preamble to 
a determination that the “humanitarian situation” in Syria constitutes a threat to peace and 
security in the region. Specifically, the resolutions use the exhortatory, but not binding, 
“urging”, and are part of only a few UNSC resolutions – and the only UNSC resolutions 
on resettlement – to address “all Member States”.  
Additionally, the refugee-focused burden sharing principle is mentioned in these 
resolutions. This is particularly relevant not only because UNHCR extols resettlement as 
a tool of burden-sharing, but also because it is a principle that has been restated in over a 
hundred ExCom conclusions654 and nearly a hundred UNGA resolutions.655 It is therefore 
a positive step to see the link between the principle of burden-sharing (also called 
                                                 
652 UNSC, Resolutions 2070(2012), para 5; 2012(2011), para 4; 1944(2010), Preamble and paras, 3, 7 and 
22. 
653 UNSC, Resolution 2012(2011), Preamble. 
654 UNHCR, ‘A Thematic Compilation of Executive Committee Conclusions’, Seventh Edition, Division 
of International Protection, 2014, <http://www.unhcr.org/53b26db69.html> (accessed 10 August 2015). 
655 UNHCR, ‘Thematic Compilation of General Assembly & Economic and Social Council Resolutions’, 
Fourth Edition, Division of International Protection, 2014, <http://www.unhcr.org/53b2c42c9.html> 
(accessed 10 August 2010), 50-51. 
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responsibility sharing or international cooperation) and resettlement being made in a 
UNSC resolution.656  
So far, no mention of resettlement in an operative part of any resolutions on Syria,657 a 
development overshadowed by the by the more urgent need for all parties to the conflict 
to respect IHRL and IHL and provide humanitarian access to the civilian population.658  
However, an operative part provision that implies third country resettlement does exist in 
the first thematic resolution on children and armed conflict.659 Paragraph 17 of that 
resolution states that the UNSC:  
Reaffirms its readiness when dealing with situations of armed conflict: (b) to 
continue to support the protection of displaced children including their 
resettlement by UNHCR and others as appropriate 
One concern regarding this provision is that there are no linguistic markers to provide 
guidance on whether local resettlement or resettlement to a third country is being 
contemplated. However, the phrase “by UNHCR and others as appropriate” could be used 
to argue that in this resolution both local and third country resettlement were 
contemplated to be applied as appropriate to the situation and the needs of the child.  
Disappointingly, resettlement is not mentioned in any of the resolutions on children and 
armed conflict that follow,660 which merely reaffirm Resolution 1261 (1999) as 
contributing “to a comprehensive framework for addressing the protection of children 
affected by armed conflict”. 
3.2.2.5 Assumptions on the use of resettlement in UNSC resolutions 
Unlike most of the provisions containing the term resettlement discussed above, the 
contents of some provisions cannot be used to divine whether local or third country 
resettlement is intended by the UNSC. For example: 
Welcomes the commitment of the parties to the right of all refugees and displaced 
persons freely to return to their homes of origin or to other places of their choice 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in safety, notes the leading humanitarian role which 
has been given by the Peace Agreement to the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, in coordination with other agencies involved and under the authority 
of the Secretary-General, in assisting with the repatriation and relief of refugees 
and displaced persons, and stresses the importance of facilitating the return or 
resettlement of refugees and displaced persons 
                                                 
656 UNHCR and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ‘Summary Conclusions, Expert Meeting on 
Complementarities between International Refugee Law, International Criminal Law and International 
Human Rights Law’, Arusha Tanzania, 11-13 April 2011, para 1. 
657 See UNSC, Resolutions 2254(2015), para 14 and 2170(2014), para 2. 
658 UNSC, Resolutions 2139(2014); 2165(2014). 
659 UNSC, Resolution 1261(1999). 
660 UNSC, Resolutions 2225(2015); 2143(2014); 2068(2012); 1998(2011); 1882(2009); 1612(2005); 
1539(2004); 1460(2003); 1379(2001); 1314(2000). 
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When considering such stipulations, it should be noted that, while the use of resettlement 
in UNSC resolutions is not consistent, a pattern of usage is nonetheless emerging.  
It is important to remember that, as was pointed out earlier in the paper, IDPs are one of 
the most numerous groups of displaced people in need of protection and one of the groups 
with least protection under international law (through not falling into the definition of 
refugee under the Refugee Convention). However, what is also clear is that the UNSC 
has been instrumental in strengthening the rights of IDPs through their resolutions, by 
formally endorsing the Guiding Principles on International Displacement, in the face of 
unwillingness of states and prior even to the UNGA.661 The above stipulate that IDPs also 
have access to durable solutions, however all within the territorial limits of their country. 
Part V of the Guiding Principles provides for the right of IDPs to resettle within their 
country. Consequently, based on this history and having analysed UNSC resolutions 
containing the provisions on resettlement as a durable solution, it could be safely argued 
that in cases of uncertainty as to the use of the term resettlement, it is most likely that the 
UNSC is using the local resettlement meaning of the term. 
3.3 Conclusions 
Even with the different uses of the term resettlement, certain conclusions can be reached 
based on the above analysis. The notion of local resettlement could, through the many 
mentions in UNSC resolutions, including as part of binding provisions and in the 
mandates of two of the most recent peacekeeping missions,662 be argued to be an 
emerging opinio juris as accepted in international law. Local resettlement, however, was 
not the question that this paper was trying to answer.  
Regarding resettlement to a third country, out of the numerous UNSC resolutions 
identified as condemning or showing concern at the mass displacements of people due to 
conflict and serious violations of IHL and IHRL (or even due to environmental disaster) 
to the point of determining these flows of the displaced to be a threat to the peace or 
security, only two recent resolution on Syria urged all member states to increase their 
resettlement efforts, while an older resolution on children in armed conflict contemplated 
resettlement in an operative provision.  
While not proof (yet) of an emerging opinio juris, these resolutions are evidence that the 
subject of resettlement to a third country is within the power of the UNSC to urge (if not 
impose on) all member states.   
                                                 
661 Ahlborn, above note 3, 38. 
662 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic 
(MINUSCA): UNSC, Resolution 2217(2015), para 32(c); United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA): UNSC, Resolutions 2227(2015), para 14(f)(i) and 2164, para 
13(c)(vii).  
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4. Application 
The previous Part illustrated that it is legally possible for the UNSC to create exhortatory 
(though not obligatory) resolutions regarding resettling refugees to a third country. This 
Part intends to start the discussion about the different incentive-driven ways in which 
UNSC resolutions on resettlement may be implemented in a way that may overcome the 
lack of political will of member states to resettle refugees to third countries. Three ideas 
of implementation are proposed and discussed, namely, using UNSC resolutions to 
“trigger” a standing arrangement of a burden-sharing regime, such as temporary 
protection, in influx situations; creating a UNMEER-like resettlement mission; and 
adding resettlement to a third country as a way of contributing to peacekeeping 
operations. It must be kept in mind that these suggestions are proposed merely as starting 
points for further investigation rather than a comprehensive exploration of the ideas.  
4.1 Triggering standing arrangements of international cooperation 
An option that could potentially be explored is to add UNSC resolutions into an already 
proposed system of standing arrangements of international cooperation. One such 
proposed system is temporary protection.  
In fact, this system already exists in the EU, in the form of a Temporary Protection 
Directive.663 This Directive is designed to lie dormant until it has been activated by a 
“Council Decision adopted by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission” 
or a member state.664 This Directive has not yet been acted upon, despite the perceived 
refugee crisis gripping Europe. 
A similar system has been proposed for the international community by UNHCR in 2014 
in the Guidelines on Temporary Protection or Stay Arrangements (Temporary Protection 
Guidelines),665 which “call for ‘standing arrangements’ to be agreed on a 
multilateral/regional basis and to be activated in response to particular situations or events 
when they arise.”666 The Guidelines suggest that the standing arrangements should be 
able to be brought to an end through a cooperative step in order to ensure not to undermine 
the responsibility sharing program and not to trigger secondary movements.667 
This section proposes that the activation (and de-activation) of what the Temporary 
Protection Guidelines call the Temporary Protection or Stay Arrangements (TPSAs) can 
be achieved through UNSC Resolutions (which are capable of terminating earlier 
                                                 
663 Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards 
for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures 
promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing, 7 August 
2001, OJ L 212/12 (Temporary Protection Directive). 
664 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, Temporary Protection, < 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/temporary-protection/index_en.htm> 
(accessed 10 August 2015); Temporary Protection Directive, Article 5(1). 
665 UNHCR, Temporary Protection Guidelines (2014), <http://www.refworld.org/docid/52fba2404.html> 
(accessed 10 August 2015) (UNHCR Temporary Protection Guidelines).  
666 Volker Türk, ‘Temporary Protection to Fill a Gap’ Forced Migration Review (2015) 49, 40-41, 40; 
UNHCR Temporary Protection Guidelines, above note 233, para 1. 
667 UNHCR Temporary Protection Guidelines, above note 233, para 22. 
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resolutions).668 The Guidelines suggest the setting up of a central body such as a “steering 
committee” which would “agree the categories, situations, or groups to whom the TPSA 
would apply, its basic parameters, modalities of implementation and, importantly, 
solutions and termination”.669 UNHCR is the organisation best placed to “play a 
convening and advisory role” in the implementation of these arrangements.670 
Suffice to point out here that the UNSC, by way of its resolutions can play the same 
triggering role for temporary or other more permanent resettlement-based responses that 
are put in place by member states as arrangements of international protection through 
responsibility and burden sharing. Furthermore, the UNSC’s Article 41 powers can be 
utilised to institute the required implementing mechanisms (discussed in section 2.3.3). 
4.2 Ebola Response template 
Another way to approach resettlement is through a UN Emergency Response mission, 
pioneered by the global response to the Ebola crisis by way of UNMEER. This was the 
UN’s first response to an emergency health situation and had as its objective the “scaling 
up the response on the ground”.671 
The mission was created by the Secretary-General, after a UNSC resolution 
“[d]etermining that the unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constitutes 
a threat to international peace and security”,672 and a unanimously adopted UNGA 
resolution, which requested the Secretary-General to establish UNMEER673 at the behest 
of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone,674 the countries in the region affected by the crisis. 
Another unusual element of UNMEER is that the World Health Organization, an 
affiliated, but not even a subsidiary body of the UN,675 was placed as the lead organisation 
of the Mission.676 In Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was not 
only not drawn down but remained to assist and cooperate with the newly established 
UNMEER.  
The Ebola response sets an ideal template for a resettlement mission. As has been stated 
earlier, the UNSC has declared humanitarian situations such as refugee flows as a threat 
to peace and security. Using the Ebola template, an emergency response mission could 
                                                 
668 Marko D. Öberg, ‘The Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion’, 
American Journal of International Law (2011) 105, 81-90, 86 referring to the Kosovo Advisory Opinion 
para 37. 
669 UNHCR Temporary Protection Guidelines, above note 233, para 24. 
670 Id., para 25. 
671 UNMEER Website, above note 64. 
672 UNSC, Resolution 2177(2014). 
673 GA, ‘Measures to contain and combat the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa’, 23 September 2014, 
A/RES/69/1. 
674 Permanent Missions, ‘UN Mission for Ebola Response Highlights New Type of UN Operation - Chef 
de Cabinet Tells UNMEER Staff’, <https://www.un.int/news/un-mission-ebola-response-highlights-new-
type-un-operation-chef-de-cabinet-tells-unmeer-staff> (accessed 10 August 2010). 
675 The World Health Organization is an autonomous organisation whose work is coordinated through 
ECOSOC (intergovernmental level) and CEB (inter-secretariat level): UN, UN, ‘The United Nations 
System: UN Organizational Chart’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/pdfs/UN_System_Chart_30June2015.pdf> (accessed 10 August 
2015). 
676 UNMEER Website, above note 64. 
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be triggered by an UNSC and/or UNGA resolution at the request of,677 and in cooperation 
with, neighbouring states who are feeling the effects of the mass displacement the most. 
Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are bearing the brunt of persons displaced from Syria. The 
mission’s objective would be the “scaling up the response on the resettlement to third 
countries” as a way of easing the burden borne by the countries in the region. UNHCR 
would lead this emergency response mission, working in collaboration with any other 
peacekeeping operations in the area.  
4.3 Resettlement mandate in peacekeeping missions 
The final and, potentially most viable, suggestion is to incorporate resettlement to a third 
country as one of the mandates of peacekeeping operations. As the analysis of UNSC 
resolutions has shown, local resettlement is increasingly being incorporated in ‘protection 
of civilians’ sections in peacekeeping operations’ mandates. 
Peacekeeping operations are created by the UNSC issuing a resolution determining a 
threat of peace and security and setting out the operation’s mandate. The peacekeeping 
operation is then created as a subsidiary organ of the UNSC.678 Simultaneously, the 
UNGA coordinates “agreement between and/or with the parties to a conflict” and finances 
the operation through their Article 17 budget powers. 679 The Secretary-General heads the 
operation.680 Peacekeeping operations are not based on any specific provision in the UN 
Charter, having evolved over time from state and institutional practice.681 Current practice 
is to mandate peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII “without specifying which 
provision”.682  
A peacekeeping operation is made up of military and civilian elements. The civilian 
personnel are hired in their individual capacity for the operation. Member states 
contribute equipment and place military staff “at the disposal of the United Nations” 
based on an agreement by between the UN and those member states.683 This agreement 
is often based on a model agreement.684 Similarly, a “multi-dimensional integrated UN 
peacekeeping operation” is achieved by working closely with other UN agencies, such as 
the UNCHR.685  
One of the benefits of peacekeeping operations is that they are to a large degree “based 
on consent and cooperation”.686 Consequently, peacekeeping operations are as much an 
exercise of the UN under the combined effect of the UN Charter as a contractual 
relationship between the UN and the host state,687 and the UN and the contributing 
                                                 
677 See for example, UNSC, Resolution 2177(2014), Preamble. 
678 UN Charter, Article 29. 
679 Bothe, above note 92, 1183. 
680 UN Charter, Articles 97-99; Bothe, above note 92, 1187. 
681 Id., 1176-1178. 
682 Id., 1186. 
683 Bothe, above note 92, 1184, 1191. 
684 UNGA, ‘Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-
Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual)’, 
20 January 2015, A/C.5/69/18, Chapter 9 Memorandum of Understanding.  
685 UN, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping: Partnerships’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/partnerships.shtml> (accessed 9 August 2015). 
686 Bothe, above note 92, 1175, 1183. 
687 Bothe, above note 92, 1187. 
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member states.688 Because of this contract-like relationship, agreement regarding state 
contributions can be amended to incorporate the resettlement of displaced persons, as per, 
for example, Article 11 of the model agreement, which states that “[t]he parties may 
conclude written supplementary arrangements to the present [Memorandum Of 
Understanding]”. 
4.3.1 Budgetary discount incentive 
Because the option of resettling displaced persons is not obligatory, for it to be attractive 
to states, it needs to be incentivised. This can be achieved through linking resettlement to 
the collection of moneys for peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping fees are obligatory 
for member states and are added on top of their regular contributions to the UN as per the 
powers of the UNGA.689 The budget for each member state is worked out by a formula, 
considering criteria, including the level of economic development of a country.690 
One of the issues facing the UN is that, at the end of 2014, USD 653 million was owed, 
with only 31 member states having paid their allocated contribution.691 It was put forward 
by South Africa that “withholding funds for approved budgets created ‘artificial’ political 
leverage” that was being abused by states.692 This so-called leverage could potentially be 
used for the benefit of resettlement. Specifically, member states’ payments could be 
decreased or worked out based on a more favourable formula, should they choose to 
contribute to the peacekeeping mission by resettling displaced persons.  
4.4 Conclusion 
As mentioned earlier, having showed that it is within the UNSC’s power to issue 
resolutions urging states to resettle displaced persons, the above three suggestions provide 
a starting point as to how the UNSC is best placed to utilise these resolutions effectively. 
While all three suggestions could be explored further, introducing resettlement as one of 
the ways to contribute to peacekeeping missions allows resettlement to be incentivised 
through budgetary discounts. This is particularly useful in combatting the lack of political 
will that is stifling the increase in global resettlement efforts. 
  
                                                 
688 Id., 1190-1191. 
689 UNGA, ‘Background Resources: How Is UN Peacekeeping Financed?’ 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/fifth/pkofinancing.shtml> (accessed 9 August 2010); Certain Expenses Advisory 
Opinion, 177-179. 
690 Ibid. 
691 UNGA, ‘Meetings Coverage and Press Releases: Budget Committee Voices Concern over Late Payment 
of Assessments, Says United Nations Has “Long Way to Go” to Financial Soundness’ 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/gaab4156.doc.htm> (accessed 9 August 2015). 
692 Ibid. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper set out to answer the following question: under international law, can the 
UNSC issue resolutions obligating states to resettle displaced persons in certain 
situations, such as that of mass influx? Having analysed the powers of the UNSC under 
the UN Charter as well as having conducted a detailed analysis on a selection of UNSC 
resolutions dealing with durable solutions and resettlement, the short answer to this 
question can be summarised as: not quite.  
One of the main difficulties of obligating states to resettle the displaced is that the durable 
solution of resettlement, apart from UNHCR Statute, has no basis in international law. 
What is more difficult is that the protections available in the Refugee Convention are only 
applicable once an asylum seeker has crossed into the territory of a signatory of the 
Refugee Convention. However, currently, most of the countries of first asylum are not 
parties to the Convention.  
The paper explored the question of the power of the UNSC to create binging obligations 
under the UN Charter. The issue of displaced people has been declared to be a threat to 
peace and security under Article 39numerous times, since the early 1990s. Thus, the issue 
of displaced people, and the mass flows of refugees have been brought into the mandate 
of the UNSC. It is therefore within the UNSC’s power to make binding non-use of force 
measures under Article 41.  
While the powers of the UNSC are indeed broad, the measures are usually targeted at the 
state(s) responsible for the threat to peace and security. And while there is an obligation 
on member states to carry out sanctions aimed at the target states, UNSC resolutions 
rarely aim binding obligations at non-offending member states for fear of acting in the 
role of a global legislator through creating laws of general application. A notable 
exception to this general practice are the resolutions sanctioning terrorism and curbing 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction.  
Nonetheless, it is likely that resettling refugees (an arguably positive obligation) would 
have to be done in an exhortatory way, requesting states, in line with the principles of 
international cooperation, responsibility and burden sharing, to assist in dealing with the 
determined threat to peace and security though, amongst other measures, resettling the 
displaced to third countries. This is in fact what has been done in two recent resolutions 
on Syria, thereby potentially paving the way for more resolutions with similar provisions 
in response to situations of mass influx. This is partly supported by a provision in the first 
thematic resolution on children and armed conflict, which contemplated resettlement of 
children where appropriate. 
An analysis of all resolutions with provisions on resettlement between 1993 and June 
2016,693 identified a growing promotion and development by the UNSC of durable 
solutions of IDPs, which not only includes the right to return, but increasingly integration 
and local resettlement. Durable solutions for IDPs are the same as those for refugees but 
are limited to the territory of their own country. This development is clearly of direct 
benefit to IDPs, which are the most numerous population of concern to UNHCR as well 
as the least protected by IRL. However, while not directly benefiting people who have 
                                                 
693 Until Resolution 2292 (2016) of 14 June 2016. 
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crossed borders, nearly half of whom are in protracted urban and camp-like situations, 
the development and acceptance, through practice, of resettlement as a right and a state 
obligation over time is likely to give legal basis to the concept. This is especially the case 
as local resettlement is increasingly one of the mandates of peacekeeping operations. 
Having acknowledged that, while the UNSC can issue resolutions on resettlement to a 
third country, those resolutions would be exhortatory, using languages such as “urges”, 
or “requests”, the paper considered ways in which such resolutions could be implemented. 
Three options are suggested.  
The first option is that rather than creating binding obligations on member states, the 
UNSC can be part of multilateral and/or regional standing arrangements to resettle 
displaced persons by being the required “trigger” in identifying when those standing 
arrangements are to be both activated and deactivated and helping run those standing 
arrangements through its Article 41 implementing mechanisms. 
Alternatively, an emergency response mission could be set up in the vein of the one 
created to address the Ebola crisis in some of the West African states. This emergency 
response mission is perfectly suited to the type of response needed by the mass influx of 
refugees into neighbouring states. The mission can be created at the request of the states 
in need of assistance and can be led by UNHCR, which is already on the ground in those 
countries. 
The third, most viable, option is including resettlement to a third country into resolutions 
specifying peacekeeping mandates. The benefit of creating such a mission is linked to the 
contractual obligations of participating states, which can be extended to resettling 
displaced persons. It is proposed that this response could be incentivised through the 
UNGA budgetary power as a way of mitigating the peacekeeping mission debt accrued 
by member states. 
Finally, it must be noted that while a positive answer to the paper’s question was hoped 
for, the current answer of “not quite” is nonetheless encouraging. Especially, as it was 
found that steps are increasingly (albeit slowly) being taken in the right direction by the 
UNSC with respect of resettlement, even while member states are lacking in political will.  
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Abstract 
 
Temporary protection mechanisms emerged in Europe in the 1990s in response to mass 
influxes of asylum seekers. The influxes of asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia, fleeing 
conflicts and violence resulting from the break-up of that country, have been closely associated 
with its emergence. In the light of the developments in that period, particularly responses of 
European states to influxes from the former Yugoslavia, the paper reviews the emergence of 
temporary protection. It reviews the convergence of European norms which lead EU states to 
agree the Temporary Protection Directive in 2001. The paper juxtaposes responses to the 1990s 
influxes with responses to the 2015 European refugee crisis. The latter responses have included 
arrangements to relocate asylum seekers from EU states under the most pressure, but have not 
included temporary protection. The omission of temporary protection is consistent with the 
findings in this paper, which show that EU states came to disfavour temporary protection as a 
response to asylum crises. The paper concludes that while EU states did commit to a set of 
standards for temporary protection, they did not commit to implementation of temporary 
protection.  
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Introduction 
Asylum claims have been a major ‘problem’ for European states as their numbers have risen 
against domestic pressures to reduce immigration. In the 1990s, there were new asylum 
pressures as large numbers of people from eastern European nations arrived in European Union 
states, (EU), with the collapse of the Soviet block and European communism. The single largest 
group of asylum seekers was comprised of persons fleeing conflict after the breakup of 
Yugoslavia. A key objective of EU states was to contain the Yugoslavian refugee problem as 
much as possible outside the EU. Refuge under various national arrangements of temporary 
protection was given to those who reached the EU from Yugoslavia. While critics of temporary 
protection were concerned with the ad hoc approach and the precariousness of status and rights 
under temporary protection, in the main, they accepted the pragmatism of temporary protection 
arrangements because, whatever their exact forms, they ensured immediate protection.  
Agreement for a common pan-EU temporary protection instrument was slow coming primarily 
due to a lack of consensus between states on an acceptable basis for sharing the burden of a 
mass influx, which was considered as a central part of an effective EU wide arrangement. 
Following change brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, which required the EU 
to have a temporary protection instrument by 2004, The Temporary Protection Directive 
2001/55/EC (TPD or The Directive) was agreed in 2001.694 
The Directive provides the EU with a mechanism to activate an EU-wide temporary protection 
arrangement in a situation of ‘mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from 
third countries’ into the EU.695 Under TPD, displaced persons include persons who have fled 
areas of armed conflict or endemic violence.696 The Directive provides temporary protection 
for one year initially, with the possibility of extension for a further two years.697  
It has been claimed that TPD establishes ‘the binding legal obligation of temporary asylum’ 
providing more legal security,698 and that TPD sets out a model temporary protection system 
which the EU can ‘take off the shelf’ and use in the event of a crisis.699  
Fourteen years after the enactment of TPD, the EU experienced what has been acknowledged 
as the largest migration and humanitarian crisis in Europe for decades, with close to 1.3 million 
recorded asylum claims in 2015.700 The vast majority of these migrants are considered by 
UNHCR to have fled war and persecution.701  363,000 asylum applications were submitted by 
Syrians, representing 29% of all claims in 2015.702 EU data shows that, since 2014 Syrians 
                                                 
694 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the 
event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member 
States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof [2001] OJ L212/12. (TPD). 
695 ibid article 1. 
696 ibid article 2(c). 
697 ibid article 4. 
698 Nuria Arenas, ‘The Concept of ‘Mass Influx of Displaced Persons’ in the European Directive Establishing the 
Temporary Protection System’ (2006) 7(4) European Journal of Migration and Law 435, 437. 
699 Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (3rd edn, OUP 2011) 300. 
700 European Commission (Asylum Statistics 2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics> accessed 20 December 2016. 
701 UNHCR (2015 News) <http://www.unhcr.org/5683d0b56.html> accessed 1 June 2016. 
702 Above note 7. 
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have had an average EU-wide asylum recognition rate equal to or higher than 75%.703 Not 
surprisingly, there have been calls to activate TPD to help address the crisis in the EU, and 
some calls to activate it to facilitate evacuation of Syrians to the EU.704 Neither the Commission 
nor any EU state has responded to calls to activate TPD.705 This seems remarkable for several 
reasons. First, the scale of the crisis seems to merit activation. Given the marathon efforts from 
the Commission and some EU states, notably Germany, to secure an EU wide temporary 
protection mechanism for a mass influx, it seems incongruous that there would be silence. 
Second, TPD secures a comprehensive set of obligations which addressed many of the 
criticisms of national temporary protection regimes in the 1990s.706 The Directive has been 
acknowledged as a benchmark in temporary protection mechanisms.707 
Given the ongoing crisis, the fact that no (political) calls are heard to activate the TPD requires 
exploration. As TPD was passed following experiences in Europe of mass influxes caused by 
the Yugoslavian wars, and as it records that the EU Commission and member states were 
exhorted to learn lessons from their responses, it is necessary to revisit that period and the 
responses to those influxes, to understand the expectations about what temporary protection 
would achieve for other mass influxes into the EU.708 
Structure of the paper 
The paper provides, first, some broader contexts against which it considers the development of 
temporary protection. The paper then considers two Yugoslavian conflicts and the resulting 
refugee influxes which are associated with the emergence of temporary protection in Europe: 
the Bosnian war 1992-1995 and the Kosovo crisis in 1999. The paper explores the early 
developments of the common European asylum system, (CEAS) which developed in parallel 
with the Yugoslavia influxes. It appraises the emergence of five elements of temporary 
                                                 
703 European Commission Press Release (22 September 2015) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
5698_en.htm> accessed 14 September 2016. 
704 See e.g. 
Cynthia Orchard and Dawn Chatty, ‘High time for Europe to offer temporary protection to refugees from Syria?’ 
(2014) <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/cynthia-orchard-dawn-chatty/high-time-for-
europe-to-offer-temporary-protection-to> accessed 6 January 2017; Cynthia Orchard and Andrew Miller, 
‘Protection in Europe for Refugees from Syria’ (2014) Refugees Studies Centre Forced Migration Policy 
Briefing 10 <http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/policy-briefing-series/pb10-protection-europe-
refugees-syria-2014.pdf> accessed 6 January 2017; European Parliament Motion (28 April 2015), 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+P8-RC-2015-
0367+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> accessed 6 January 2016;  Meltem Ineli-Ciger, ‘Time to Activate the 
Temporary Protection Directive: Why the Directive can Play a Key Role in Solving the Migration Crisis in 
Europe’ (2016) 18(1) European Journal of Migration and Law 1.  
705 cf Hanne Beirens and others, Study on the Temporary Protection Directive Final report, (2016) undertaken by 
ICF Consulting Services Limited sponsored by EU Commission 14, 16-17 available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/asylum/temporary-
protection/docs/final_report_evaluation_tpd_en.pdf> accessed 10 January 2017 (ICF Study on TPD). 
706 Jean-François Durieux, ‘Temporary Protection: Hovering at the Edges of Refugee Law’ (2014]) 45 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 221, 242-243; ECRE (2001) Information Note on Council Directive 2001/55/EC 
of 20 July 2001 (1 September 2001). 
707 Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime’ (2000) 94 American 
Journal of International Law 279, 305; UNHCR (2014), ‘Guidelines on Temporary Protection or Stay 
Arrangements’ available at <http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protection/expert/5304b71c9/guidelines-temporary-
protection-stay-arrangements.html> accessed 6 January 2017. 
708 Above note 1, Recital 6; see also note 55. 
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protection as reflected in the TPD. Finally, consideration is given to the responses of the EU to 
the 2015 refugee crisis, noting the significance of the relocation mechanisms, which have been 
innovated in lieu of activation of TPD, to relocate asylum seekers from Greece and Italy. The 
paper concludes that following their experiences of the Yugoslavian influxes, EU states were 
committed to an instrument on temporary protection but were not committed to implementing 
temporary protection.  
1990s- some contexts 
Three general observations can be made about the character of European and international 
politics in the 1990s which are integral to an understanding of the emergence of temporary 
protection and the subsequent concerns about its putative benefits and purpose.    
First, there was the rising migration numbers, and, from the perspective of EU states, this was 
dominated by an increasing asylum problem. In the 1970s the total number of asylum claims 
across Western Europe averaged no more than 13,000 annually.709 In the early 1980s, across 
the fifteen western European states that came to constitute the EU15710, there was a total of 
46,000 asylum claims. By the mid-1980s the numbers began to cause serious concern. By1985, 
the number had risen to 157,000. By 1990, asylum seekers were arriving from Afghanistan, 
Angola, Ghana, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Viet Nam and Zaire.711 To 
resist the trend European states put up a ‘battery’ of non-entrée policies.712 Hence not 
surprisingly the ‘Fortress Europe’ critique emerged.713  These policies did not see a reduction 
in asylum numbers and it has been suggested that they contributed to the increase as some 
would-be economic migrants turned to asylum as an entry route to avoid them.714 The 1990s 
became a decade of new record numbers of asylum claims as new groups of asylum seekers 
arrived from eastern Europe. In 1992, the EU15 received a high of 674,000 asylum claims.715 
The second context was the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the decade and 
the decline of its influence.716 The impact of this was both a period of political uncertainty in 
the international arena, and, as noted above, an increasing numbers of asylum applications in 
EU states from east Europeans.  
                                                 
709 Matthew J. Gibney, ‘Between Control and Humanitarianism: Temporary Protection in Contemporary Europe’ 
(2000) 14 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 689, 693. 
710 For a summary of states of EU in 1990s, see note 37. 
711 UNCHR, The State of the World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action (OUP) 156 available 
at <http://www.unhcr.org/3ebf9bb10.html> accessed 9 January 2017. 
712 Katy Long, The Point of No Return: Refugees, Rights and Repatriation (2013 OUP) 106; UNHCR, The State 
of the World’s Refugees, above note 18, 155. 
713 UNCHR, The State of the World’s Refugees, above note 18, 161;  
Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edn OUP 2003) 752. 
714 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda (1997 Chapter 5) 156 available at 
<www.unhcr.org/3eb7ba414.html> accessed 6 December 2016. 
715 See note 37. 
716 J M Roberts, The New Penguin History of the World (4th edn Penguin 2002) 1141. 
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The third observation is how international affairs were increasingly viewed and legitimised 
from a humanitarian perspective.717 The increasingly influential role of the media facilitated 
this.718  
The first major international crisis of the 1990s was the first Gulf War, January - February 
1991, where a UN authorised, American lead coalition successfully removed Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait.719 In the aftermath of this war a huge number of ethnic Kurds, estimated by some at 
two million, fled, most towards Turkey, after a failed coup attempt against the Iraqi regime. 
The Turkish government alarmed by the impending mass influx closed its border. A potential 
humanitarian disaster was averted by international intervention - an American lead operation 
to secure a ‘safe-haven’: a no-fly zone, to provide a protected space for the Iraqi Kurds. While 
there were incursions, the safe-haven was considered effective. 720  
The humanitarian cause was used to justify a new role for NATO721 for its interventions in the 
Yugoslav conflicts.722 
1990s- the Yugoslav conflicts 
The break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) into separate 
independent states was a complex series of bloody conflicts representing the first wars in 
Europe since the end of World War Two. The re-emergence of deep historical divisions along 
national lines and ethnic groupings shaped the series of conflicts and resulting displacements 
of huge numbers of people linked to ethnic cleansing.723 As one commentator has suggested, 
given the mix of ethnicities and nationalities, the conflicts ‘represented logical (if violent and 
brutal) steps towards coherent goals’.724 For the seceding states the goals were independence 
from an increasingly dominant Serbia, and in the process, to secure territory and protection of 
their ethnic compatriots. While pursuing nationalistic aims, armies and militia from all sides 
sought to intimidate, ethnically cleanse and expel minorities from their territories.  
Between 1991 and 1992, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, (Bosnia), Macedonia, and Slovenia 
declared themselves separate states, leaving Serbia, (with its two provinces, Vojvodina and 
Kosovo), and Montenegro, as the remainder of what was to be re-named the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia.725  Slovenia seceded first. The first major Yugoslavian conflict was the Croatian 
civil war between 1991 and 1995. During the war a UN force, UNPROFOR, was deployed to 
                                                 
717 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report – Conflict - International Response 
- Lessons Learned (2000 OUP) 186 (The Independent Kosovo Report); Adam Roberts, ‘The Role of Humanitarian 
Issues in International Politics in 1990s’ (1999) 81 (833) International Review of the Red Cross 19; UNHCR 
(Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit), The Kosovo Refugee crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR’s 
Emergency Preparedness and Response (Pre-publication edition) (Geneva 2000) vi: (UNHCR Kosovo Report). 
718 Adam Roberts, above note 24; The Independent Kosovo Report, above note 24, 6. 
719 J M Roberts, above note 23, 1130-1131. 
720 For example, see comments by Morten Kjaerum, note 56. 
721 J M Roberts, above note 23, 1148. 
722 Adam Roberts, above note 24; The Independent Kosovo Report, above note 24, 6. 
723 Above note 23, 1142-1143. 
724 Steven W Soward, ‘The Yugoslav Civil War: Lecture 25’ (1996) 
<http://staff.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/lect25.htm> accessed 19 December 2016. 
725 UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) website at  
<www.icty.org/en/about/what-former-yugoslavia> accessed 15 November 2016. 
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facilitate demilitarization and to monitor.726  
The second and bloodiest conflict was the Bosnian civil war, 1992-1995, with both Croatia and 
Serbia seeking to make gains from Bosnian territory at the expense of the majority Bosnian 
Muslims. As the conflict escalated UNPROFOR’s mandate was extended into Bosnia to create 
‘safe areas’ to deter attacks on and to protect ethnic Muslims populations in several areas 
including Sarajevo and Srebrenica. UNPROFOR proved to be wholly inadequate in Bosnia as 
Bosnian ethnic Serb forces attacked these areas with little impunity, sieging and bombing 
Sarajevo for the duration of the war, and notoriously killing thousands of Muslim men and 
boys in Srebrenica.727 After some hesitation, due to differences in the NATO alliance about 
strategy, but under pressure for a resolution to a worsening humanitarian crisis, NATO’s 
sustained and intense bombing of Serbian targets in 1995 was seen as instrumental in bringing 
the conflict to an end.728 In late 1995 the Dayton Peace agreement was signed.729   
These wars resulted in what were the largest refugee movements in Europe since World War 
Two. It has been suggested that the total number of displaced Bosnians was over three 
million.730 In 1992, the year with the highest number of recorded asylum applications across 
the 15 EU states, 224,000 were from those fleeing the conflicts in Yugoslavia, notably Bosnia, 
representing 33% of all applications.731 EU states implemented temporary protection 
arrangements for these refugees.  
In the late 1990s there was further disintegration and conflict as a Serbian-lead government 
sought to put down protests and guerrilla style attacks from Albanian-ethnic Kosovars seeking 
the independence of the Kosovo region from Serbian rule.732 In the spring of 1999, following 
increased intensity to the conflict and human rights abuses, there was a sudden and massive 
increase to the refugee flows, (quite possibly accelerated by NATO bombing).733 In a very short 
period very large numbers of Albanian-ethnic Kosovars, estimated around 800,000, fled to 
                                                 
726 UN Department of Public Information (1996) <www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm> 
accessed 6 January 2017. 
727 Barbara Crossette, ‘U.N. Details Its Failure to Stop '95 Bosnia Massacre’ The New York Times (New York, 16 
November 1999) <www.nytimes.com/1999/11/16/world/un-details-its-failure-to-stop-95-bosnia-massacre.html> 
accessed 6 January 2017; (ICTY) website ‘Facts about Srebrenica’ available at 
<www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/view_from_hague/jit_srebrenica_en.pdf> (note 31). 
728 UNHCR (Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit), above note 24, para 96. 
729 NATO website, ‘Peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ 
<www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52122.htm> accessed 15 November 2016. 
730 Kirsten Young, ‘UNHCR and ICRC in the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia-Herzegovina’ (2001) 83 International 
Review of the Red Cross 782-3. 
731 UNHCR data suggests that, the total number of all recorded asylum applications in the EU for 1992 was 
674,000. 
The data for numbers of recorded claims in the EU in 1990s comes mostly from UNHCR sources, in particular, 
‘Asylum Applications in Industrialized Countries: 1980-1999’ Tables III.28 and V.14 
<http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/3c3eb40f4.pdf> accessed 6 January 2017 (Figures extrapolated 
from these tables by author). (UNHCR 1980-1999). 
The 1990s EU data corresponds to fifteen states, (EU15): twelve were full members at the beginning of the 1990s 
and three were candidate states attaining full membership in 1995. The twelve were: Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK; the three states which attained 
full membership in 1995 were Sweden, Finland and Austria. See page x of UNHCR statistics.  
732 The Independent Kosovo Report above note 24, 50-98. 
733 UNHCR Kosovo Report above note 24, vi, 88: for a discussion about the extent to which NATO bombing 
accentuated or even caused displacement as well discussion on the legality of NATO intervention.  
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Albania and Macedonia.734 The Macedonian government closed the border and threatened to 
keep it closed unless there was an international agreement to share the burden.  The response, 
at the initiative of the US, involving several countries, including most EU countries, was an 
evacuation programme, under which states agreed to take quotas of refugees from the 
Macedonian border. There were around 90,000 evacuees, with 14 EU states accepting a total 
of 53,000 of these.735 EU states used temporary protection mechanisms for these evacuees. In 
June 1999 following NATO bombing, Serbian aggression in Kosovo ended when the Serbian 
parliament agreed to a peace plan for the withdrawal of Serb militarised forces, the deployment 
of UN personnel, the return of refugees and to respect substantial autonomy for Kosovo.736   
1990s – developing an EU asylum system 
During the 1990s the EU started developing its common European asylum system (CEAS): a 
system of harmonised law applicable across all EU states.737 While there were sound 
humanitarian reasons to develop common obligations and standards, it was the case, for reasons 
already noted, that this development was to address the growing asylum ‘problem’.738  
A common approach to the ‘problem’ was also intended to protect the EU’s internal market, 
designed to enable free movement for EU citizens, which, with the EU Schengen rules, required 
states to remove border controls between themselves.739 There was a particular risk to the 
functioning of the internal market of multiple asylum claims by the same person: an asylum 
claim denied in one state could be made in another state if nothing was done to deny this 
possibility and to reduce secondary movements between states. It made sense then to develop 
a common EU wide set of asylum rules to manage, reduce and eliminate multiple claims. 
A key innovation was the so-called Dublin transfer rules. The principle of these rules was, and 
remains, that an asylum seeker can make one claim only for asylum within the EU.740 The rules 
are to discourage and prevent multiple applications which as noted were recognised as 
                                                 
734 UNHCR Kosovo Report above note 24, para 74; The Independent Kosovo Report above note 24, 304-5. 
735 Greece did not receive any evacuees: UNHCR Kosovo Report above note 24, para 454; Joanne Van Selm (ed), 
Kosovo’s Refugees in the European Union (Pinter 2000) Appendix 2: 224. 
736 The Independent Kosovo Report above note 24, 95-97. 
737 Under the EU Treaties, Denmark, Ireland and UK have various forms of ‘opt-outs’ from obligations under EU 
asylum law.  While there are some differences between them in general they allow these states to choose, subject 
to consent by other EU states, which EU asylum laws they wish to adopt and which they do not. TPD does not 
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312-314.  
738 Home Office UK (Research, Development and Statistics Directorate), ‘An Assessment of the Impact  
of Asylum Policies in Europe 1990-2000’ Research Study 259 (June 2003) 3-4 available at 
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Study 259); UNHCR 1997 above note 21. 
739 Though not all states are bound by the Schengen rules. Ireland and UK are permitted to maintain border control, 
(Protocols 19, 20 to the EU Treaties); newly acceded states phase in abolition of border controls, according to the 
accession agreement with the EU. EU Treaties and Protocols [2016] OJ C202/1 available at  
< http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2016:202:TOC> accessed 14 January 2017. 
740 The current transfer rules are in a 2013 EU Regulation, 604/2013: European Parliament and Council Regulation 
604/2013 of 29 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person [2013] OJ  L180/1. 
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contributing to increasing numbers of asylum claims.741 The Dublin rules determine which one 
state is responsible for the claim.742  Under the rules it might not be the state in which the claim 
is made as an asylum seeker could have travelled through a number of EU states to reach a 
preferred state. The criterion more often applicable for determining responsibility is the state 
through which the asylum seeker first entered the EU. Given that entry is overwhelmingly 
through eastern and southern states, as seen in both the 1990s and 2015 influxes, the system 
places severe burdens on frontline states.743 
In 1997, EU states agreed the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was intended to provide a firm and 
coherent legal base to build the common asylum system.744Amsterdam incorporated formally 
into EU law the Dublin transfer rules and the Schengen rules abolishing border controls, (both 
of which had been developed by EU states but outside mainstream EU law).745 In addition, 
Amsterdam committed the EU institutions to develop a pan-EU temporary protection 
mechanism. 746 On 1 May 1999, day 39 of the NATO bombing in Serbia, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam changes came into force.747  The first post Treaty of Amsterdam instrument was 
TPD.748 
Yugoslav crises – emergence of European Temporary Protection 
As recitals 3 and 6 of TPD acknowledge, the experiences of the refugee influxes caused by the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, and their responses to them, contextualised the discussions and 
development of temporary protection. Note recital 6: 
On 27 May 1999, the Council adopted conclusions on displaced persons from 
Kosovo. These conclusions call on the Commission and the Member States to 
learn the lessons of their responses to the Kosovo crisis in order to establish 
                                                 
741 Nicholas Blake, ‘The Dublin Convention and Rights of Asylum Seekers in the European Union’ in Elspeth 
Guild and Carol Harlow (eds), Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law (Hart 
Publishing 2001) 104. 
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considered in this paper – see at section below, 2015 Refugee crisis: responses and temporary relocation; but the 
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Home Office Research Study 259 above note 45, 29-30; Nicholas Blake above note 48, 104; 
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744 Karoline Kerber, ‘Temporary Protection in The European Union: A Chronology’ (1999) 14 Georgetown 
Immigration Law Journal 35, 44, 49. 
745 Johannes Van Der Klaauw, ‘Towards a Common Asylum Procedure’ in Elspeth Guild and Carol Harlow (eds), 
Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law (Hart Publishing 2001). 
746 Under art 63(2) EC Treaty (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam), the Council adopt measures on refugees 
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(a) minimum standards for giving temporary protection to displaced persons from third countries who cannot 
return to their country of origin and for persons who otherwise need international protection, 
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of the European Union (TFEU), above note 42, 
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the measures in accordance with the Treaty.749 
Before looking at TPD, it is right to emphasise that the emergence of temporary protection was 
not separated from the politics about how to address and resist increasing migration into the 
EU particularly from asylum seekers. The maintenance of non-entrée policies, including by 
some states visa, requirements for Bosnian nationals at the height of the Bosnian conflict,750 
the promotion of ‘safe areas’ despite the risks, and the motivation for supporting the evacuation 
programmes in response to the Kosovo crisis, are indicative of clear policies to keep the crises 
and asylum seekers outside the EU as much as possible. Temporary protection emerged 
because not all refugees could be kept out: a response to spontaneous arrivals. It was not an 
admission of defeat.751 Temporary protection was a part of the control policies vis à vis the 
influxes.  
The emergence of temporary protection was controversial.  On the one hand, it had the support 
of UNHCR as an innovative response to the Yugoslavian refugee crises.752 On the positive 
side, by applying temporary protection, EU states accepted a humanitarian obligation to protect 
those fleeing war and conflict. On the other hand, there were concerns: UNHCR support for 
temporary protection did not insist that displaced people be treated as regular Convention 
refugees.753  There was no common set of EU obligations on the form and extent of protection 
- each state implemented its own arrangements.754 There were concerns that some states used 
temporary protection to avoid or water down obligations under the 1951 Convention.755 
Despite the varied approaches, it became accepted wisdom that temporary protection could be 
an appropriate response to mass influxes and so states moved towards converging on the key 
elements.756 TPD is the result of a decade long journey to an agreement.757  Using Joan 
Fitzpatrick’s nomenclature, this paper analyses the ‘elements’ of temporary protection through 
their formalization in TPD.758 
Elements of EU Temporary Protection 
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755 Joan Fitzpatrick above note 14, 279, 280. 
756 Home Office Research Study 259 above note 45,12.  
757 Karoline Kerber above note 51. 
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Elements of EU 
temporary protection  
Related provisions of TPD 
The purpose: a response 
providing immediate 
protection to a mass 
influx of displaced 
persons 
 
Recitals 2 and 8 
Article 1: purpose of directive in relation to mass influx of 
‘displaced persons’ 
Article 2(a): an exceptional procedure 
Article 2(a): particularly to protect asylum system from being 
overwhelmed 
Protection for a group 
fleeing conflict, war or 
violations of human 
rights 
Article 2(c): defines ‘displaced persons’  
Article 2(d): group(s) of displaced persons which benefit from 
TPD 
A mechanism enabling 
protection which does not 
undermine protection 
obligations, notably 
under 1951 
Convention759 
Recitals 10, 15, 16 and 18 
Article 5 and 25: procedure to activate  
Articles 8-15: protections and rights for beneficiaries of TPD 
Articles 17-19: right to access to regular asylum  
Solidarity:  promotion of 
sharing the burden 
between EU states760 
 
Recital 20 
Article 24: activation of TPD gives access to EU refugee 
funding 
Article 25:  states to indicate capacity to share the burden 
Article 26: process for transferring displaced persons between 
states including need for consent of such persons. 
End of temporary 
protection  
 
Recitals 13 and 19 
Article 4:  length of temporary protection and extensions 
Article 6:  ending of temporary protection 
Article 21: facilitating voluntary return 
Article 22: circumstances for enforced return  
Article 23:  circumstances when return may have to be delayed 
The purpose: a response providing immediate protection to a mass influx of displaced 
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persons 
Recital 2 acknowledges that TPD was created to provide an ‘exceptional’ arrangement for 
‘immediate temporary protection’ to ‘displaced persons’ arriving in the EU as part of a mass 
influx ‘who cannot return to the country of origin’.761 According to Article 2(d), the required 
characteristic of ‘mass influx’ is ‘arrival in the Community of a large number of displaced 
persons, who come from a specific country or geographical area, whether their arrival in the 
Community was spontaneous or aided …’.762 
There is no specified number or formula to determine precisely a ‘large number’ threshold.763  
Under article 2(a) risk to the functioning of the ‘asylum system’ is identified as a particular 
indicator that the influx is large so TPD applies.764 Avoiding failures in states asylum systems 
because of the pressure from large numbers was a clear factor in UNHCR’s support for 
temporary protection in Europe in the 1990s.765 Interestingly, Fitzpatrick considered that there 
were not many EU states whose asylum systems were at risk of failure even at the height of the 
influxes in 1992 and 1993.766 During the Kosovo crisis in 1999 the number of asylum claims 
across EU15 was 40% lower than the 1992 high, with no state under the level of pressure that 
was experienced by some in 1992-3; so it is even less likely that an EU state’s asylum system 
was overwhelmed.767 
No formula was applied in 1990s to determine a mass influx threshold and none applies for 
TPD. To activate TPD, the UNHCR criterion to avoid risk to the functioning of the asylum 
system, is a relevant but not contingent factor. Ultimately the decision to activate is, as it was 
in the 1990s, a matter of political choice (though temporary protection requires a majority vote 
in favour and, unlike in the 1990s, a state cannot now implement such arrangements on its 
own.768) The Commission has acknowledged the political rather than legal character of the 
activation trigger in its 2000 memorandum when proposing the first draft of the Directive, 
                                                 
761 Recital 2: Cases of mass influx of displaced persons who cannot return to their country of origin have become 
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767 In 1999 the EU state with the highest number of total recorded applications, 95,000 applications, was Germany 
(60% down on its 1992 number) of which 31,000 were from Yugoslavians; second was UK with 71,000 
applications, of which 14,000 were from Yugoslavia. 
768 above note 1, article 5. See also Peers, above note 6, 342, 345. 
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‘Finally, except that the number of people must be substantial, it is impossible to quantify in 
advance precisely what constitutes a mass influx. The decision establishing the existence of a 
mass influx will rest with the Council’.769 
The numbers of asylum seekers arriving in the EU in 2015 were unprecedented.770 It was 
universally acknowledged as the largest migration and humanitarian crisis in Europe for 
decades. Across the EU15, 1,044,000 applications were received during 2015.771 The previous 
high for these fifteen states, in 1992 during the Bosnian conflict, was 674,000.772 It is beyond 
dispute that the majority of the 2015 migrants were considered to be fleeing war and 
persecution with at least 363,000 fleeing Syria alone.773 Data shows that from 2014, Syrians 
had an EU-wide asylum recognition rate equal to or higher than 75%.774  The pressures on 
asylum systems caused by these numbers were real, acknowledged by the EU, and were a key 
reason why the EU decided to act.775 
While there is a lack of precision and clarity around the notion of ‘mass influx’ it is implausible 
to suggest that the scale of the crisis in 2015 could not be considered as having met the mass 
influx threshold of ‘arrival in the [EU] of a large number of displaced persons’.776  The 2015 
numbers climbed and exceed the scale of 1990 influxes, the pressures on asylum systems in 
2015 were at least as severe and widespread, if not more so, than 1990s. The unprecedented 
scale and pressures have been acknowledged universally. An understanding of the political 
calculations for leaving TPD on the shelf needs exploring. 
Protection for a group fleeing conflict, war or violations of human rights 
Temporary protection is associated with protection of a group of displaced persons. Fitzpatrick 
explained temporary protection in 1990s Europe as expanding the protection of forced migrants 
who could not satisfy the criteria under the 1951 Convention by giving group-based 
protection.777 Though, it is contested that the 1951 Convention is limited to individualised 
                                                 
769 Council Proposal (Com (2000) 303 Final) above note 60; cf Nuria Arenas, above note 5. 
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775 ibid.  
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2016-0066> accessed 10 January 2017; 
cf 2016 ICF Study on TPD above note 12. 
777 Joan Fitzpatrick, above note 10, 280. 
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protection and correspondingly does not provide protection to a group.778  Group recognition 
avoids this controversy and provides immediate protection. Temporary protection is then 
pragmatic, in providing refuge, avoiding delays (benefitting too those claiming asylum out-
with the ambit of the temporary protection mechanism), and avoiding an over legalistic or 
arguably an erroneous narrow interpretation of the protection obligation.  
TPD avoids the narrow interpretation of obligations. Under article 2(c) the ‘displaced persons’ 
beneficiaries are,  
third-country nationals or stateless persons who have had to leave their country or region of 
origin, or have been evacuated, in particular in response to an appeal by international 
organisations, and are unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the situation 
prevailing in that country, who may fall within the scope of Article 1A of the Geneva 
Convention or other international or national instruments giving international protection, in 
particular: 
(i) persons who have fled areas of armed conflict or endemic violence; 
(ii) persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or generalised 
violations of their human rights. 
The application of protection to a group is clear. Article 2(d) requires that the character of 
‘mass influx’ is ‘arrival in the Community of a large number of displaced persons, who come 
from a specific country or geographical area, whether their arrival in the Community was 
spontaneous or aided …’. Article 5 requires that both the proposal for activation and the final 
Decision to activate the temporary protection mechanism must include ‘a description of the 
specific groups of persons to whom the temporary protection applies’.779 
One final point which can be touched upon, but not developed here, is whether there was an 
assumption that temporary protection was only intended for a crisis involving displaced 
Europeans. There are pointers that some commentators and possibly the EU Commission at 
one time had this in mind.780 That said, it is clear from Article 2(c) that TPD applies to a group 
arriving from any region in the world as TPD explicitly protects ‘third country nationals or 
stateless persons’. 
It follows that TPD could have been activated to address en masse the protection needs to 
Syrians arriving in the EU in 2015.  
                                                 
778 Jean-François Durieux and Jane McAdam, ‘Non-Refoulement through Time: The Case for a Derogation Clause 
to the Refugee Convention in Mass Influx Emergencies’ (2004) 16 (1) International Journal of Refugee Law 4, 
10; UNHCR, Guidelines on Temporary Protection or Stay Arrangements (2014) above note 14. 
779 Emphasis added. 
780 Joan Fitzpatrick, above note 14,  297-9; Joanne van Selm-Thorburn, Refugee Protection in Europe: Lessons of 
the Yugoslav Crisis (Kluwer Law International 1998). 
Asha Hans and Astri Suhrke, ‘Responsibility Sharing’ in James C. Hathaway (ed) above note 58, 104-7, 8; 
Council Resolution of 25 September 1995 on burden-sharing with regard to the admission and residence of 
displaced persons on a temporary basis [1995] OJ C 262 (38) 1-3: sixth recital. 
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A mechanism enabling protection, which does not undermine obligations to protect 
notably under 1951 Geneva Convention 
Temporary protection was promoted by UNHCR for its pragmatism to address immediately a 
large-scale refugee influx. It has been noted that there were concerns though. These included 
the lack of a clear status for asylum seekers on temporary protection arrangements, the lack of 
welfare and social rights, and in some EU states, a denial of the right to regular asylum 
processes.781 One commentator opined that ‘Temporary protection introduces a qualitatively 
different approach, which negates the premise of the Geneva Convention’.782  
It was incumbent on the EU to address these concerns and it made sense to ensure a harmonised 
protection system to reduce risks of secondary movements within the EU caused by protection 
differentials between states.783  
According to Article 2(a), TPD activation is described as a ‘‘procedure’ to offer ‘immediate 
and temporary protection’ to displaced persons. TPD does not create an alternative form of 
protection to regular asylum.784 As has been noted, the process follows the political decision to 
activate. According to Article 5, the process commences with the Commission submitting a 
proposal, which may have been requested by a Member State, to the Council for temporary 
protection for a prescribed group or groups of displaced persons, giving an estimation of the 
scale of the mass influx. According to Article 25, EU states are then required to indicate, ‘in 
figures or in general terms’ their capacity to receive such persons. The Council, assessing the 
circumstances and the scale of the movements of displaced persons, votes on the proposal. 
Under article 5 activation is secured by qualified majority vote.  
It has been suggested that the procedure itself is a considerable blocker to activation.785  
However the activation process described above is straightforward. It does not, say, require 
complicated inter-institution processes, notably it does not require negotiation to secure the 
consent of the European Parliament, instead only that the latter be informed of activation.  But, 
it cannot be denied there would have been hurdles to overcome and fixes to be made. TPD 
                                                 
781 Joan Fitzpatrick above note 14, 286; ‘[EU states] responded by favoring temporary protection and avoiding 
grants of durable asylum; additional interim measures of protection were introduced in national law and practice 
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784 Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass 
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785 ICF Study on TPD above note 12, 19-23. 
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should have been transposed into the domestic law of all the MSs by the end of 2002.786 It has 
been reported that not all states have done this as required.787 The mechanics for operating the 
burden sharing transfer mechanism under Articles 26 and 27 are untested, and the requirement 
to achieve convergence between the consent of the proposed asylum seekers for transfer under 
Article 26.1, with the available places across EU states would have been challenging.788 Valid 
concern has been raised about how temporary protection status under TPD impacts on the 
operation of regular Dublin transfer rules as this is articulated poorly in Article 18.789 Achieving 
political solidarity for enough votes to pass may not have been straightforward of course – 
resistance by some states to the relocation Decisions, which are considered below, suggests 
this.790  But, these hurdles would have been overcome if the political will had been present. 
And this is the key point. 
TPD has harmonised a sound minimum set of rights.791 It addresses the key criticisms of 
national temporary protection arrangements it replaced.792 The rights include a right to a 
resident permit and access to necessary visas, right to work (but not necessarily equal priority 
with EU citizens), access to accommodation, welfare, healthcare and means of subsistence, 
access to education, rules on family reunification, and measures for unaccompanied minors.793 
Crucially, under Article 17, it secures access to regular asylum processes, though processing 
of the claim can be suspended during the period of operation of TPD. Therefore, activation 
would not have negated the premise of protection under the Geneva Convention.794 It is also 
pertinent to note that these rights are no more generous than equivalent rights under regular 
asylum processes, so the argument that activation would have acted as pull due to the perceived 
generosity of the rights is less tenable.795  
Therefore, there would have been some fixing to do to activate TPD effectively and it is the 
case that as it has never been activated it is untested with some unclear elements notably in 
relation to the burden sharing transfer rules and the fit with the Dublin transfer rules under 
Article 18. If the political will was in favour, it is suggested though, TPD would have been 
activated with the necessary fixes and guidelines. Advocates of refugee rights would not have 
                                                 
786 Article 32 TPD. 
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been concerned in the way they were in 1990s. In short, TPD addresses the earlier criticisms 
in providing an appropriate level of rights and protections.  
Solidarity: promotion of sharing the burden between EU states 
The physical sharing of the burden between states on some objective and fair basis is strongly 
associated with an effective response to a mass influx.796   It may be surprising to consider then 
there was no such burden sharing between EU states during the Yugoslavian crises. 797  
During the Bosnian influx, the reception of asylum seekers was uneven between states. 
Germany received far more than any other state because of geography: its proximity to 
Yugoslavia, its cultural and historical connections, and because it was more open to 
applications for protection.798  So, unsurprisingly Germany lead proposals for an EU wide 
burden sharing instrument. But there was no agreement799 as burden sharing became the most 
disputed element and block to reaching an agreement.800 It is for this reason why temporary 
protection became less attractive during the 1990s. After having used temporary protection for 
the Bosnian influx, there was reluctance and hesitation to use it again to address the Kosovo 
crisis: 
When open conflict erupted in Kosovo in both 1998 and 1999, European governments were 
at first reluctant to repeat the temporary protection experiment. They continued to channel 
asylum seekers from Kosovo into regular status determination procedures, as had been the 
case throughout the 1990s. 801  
Germany’s experience of carrying the burden of Bosnian refugees had a direct influence of its 
reluctance to participate in the Kosovar evacuation programmes.802 Germany did reluctantly 
participate, like most EU states, but these programmes were not based on any EU agreement 
for a division and sharing of numbers, instead each state admitted, (or did not), according to its 
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own reception capacity and political will.803  
These experiences are reflected in the burden sharing provision in TPD. While, as has been 
noted, the Amsterdam Treaty changes required EU states to settle a common position on burden 
sharing, the obligation did not settle the divisions over burden sharing. Instead TPD reflects 
the existence of the divisions.804 As unanimity was required to secure a burden sharing 
mechanism there was little chance of agreeing something radically different. 
Under TPD, following a proposal from the Commission, Article 25 requires that states,  
‘shall receive [displaced persons] in a spirit of Community solidarity. They shall indicate 
– in figures or in general terms - their capacity to receive such persons. This information 
shall be set out in the Council Decision referred to in Article 5.’ 
The obligation to act in a ‘spirit of Community solidarity’ lacks juridical force beyond a 
requirement to consider burden sharing. This is a weak obligation. This is clear, as there is no 
obligation to declare a minimum capacity vis à vis criteria. The obligation does not require 
even a statement of reasons. At best, it amounts to a “pledging” mechanism but one under 
which a state can pledge a lack of capacity. This weakness, and a corresponding pessimism in 
its effectiveness, is clear in the title of TPD as ‘a measure promoting a balance of efforts 
between Member States in receiving persons and the consequences thereof.’805 
TPD does not change the status quo evident in the 1990s: states were not then, and are not now 
under TPD, committed to accepting any burden. TPD is thus no paradigm shift.806 As Durieux 
has commented, ‘[i]t appears that no member state was more willing in 2001 than in 1992 to 
commit to a predictable formula for the distribution of responsibilities and costs.’807 
Burden sharing would have obviously benefitted frontline states such as Germany, Hungary, 
Italy and Greece since the 2015. Yet it is telling there is no indication that any of these states 
sought to start the activation process. It is suggested that given the Yugoslavian experiences 
and the failure to secure a radical shift to an effective and legally binding burden sharing 
mechanism, the TPD inherited the divisions on solidarity.808  
The End of temporary protection  
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The defining element of temporary protection is plainly the notion of temporary. What is 
temporary though in this context: the duration of the mechanism or the duration of the 
protection, or both? How does temporary fit with obligations to refugees under international 
law, notably not to return persons in need of protection when the cause of flight is still 
prevailing – the principle of non refoulement? In short, when does temporary protection end 
and what are the consequences following the end? 
There are two competing conceptions about what happens after temporary protection ends. 
While both conceptions have the same beginning: a pragmatic arrangement to cast a safety net 
to secure immediate protection of a group, they differ on what then follows. On one view, 
temporary protection is an exception to regular international refugee law, and there should be 
ultimately a return of the asylum seekers to the country of origin. The alternative view is that, 
return of asylum seekers to the country of origin is but one possible solution. These competing 
conceptions are considered in turn.  
The return view is driven by the politics of the receiving state and specifically its control 
agenda. At the end of the period of protection there is an expectation of a return to the state or 
region of origin. Temporary protection functions as ‘a bar to the possibility of permanent 
resettlement being considered as a durable solution to flight: ‘solution’ is understood in terms 
of repatriation alone.’809  
The attraction to states of this conception is clear. It means that a state can seemingly fulfil its 
international humanitarian obligations to protect while maintaining ultimate control over 
immigration numbers.810 Put another way, if states are prepared to widen the protection net at 
a time when they are subject to high levels of asylum, then there needs to be a plausible 
rationale that can also assure the public at large - this is temporary protection.811 
Under this control and return model the length of the protection ‘lasts only for the duration of 
the risk that forces them to seek refuge’.812 However, as Kjaerum and others have correctly 
identified, the return conception operates on an assumption ‘that the refugees will only be living 
in [the state of asylum] for a relatively short period, and certainly shorter than what is normally 
anticipated in a refugee situation.’813   
Which basis could such an assumption be maintained on? It will be recalled that with end of 
the Cold War and extensive media interest in humanitarian causes, there was a cycle of 
humanitarian interventions leading to expectations for more: 
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 ‘The temporary nature of refugee status may in time come to be more extensively explored 
following the desire of the international community to provide resources for the speedy 
ending of violent conflicts, and to act upon its unwillingness to accept gross violations of 
human rights in a particular country or region. The international community will concentrate 
its efforts on ensuring that civil wars and wars last as short a time as possible; witness the 
situation in Northern Iraq, Somalia and to some extent also Croatia and Bosnia … As far as 
refugees are concerned this political development will result in expectations of their return 
within a foreseeable period of time, a possibility which was not considered for most refugees 
during the Cold War….’814 
At that time, there was a degree of confidence in the will of the international community to 
act.815 Commentators could point to evidence for speedier resolutions to conflicts.816 The 
ending of the Yugoslavian wars, were, as noted by Kjaerum, part of the proof that there was a 
post-Cold War international resolve. The Bosnian war was effectively ended by NATO 
bombing with repatriation a key outcome of the peace agreement.817 The 1999 Kosovo 
displacement crisis was over within weeks, again following NATO bombing, with immediate 
mass returns. As Fitzpatrick noted, ‘[t]he Kosovo experience, by restoring faith that some mass 
influxes are genuinely temporary, may reinvigorate enthusiasm for temporary protection, 
which had flagged during the endgame to the Bosnian refugee crisis’.818    
In this context the UNHCR could not but consider the link with temporary protection 
arrangements, ‘[o]ne of the principal reasons for applying the term ‘temporary’ to protection 
given to persons fleeing conflicts or acute crises in their country of origin is the expectation – 
or at least the hope – that international efforts to resolve the crisis will, within a fairly short 
period, produce results that will enable the refugees to exercise their right to return home in 
safety’.819 Temporary protection arrangements for asylum seekers escaping Yugoslavia were 
tried in the ‘the expectation – or at least the hope’ that efforts of the international community 
to address the root causes of the conflicts would lead to an ending of the causes of flight.820   
However, there is another view about what temporary protection can achieve. While Fitzpatrick 
noted the mood change in the international environment, her position on temporary protection 
was more circumspect.821 Her description of the competing conception was ‘as a short-term 
strategy to secure the immediate physical safety of refugees and a way station to more durable 
protection’.822 There is no fixation on an end result with this conception. Indeed the ‘way 
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station’ ‘may well be a prelude to permanent settlement’.823  
EU states enthusiasm for temporary protection ‘had flagged during the endgame to the Bosnian 
refugee crisis’.824 This was because their own experiences of temporary protection showed that 
the expectation of return was not necessarily the outcome. While Germany, which hosted the 
majority of refugees from the Bosnian conflict, repatriated most, perhaps around 250,000 of 
approximately 350,000 Bosnian refugees, that is over 70%, the repatriation programme was 
subject to severe and widespread criticisms on the basis that many were forced to return to 
circumstances where it was not safe.825 Given the difficulties of forced return and the fragile 
peace, research has shown that most states did not force return and that in the majority of EU 
states Bosnians asylum seekers stayed.826 The view that temporary protection cannot be fixed 
on return is borne out by these facts. As Gibney commented in the 1990s, ‘states gambled on 
the fact that the conflict from which they took refugees would be short in duration’.827 
Given the need to reach agreement across all EU states perhaps it should not be a surprise that 
both conceptions of temporary protection, control and return and way station are provided for 
in TPD.  
Recitals 13 and 19 emphasise the expectation of return: 
Recital 13: ‘Given the exceptional character of the provisions established by this Directive 
in order to deal with a mass influx or imminent mass influx of displaced persons from third 
countries who are unable to return to their country of origin, the protection should be of 
limited duration.’  
Recital 19: Provision should be made for principles and measures governing the return to 
the country of origin and the measures to be taken by Member States in respect of persons 
whose temporary protection has ended. 828 
Article 20 states that at the end of the temporary protection period the ‘general laws on 
protection apply’. Article 21 requires states to take measures to enable voluntary return. Article 
22 states, 
1. The Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that the enforced return 
of persons whose temporary protection has ended and who are not eligible for 
admission is conducted with due respect for human dignity. 
2.  In cases of enforced return, Member States shall consider any compelling humanitarian 
reasons which may make return impossible or unreasonable in specific cases.  
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Article 22.1 permits forced returns.829 However, this cannot be assured as TPD does not 
predicate the end of protection on an assumption about an end of the cause of displacement. At 
the end of the temporary protection period article 22.2 clearly precludes a state from forcing a 
return when it would violate its international humanitarian obligations. Further, as noted earlier, 
article 17 grants access to the regular asylum process, which, while it can be delayed, cannot 
be denied.  
Turning to 2015 crisis, it became clear that the complexity of the Syrian war and the very 
different mood in the international community, made any assumptions or expectations about 
the end impossible. The most certain prediction could only be that Syrian refugees in the EU 
would need to be given refugee for an indefinite period. Since the arrival of Syrian refugees, 
EU statements and actions have pointed to this. The EU Commission has acknowledged that 
the end to the refugee crisis in Europe is directly linked to the end of the root causes but 
conspicuously, (but also understandably), makes no reference to any indicators of how and 
when it sees an end to the war.830 The Commission has even suggested linkage between the 
influx and the longer-term demographic challenge of an aging EU population.831  
If repatriation is the reason for states to consider temporary protection, then their experiences 
from the 1990s show that expecting this is a gamble. As Gibney commented aptly, ‘States have 
no reason to support temporary protection if it proves simply to be an extended pathway to 
permanent immigration’.832 In the final analysis, TPD is a way station to possible outcomes, 
one might be return but another could be permanent residence as was the outcome for Bosnians 
in most EU states in the 1990s. 
The 2015 Refugee crisis: responses and temporary relocation 
In this final section consideration is given to the steps the EU has taken and proposed to address 
the 2015 refugee crisis. An outline of the key actions is provided as they relate to the issues in 
this paper. It has been suggested that if there was the political will TPD would have been 
activated. The reasons why it has not been activated and why there has been no support for 
activation from either the Commission or the frontline states find their origins in EU states long 
history of failure in solidarity which TPD does not fix, and, that temporary protection would 
have represented a clear risk to the setting of expectations of control and return.  
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Throughout the 2015 crisis TPD remained on the shelf.833 A raft of proposals and measures 
were however passed.834 The May 2015 European Agenda on Migration set out seven key 
actions to address the immediate crisis.835 These included EU resources to help frontline states 
process asylum claims and proposals for temporary and permanent mechanisms to relocate 
asylum seekers from states under the most pressure to other states.836 The temporary relocations 
proposals have been implemented through two EU instruments. The first instrument was an 
EU Decision passed in May 2015.837 This Decision seeks to relocate up to 40,000 Syrian, Iraqi 
and Eritrean asylum seekers from Greece and Italy. 838 The second instrument increased the 
quotas by another 120,000 to a total of 160,000 relocations.839 Both Decisions are ‘provisional’ 
meaning that the period for relocations is time-limited to September 2017.840 These Decisions 
constitute a temporary derogation from the normal Dublin transfer rules for determining the 
responsible state for asylum claims from Syrians, Iraqis and Eritreans, by diverting 
responsibility for up to 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other states.841 Both 
decisions acknowledge that the EU acted to address the ‘unprecedented’ flows of migrants in 
clear need of protection putting ‘significant pressure of asylum systems.842  
These Decisions are novel in that, for the first time, burden sharing is secured as a legal 
obligation. The Treaty basis for these decisions is Article 78.3, which states: 
In the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation 
characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal 
from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member 
State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.843 
That enough EU states considered that this provision applied to the crisis there can be no doubt. 
It has been shown that TPD could have applied too. While not worded identically, the scope of 
                                                 
833 cf Peers above note 6. 
834 Summarized in Meltem Ineli-Ciger above note 11, 6-12. 
835 Commission Communication of 13 May 2015, ‘A European Agenda on Migration’ above note 138. 
836 Denmark, Ireland and UK are not bound by the Decisions and do not participate in them following their opt-
outs permitted under EU law: recitals 39 and 40 May Decision 2015/1523 (n 144); recitals 46, 47 and 59 of the 
September Decision 2015/1601 above note 146; see also above note 44. 
837 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece [2015] OJ L 239/146 (May relocation Decision). 
838 Despite being a frontline state under severe pressure Hungary refused to support the relocation mechanisms. 
839 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece [2015] OJ L248/80 (September Relocation Decision). 
840 ibid article 13. 
841 See above note 47. 
842 September Relocation Decision above note 146, recital 10: Among the Member States witnessing situations 
of considerable pressure and in light of the recent tragic events in the Mediterranean, Italy and Greece in 
particular have experienced unprecedented flows of migrants, including applicants for international protection 
who are in clear need of international protection, arriving on their territories, generating significant pressure on 
their migration and asylum systems; also May relocation Decision above note 144, recital 9. 
843 EU Treaties and Protocols [2016] OJ C202/1 above note 46. 
the original value of article 78.3, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, may relate to the fact that measures 
under it can be taken by qualified majority voting whereas back in 1999 temporary protection measures could 
only be passed under the Treaty by unanimity:  Kerber above note 51, 46: ‘The new Article 64(2) contains a very 
important innovation. By qualified majority, the Council may, upon proposal by the Commission and without 
prejudice to paragraph 1 adopt measures valid for no more than six months for the benefit of a Member State that 
is confronted with an emergency situation of mass influx. In such cases, the Council may use a simplified voting 
procedure that is more likely to lead to a quick decision’. cf above note 53. 
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article 78.3 of the Treaty and TPD overlap extensively. The 2015 crisis can be interpreted as 
both a ‘mass influx of displaced persons’ and as an ‘emergency situation characterised by a 
sudden inflow’ of nationals of third countries.844 The EU Commission is proposing to make 
further amendments to the Dublin transfer rules by adding a trigger for a  permanent relocation 
mechanism based upon a ‘corrective’ formula which would automatically apply to redistribute 
asylum claims in ‘situations of disproportionate pressure on Member States’ asylum 
systems’.845  
Perhaps the most significant response will prove to be the November 2015 Joint Action Plan 
with Turkey. Under this Plan, Turkey, which has been one of the major places of departure to 
the EU, agrees, for a substantial EU pay-out, to act to deter and prevent irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers leaving its territory for the EU. 846 
As in 1990s the EU seeks to keep the asylum problem as much as possible outside the EU 
borders, this time in Turkey.  However, for spontaneous arrivals this time, there has been almost 
complete silence on temporary protection, because the preferred approach has become 
relocations within the EU. 847 
Conclusion 
The interventions in Yugoslavia and the responses to the refugee influxes served a 
humanitarian purpose. However, these interventions and the responses to the influxes were 
predicated on the need to control refugee numbers, and as far as possible, to keep the problem 
outside the EU. EU support for the risky, and tragically ill-fittingly named, ‘safe areas’, 
maintenance of visa restrictions, and resistance to burden sharing are all evidence of this.  The 
(valid) narrative of keeping refugees close to their homes to counter ethnic cleansing, helped 
served this purpose.   
Temporary protection did emerge in Europe during the Yugoslavian wars as a response to large 
influxes into the EU, despite the EU’s efforts to keep asylum seekers away. Temporary 
protection was for most, if not all states, part of their battery of policies to deflect mass influxes 
and minimize the impact of asylum immigration. There was at first some enthusiasm for it as 
it seemingly offered a way of balancing international humanitarian obligations with controlling 
                                                 
844 ibid; 2015 European Parliament Motion (28 April 2015) (n 10) para 6: European Parliament ‘Calls on the 
Member States to make full use of the existing possibilities for issuing humanitarian visas at their embassies and 
consular offices; points out, in this connection, that the Council should seriously consider the possibility of 
triggering the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive or Article 78(3) of the TFEU, both of which foresee a 
solidarity mechanism in the case of mass and sudden inflows of displaced persons…’. 
845 European Commission Proposal of 4 May 2016 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person (recast) COM (2016) 270 final: 4, 17-18 available at <https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/20160504/dublin_reform_proposal_en.pdf>  accessed 12 January 2017. 
846 European Commission Infographic: Managing The Refugee Crisis EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan: 
Implementation Report available at <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/managing_the_refugee_crisis_-_eu-
turkey_join_action_plan_implementation_report_20160210_en.pdf> accessed 12 January 2017. 
847cf ICF Study on TPD above note 12, 38, a passing reference to temporary protection in a proposed revision of 
art 2 of the Dublin Regulation. 
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numbers. But it proved to be a gamble. 
Any view that temporary protection proved to be a preferred or an effective solution is not 
borne out by the evidence.  Temporary protection could not support the balancing of obligations 
to refugees and controlling admission numbers. While there were mass returns of Bosnians 
following the end of the Bosnian war, these were from one state, Germany, because of the 
disproportionate burden borne by it due to a failure to secure an agreement to share the load.  
The manner and timing of the repatriations attracted wide criticism. The difficulties Germany 
experienced informed responses of Germany and other EU states to the Kosovo crisis in 1999. 
Following the experiences of spontaneous arrivals from Bosnia, temporary protection was not 
in the main preferred for the spontaneous arrivals during the Kosovo crisis. Temporary 
protection was mainly for those who arrived through the evacuation programmes, but even 
then, EU states were prepared to accept only very modest numbers, or, in the case of one state, 
none. 
TPD was passed because the Amsterdam Treaty made it a binding obligation to pass an EU 
wide instrument. The characteristic of the 2015 crisis was within the framework of the TPD. 
There have been calls to activate TPD but in truth they have been limited. Significantly the 
support for activation has been lukewarm from UNHCR, a key influence on the emergence of 
temporary protection in 1990s.848 It is also telling that neither the EU Commission nor any EU 
state has called for activation of TPD.  
The shelving of TPD in the face of the 2015 crisis cannot be explained by technical or 
interpretative ambiguities or problems associated with the TPD. These are excuses. The fact is 
TPD is no game changer. It was constructed on the same politics of immigration control, and 
by the end of the 1990s, temporary protection showed it limits to support this. TPD has no 
answer to the lack of solidarity around burden sharing.849 Temporary protection would have 
served no beneficial purpose for EU states, (or for Syrian asylum seekers), and would have 
been a way station to regular asylum within in the EU. 
 
 
  
                                                 
848 For example, UNHCR communication (10 September 2015) ‘UNHCR’s proposals in light of the EU response 
to the refugee crisis and the EU package of 9 September 2015’: ‘UNHCR recalls that the EU Temporary Protection 
Directive 2001/55/EC (TPD), which has never been activated, was designed to ensure a uniform status rights 
across the EU and would allow for fast and simplified processing, resulting in efficiency gains and cost reductions 
for national asylum systems. The TPD foresees the activation of a solidarity relocation mechanism, financial 
support and a reception element. With or without the activation of this directive it is important that these objectives 
are pursued’. Available at <www.unhcr.org/55f28c4c9.html> accessed 2 December 2016; 
ECRE interview with Volker Türk 23 October 2015 available at <www.ecre.org/ecre-interviews-volker-tuerk-
we-need-to-remember-why-asylum-was-so-necessary-when-it-was-first-instituted-and-why-it-is-so-necessary-
now> accessed 6 January 2017. 
849 Nor do the January 2017 relocations figures give reason to believe the binding relocation quotas will 
significantly enhance fair and effective burden sharing: a little over 10,000 transfers have taken place since 2015 
out of the 160,000 quota; data available at <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf> accessed 13 
January 2017. 
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